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Macroeconomic Implications of Consumer Default Policies, Mortgage
Bailout Guarantees & Unemployment Insurance
Abstract
In this dissertation, I examine the effects of three broad government interventions in the economy: 1)
bankruptcy and foreclosure laws; 2) bailout guarantees in the mortgage market; and 3) unemployment
insurance.
In the first chapter, I develop a general-equilibrium model of housing and default to jointly analyze the effects
of bankruptcy and foreclosure policies. Heterogeneous households have access to mortgages and unsecured
credit and can default separately on both types of debt. I show that the interaction between foreclosure and
bankruptcy decisions is crucial for explaining the observed cross-state correlation between default policies
and default rates. I use the model to argue that a major recent reform to bankruptcy has unintended
consequences: it substantially increases bankruptcy rates, despite being intended to reduce them, and also
increases foreclosure rates. Nevertheless, the reform yields large welfare gains.
In the second chapter, I ask what are the macroeconomic and distributional effects of
government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (e.g.,
Fannie Mae)? A model with heterogeneous, infinitely-lived households and
competitive housing and mortgage markets is constructed to evaluate this
question. Households can default on their mortgages via foreclosure. The
bailout guarantee is a tax-financed mortgage interest rate subsidy.
Eliminating this subsidy leads to a large decline in mortgage origination
and increases aggregate welfare by 0.5\% in consumption equivalent
variation, but has little effect on foreclosure rates and housing
investment. The interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy: it hurts
low-income and low-asset households.
Finally, I evaluate the positive and normative implications of unemployment benefits. In the third chapter, we
exploit a policy discontinuity at U.S. state borders to identify the effects of unemployment insurance policies
on unemployment. Our estimates imply that most of the persistent increase in unemployment during the
Great Recession can be accounted for by the unprecedented extensions of unemployment benefit eligibility.
In contrast to the existing recent literature that mainly focused on estimating the effects of benefit duration on
job search and acceptance strategies of the unemployed -- the micro effect -- we focus on measuring the
general equilibrium macro effect that operates primarily through the response of job creation to
unemployment benefit extensions. We find that it is the latter effect that is very important quantitatively.
The last three recessions in the United States were followed by jobless recoveries: while labor productivity
recovered, unemployment remained high. In the fourth chapter, we argue that countercyclical unemployment
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1373
benefit extensions lead to jobless recoveries. We augment the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model to
incorporate unemployment benefit expiration and state-dependent extensions of unemployment benefits. In
the model, an extension of unemployment benefits raises the outside option of unemployed workers in wage
bargaining, thereby reducing firm profits from hiring and slowing down the recovery of vacancy creation in
the aftermath of a recession. We calibrate the model to US data and show that it is quantitatively consists with
observed labor market dynamics, in particular the emergence of jobless recoveries after 1985. Furthermore,
counterfactual experiments indicate that unemployment benefits are quantitatively important in explaining
jobless recoveries.
In the fifth chapter, we use an equilibrium search model with risk-averse workers to characterize the optimal
cyclical behavior of unemployment insurance. Contrary to the current US policy, we find that the path of
optimal unemployment benefits is pro-cyclical - positively correlated with productivity and employment.
Furthermore, optimal unemployment benefits react non-monotonically to a productivity shock: in response
to a fall in productivity, they rise on impact but then fall significantly below their pre-recession level. As
compared to the current US unemployment insurance policy, the optimal state-contingent unemployment
benefits smooth cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and deliver substantial welfare gains.
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ABSTRACT
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER
DEFAULT POLICIES, MORTGAGE BAILOUT
GUARANTEES & UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Kurt E. Mitman
Dirk Krueger
In this dissertation, I examine the effects of three broad government interventions
in the economy: 1) bankruptcy and foreclosure laws 2) bailout guarantees in the
mortgage market 3) unemployment insurance.
In the first chapter, I develop a general-equilibrium model of housing and default
to jointly analyze the effects of bankruptcy and foreclosure policies. Heterogeneous
households have access to mortgages and unsecured credit and can default separately
on both types of debt. I show that the interaction between foreclosure and bankruptcy
decisions is crucial for explaining the observed cross-state correlation between default
policies and default rates. I use the model to argue that a major recent reform
to bankruptcy has unintended consequences: it substantially increases bankruptcy
rates, despite being intended to reduce them, and also increases foreclosure rates.
Nevertheless, the reform yields large welfare gains.
In the second chapter, I ask what are the macroeconomic and distributional effects
of government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (e.g., Fannie
Mae)? A model with heterogeneous, infinitely-lived households and competitive hous-
ing and mortgage markets is constructed to evaluate this question. Households can
default on their mortgages via foreclosure. The bailout guarantee is a tax-financed
mortgage interest rate subsidy. Eliminating this subsidy leads to a large decline in
mortgage origination and increases aggregate welfare by 0.5% in consumption equiv-
v
alent variation, but has little effect on foreclosure rates and housing investment. The
interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy: it hurts low-income and low-asset house-
holds.
Finally, I evaluate the positive and normative implications of unemployment ben-
efits. In the third chapter, we exploit a policy discontinuity at U.S. state borders to
identify the effects of unemployment insurance policies on unemployment. Our esti-
mates imply that most of the persistent increase in unemployment during the Great
Recession can be accounted for by the unprecedented extensions of unemployment
benefit eligibility. In contrast to the existing recent literature that mainly focused on
estimating the effects of benefit duration on job search and acceptance strategies of
the unemployed – the micro effect – we focus on measuring the general equilibrium
macro effect that operates primarily through the response of job creation to unem-
ployment benefit extensions. We find that it is the latter effect that is very important
quantitatively.
The last three recessions in the United States were followed by jobless recover-
ies: while labor productivity recovered, unemployment remained high. In the fourth
chapter, we argue that countercyclical unemployment benefit extensions lead to job-
less recoveries. We augment the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model to incorporate
unemployment benefit expiration and state-dependent extensions of unemployment
benefits. In the model, an extension of unemployment benefits raises the outside
option of unemployed workers in wage bargaining, thereby reducing firm profits from
hiring and slowing down the recovery of vacancy creation in the aftermath of a reces-
sion. We calibrate the model to US data and show that it is quantitatively consists
with observed labor market dynamics, in particular the emergence of jobless recover-
ies after 1985. Furthermore, counterfactual experiments indicate that unemployment
benefits are quantitatively important in explaining jobless recoveries.
In the fifth chapter, we use an equilibrium search model with risk-averse workers
vi
to characterize the optimal cyclical behavior of unemployment insurance. Contrary
to the current US policy, we find that the path of optimal unemployment benefits is
pro-cyclical - positively correlated with productivity and employment. Furthermore,
optimal unemployment benefits react non-monotonically to a productivity shock: in
response to a fall in productivity, they rise on impact but then fall significantly below
their pre-recession level. As compared to the current US unemployment insurance
policy, the optimal state-contingent unemployment benefits smooth cyclical fluctua-
tions in unemployment and deliver substantial welfare gains.
vii
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MACROECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER
DEFAULT POLICIES,
MORTGAGE BAILOUT
GUARANTEES &
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
2
Chapter 1
Macroeconomic Effects of Bankruptcy and
Foreclosure Policies
In the United States, households hold two types of debt, secured and unsecured, and
they hold large amounts of it, currently averaging more than 100 percent of disposable
income. There are two channels for defaulting on this debt: bankruptcy for unsecured
borrowing and foreclosure for secured mortgage borrowing. Households exercise these
default options in substantial numbers - in 2010 more than 1.5 million households filed
for bankruptcy and more than 1 million homes were foreclosed. In this paper, I use a
calibrated structural model to argue that the two channels for default - bankruptcy
and foreclosure - are fundamentally linked by household behavior. Understanding
this link is critical for explaining the observed cross-state variation in bankruptcy
and foreclosure rates and evaluating the consequences of reforms to bankruptcy and
foreclosure policies.
Despite being separate legal processes, bankruptcy and foreclosure can be com-
plements or substitutes: bankruptcy may prevent foreclosure by discharging a house-
hold’s unsecured debt, thereby freeing up income for making mortgage payments.
On the other hand, foreclosure could lead to bankruptcy if banks can sue households
who default on their mortgages to recoup losses (in addition to seizing their homes).
Further, households take into account the different channels for default when choos-
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ing the optimal composition of secured and unsecured debt in their portfolios. Thus,
a change to bankruptcy laws, for example, may impact secured credit holdings and
foreclosure rates if households respond by adjusting their debt portfolios.
The fraction of households that choose to exercise the bankruptcy or foreclosure
option varies greatly across U.S. states. In 2010, bankruptcy rates ranged from a low
of 0.4 percent of households in Alaska to a high of 2.9 percent of households in Nevada.
Similarly, foreclosure rates ranged from 0.4 percent of mortgages in North Dakota to
2.9 percent of mortgages in Nevada. A natural candidate to explain the cross-state
variation in default rates is the variation in state bankruptcy and foreclosure laws.
States vary significantly in two pertinent dimensions of default law: the homestead
exemption in bankruptcy and recourse in foreclosure. The homestead exemption spec-
ifies how much home equity the household can keep after the discharge of unsecured
debt when a household files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In recourse states, after for-
feiting their home, foreclosed households are still liable for the difference between
the recovered value of the house and the face value of the mortgage, as opposed to
no-recourse states where households can walk away from their mortgages with no ad-
ditional liability. In Figures 1.1(a) and 1.1(b), I plot state bankruptcy and foreclosure
rates as a function of the homestead exemption. The figures illustrate the significant
variation in default rates and laws across states. In addition, Figure 1.1(a) illus-
trates a negative correlation between the generosity of the bankruptcy law and the
bankruptcy rate. This relationship is striking: one might expect that more generous
bankruptcy laws would make households more likely to go bankrupt. In fact, in an
empirical study Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) find that a household’s chance of going
bankrupt is increasing in the financial benefit from doing so. However, micro analysis
is silent on whether portfolios of debt held by households are systematically different
in states with different homestead exemptions. If more generous bankruptcy policies
result in higher interest rates on unsecured debt, they may lead to lower unsecured
4
 
NC 
WA 
AK 
CA 
ND 
MT 
AZ 
MN 
IA 
MD 
KY 
IN 
TN 
VA 
GA 
OH 
SC 
AL 
IL 
MO 
LA 
NY 
WY 
NJ 
NE 
MI 
PA 
HI 
OR 
WV 
UT 
WI 
AR 
DE 
CO 
ID 
NM 
ME 
NH 
MS 
CT 
NV 
VT 
RI 
MA 
DC 
FL 
KS 
OK 
TX 
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
B
an
kr
u
p
tc
y 
R
at
e
 (
1
9
9
5
-2
0
0
4
) 
Homestead Exemption 
(in Multiples of Median Household Income) 
No Recourse
Recourse
    Unlimited 
(a) State bankruptcy rates
 
NC 
WA 
AK 
CA 
ND 
MT 
AZ 
MN 
IA 
MD 
KY 
IN 
TN 
VA G  
OH 
SC 
AL 
IL 
MO 
LA 
NY 
WY 
NJ 
NE MI 
PA 
HI 
OR 
WV UT 
WI 
AR 
DE 
CO 
ID 
NM 
ME 
NH 
MS 
CT 
NV 
VT 
RI MA 
DC 
FL 
KS 
OK 
TX 
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fo
re
cl
o
su
re
 R
at
e
 (
1
9
9
4
-1
9
9
9
) 
Homestead Exemption 
(in units of Median Household Income) 
No Recourse
Recourse
    Unlimited 
(b) State foreclosure rates
Figure 1.1: Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Rates Across States.
Notes: The homestead exemptions in terms of median income is calculated by state law for the homestead
exemption in the year 2000 and median household income from the Census in 2000. Average state
bankruptcy rates 1995-2004 are computed using bankruptcy filings from the American Bankruptcy
Institute and the number of households in each state from the Census. Average state foreclosure rates
1994-1999 are computed from the Mortgage Banker Association’s quarterly National Delinquency Survey
from 1994-1999. The dashed lines are smoothed versions of the data.
debt holdings and therefore lower bankruptcy rates. This observed relationship be-
tween bankruptcy and the homestead exemption suggests that accounting for general
equilibrium effects of policies might be important in reconciling micro and macro facts
related to bankruptcy.
Motivated by these observations, I ask three questions in this paper: (1) What
fraction of cross-state variation in default rates can be explained by differences in
bankruptcy and foreclosure laws? (2) What are the effects of a major reform to
bankruptcy, the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA)? and (3) If the government could standardize exemption and recourse
policy across states, what policy should it adopt?1
To address these questions, I analyze theoretically and quantitatively the effects
of the homestead exemption and recourse on household portfolio and default choices,
default rates and welfare. I construct a heterogeneous-agent general-equilibrium
1The U.S. Congress has attempted and failed to standardize state exemption policy numerous times in
the last 35 years amid intense debate over the optimal level of exemptions.
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incomplete-markets model. The model has elements in common with the bankruptcy
model of Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rı́os-Rull (2007) and the foreclosure
model of Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011). Households can finance purchases of
a housing good with mortgages, and can save in bonds or borrow in unsecured debt.
Households face idiosyncratic income and housing risk and can default separately on
their mortgages and unsecured credit. Households who default on mortgages forfeit
their housing collateral. In addition, in recourse states, the difference between the
face value of the mortgage and the collateral is stochastically converted into unse-
cured credit. Households who file for bankruptcy have all unsecured debts discharged
and can keep home equity up to the homestead exemption, but are then excluded
from filing for bankruptcy again for a period of time.
My main theoretical contribution is to characterize how the bankruptcy decision
depends on the entire household portfolio. Unlike Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and
Ŕıos-Rull (2007), I find that the net worth of a household is not a sufficient statistic
for understanding a household’s decision to go bankrupt. The bankruptcy decision
depends jointly on the level of unsecured debt, home equity and non-exempt home
equity. Given these three quantities, I prove that the set of income realizations that
triggers bankruptcy is a closed interval. Further, I show that for a fixed level of net
worth, a household with more home equity is more likely to declare bankruptcy since
it stands to gain more from having its unsecured debt discharged. In addition, I show
that the probability of going bankrupt is decreasing in the amount of non-exempt
home equity, as the non-exempt portion is seized in bankruptcy.
My main quantitative result is that the model can account for 20 percent of the
overall variation in state bankruptcy rates, and for 80 percent of the variation that
cross-state regressions attribute to differences in laws. The model predicts, consistent
with state level data, lower bankruptcy rates in states with higher homestead exemp-
tions. More generous exemptions lessen the penalty from bankruptcy and therefore
6
increase the probability of homeowners going bankrupt. This raises the equilibrium
interest rate on unsecured borrowing. This higher interest rate, coupled with access
to secured borrowing, causes households to substitute secured credit for unsecured by
taking on more highly leveraged mortgages. Therefore, in states with higher exemp-
tions, the household portfolio is more heavily weighted toward secured debt, resulting
in lower bankruptcy rates, but higher foreclosure rates. Generating the negative cor-
relation between bankruptcy rates and the homestead exemption depends crucially
on the ability of households to endogenously substitute between the two types of
credit. I show in a counter-factual analysis where secured borrowing and foreclo-
sure are not allowed, that this version of the model does not reproduce the observed
negative relationship between bankruptcy rates and the homestead exemption. This
thought experiment highlights the importance of modeling secured and unsecured
credit together.
Third, I use the calibrated model to evaluate the effects of a recent major reform
to bankruptcy law: the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA). The reform prohibited households earning above median income in
their state from filing for bankruptcy. Analyzing the transition path induced by the
reform, I find that bankruptcy rates initially drop, but then rise significantly for sev-
eral years until converging to a rate roughly double the pre-reform level. The fraction
of households with negative net worth and the total unsecured debt outstanding also
increase significantly along the transition. Since income is highly persistent, house-
holds with above median income have a high probability of staying above median
income (and being precluded from filing for bankruptcy) in subsequent periods, and
thus their default risk is low. As a result, these households face much lower prices
for unsecured debt, and optimally take on more of it than before the reform. If they
remain above median income they repay or roll over the debt, but if they fall below
the income threshold they optimally choose to go bankrupt. This simultaneously
7
generates increased indebtedness and higher bankruptcy rates.
Even though the BAPCPA reform only changed bankruptcy law, I find that it has
significant effects on foreclosure rates as well. Along the transition foreclosure rates
increase for several years and then converge to a level 0.6 percentage points higher. My
findings provide support for the hypotheses of Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2009) and
Li, White, and Zhu (2010) that BAPCPA contributed to the subsequent observed rise
in foreclosure rates. As mentioned above, households become increasingly indebted
causing a left-ward shift in the wealth distribution. Both before and after BAPCPA,
households with low net worth take on more highly leveraged mortgages than high
net worth households because they have fewer resources to finance housing purchases.
Thus, increasing the mass of low net worth households increases the foreclosure rate.
In addition, households with non-exempt home equity take on less unsecured debt
(since it provides less insurance against housing risk), resulting in portfolios more
heavily weighted toward mortgage debt.
Despite the increase in default rates, using a utilitarian welfare measure, house-
holds on average are willing to pay more than 1.4 percent of lifetime consumption
to implement the policy. The mechanism behind the welfare gain is the increased
state-contingency of unsecured debt after BAPCPA. Restricting bankruptcy only to
households who earn below median income moves the unsecured debt contract closer
to an insurance contract against low income realizations. Households can take on
unsecured debt and exempt home equity at lower prices than before the reform. In
the event of a low income realization, households can declare bankruptcy and keep
the home equity. Thus, using a combination of home equity and unsecured credit,
households can insure themselves against low income realizations.
Finally, I address the question of what level of exemption and recourse policy the
federal government should enact were it to standardize default policies across states. I
find that, under a utilitarian welfare function, the optimal joint policy is no-recourse
8
foreclosure and a homestead exemption of roughly 25 percent of the state median
income. The intuition for the result is as follows. Households in the economy face
two types of risk: income risk and house price risk. By preventing recourse, secured
debt can more effectively provide insurance against housing risk, since it does not
expose households to the risk of also having to go bankrupt. The optimal size of the
homestead exemption balances the insurance value of being able to keep home equity
after bankruptcy with the increased cost of credit associated with the higher default
risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I review the existing
literature. In Section 2, I describe the model economy. In Section 3, I provide theoret-
ical characterizations of household decisions and endogenous prices. The calibration
procedure and the relevant data targets are presented in Section 4. The characteris-
tics of the calibrated economy are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, I discuss the
results of policy experiments. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Connections to Existing Literature
This paper is related to multiple areas of the literature on incomplete markets and
household default. Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ŕıos-Rull (2007) and Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) study economies with savings and competitively priced
unsecured debt, with prices depending on loan size and household characteristics.2
In their models, these authors abstract from a household portfolio of exempt assets
and liabilities and only consider the net household position since their focus is only
on bankruptcy and unsecured credit. In my framework, I include an exempt housing
asset and show that the net position is not sufficient to determine the default deci-
sion. Including assets and liabilities allows the model to be consistent with the large
2Athreya (2002) provides an early analysis of an incomplete markets model integrating a bankruptcy
option. However, he assumes that all loans are pooled, so that loan pricing does not depend on household
characteristics or loan sizes.
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fraction of bankrupt households who have positive home equity. Further, the endoge-
nous penalty of having non-exempt assets seized generates average credit spreads on
unsecured credit that are consistent with what is observed in the data, which the
existing literature has had trouble matching. Pavan (2008) and Li and Sarte (2006)
incorporate durables into equilibrium default models to study the effects of home-
stead exemptions, but abstract from secured debt. Hintermaier and Koeniger (2009)
analyze optimal debt portfolios in a life-cycle model of durable and non-durable con-
sumption, but without the possibility of mortgage default.
Recent papers by Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011), Corbae and Quintin (2011),
Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) and Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009) build equilib-
rium models of housing, endogenous leverage choice, and foreclosure. Those papers
abstract from unsecured debt and bankruptcy, and are primarily focused on under-
standing the effects of government housing market policy or the 2007 housing bust.3
I see my paper as complementing those papers by providing insight on how BAPCPA
may have contributed to the subsequent rise in foreclosures. To my knowledge, this
is the first study to investigate the joint causes and consequences of foreclosure and
bankruptcy in a structural, dynamic, general equilibrium model.4
Another strand of the literature has empirically investigated the effects of home-
stead exemptions and recourse. These papers provide an empirical benchmark to
evaluate the predictions of the model. Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) find that
in states with higher homestead exemptions households with lower wealth are more
likely to be denied auto loans. Pence (2006) finds smaller mortgages are originated
in states with borrower friendly foreclosure laws. Complementing that work, Ghent
and Kudlyak (2011) estimate that recourse laws significantly reduce the probability
of foreclosure.
3There is also an important, empirically focused literature that investigates the causes and consequences
of the recent housing bust, see e.g. Foote et al. 2009 or Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011).
4This work also complements a growing empirical literature that focuses on the interaction between
foreclosure and bankruptcy (e.g., Carroll and Li (2008), Li and White (2009)).
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1.2 Model
I model each state in the US as an endowment economy, populated with a measure
one continuum of households, a measure one continuum of banks and a measure one
continuum of real estate construction companies. Time is modeled discretely and all
agents are infinitely lived.
1.2.1 Households
Each period, households receive an idiosyncratic endowment of the consumption good
y. The endowment is assumed to follow a stochastic process consisting of a persistent
and a transitory component:
log(y) = z + ε
where
z′ = ρz +
√
(1− ρ2)η
where ε and η are independent normally distributed random variables with variances
σ2ε and σ
2
η.
Households derive period utility U(c, s) from consumption and housing services s,
which can be purchased at a price ps relative to the consumption good. Households
are expected utility maximizers and discount the future with parameter β.
Households can save or borrow by purchasing one-period bonds with face value
b′, with negative values interpreted as unsecured loans. The “price” of a bond with
face value b′ can be a function of all observable household characteristics as well as
asset choices and is denoted qb(·). The timing is such that for savings the household
pays b′ × qb(b′, ·) in the current period to receive b′ in the subsequent period. For
unsecured borrowing, the household receives −b′ × qb(b′, ·) and has to repay −b′ in
the subsequent period or has to go bankrupt.
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Households can purchase perfectly divisible houses h′ at a price ph per unit of
housing. Each unit of the housing good generates a unit flow of housing services,
which can be rented out in the same period of purchase. I assume that houses are
subject to idiosyncratic depreciation shocks, δ′.5 The shocks are distributed according
to CDF F (δ′), with negative values of δ′ corresponding to house appreciation. The
realizations of δ′ are assumed to be independent across time and households. A law
of large numbers is assumed to hold such that F (·) represents the cross-sectional
distribution of depreciation shocks.
Households can finance housing purchases with mortgages with face value denoted
by m′. The mortgage is secured by the housing good owned by the household, and
the price qm(·) can be a function of all observable household characteristics as well as
goods and asset choices. I assume that neither households nor financial intermediaries
can commit to long term mortgage contracts.6 A mortgage therefore is a one-period
contract to receive m′×qm(m′, ·) units of the consumption good in the current period
and to repay m′ in the subsequent period or to go into foreclosure.
5The depreciation shock is intended to capture individual (as opposed to aggregate) changes in house
values. In a steady state environment with constant aggregate house prices, this shock will generate house-
holds with negative home equity, which I later prove is a necessary condition for going into foreclosure.
Alternatively, one could assume that the shocks are to the per unit price of the house, as opposed to the
physical stock. That model is equivalent except for the case of sufficiently large shocks that would cause
the price of the home to fall below the value of the services it generates. Given that the probability of such
shocks is small, this modeling choice is inconsequential.
6On the household side, the assumption is innocuous given access to low cost mortgage refinance and
home-equity lines of credit. On the bank side, long term contracts provide households insurance against
inflation risk, real-interest rate risk and income risk. Since I am focused on steady-state equilibria, there
is no aggregate inflation or interest rate risk that households need to insure against. In Section 3, I show
that in no-recourse states households are also insured against income risk. A result of the assumption is
that households face significant risk from housing shocks because they must refinance every period. This
is most likely to affect results regarding how much negative home equity households are willing to tolerate
before going into foreclosure. It is not clear that missing on that margin, however, significantly impacts the
cross-state variation in defaults or evaluating reforms to bankruptcy laws, and is thus defendable for my
analysis.
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1.2.2 Legal Environment
Foreclosure
Households have the option to default on mortgages after the realization of the housing
depreciation and income shocks. When a household defaults, the depreciated housing
collateral is seized via a foreclosure technology. If the depreciated housing collateral
exceeds the face value of the mortgage, the excess is returned to the household,7 i.e.
the household receives max{γ(1 − δ′)phh′ − m′, 0}, where m′, h′ are the mortgage
and house size before the default decision respectively, δ′ is the realized depreciation
shock, and γ ≤ 1 represents the foreclosure technology. If the housing collateral (after
depreciation and foreclosure) is less than the face value of the mortgage, the difference
is converted into unsecured debt via a stochastic deficiency judgment technology.
Deficiency judgments J = 1 occur with probability ψ ∈ [0, 1], with probability 1−ψ,
J = 0.8 The unsecured position of the households after foreclosure can be represented
as:
bF = b
′ + J (γ(1− δ′)phh′ −m′)
where E[J ] = ψ. A no-recourse state is a state where ψ = 0.9
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is modeled after the U.S. Chapter 7 bankruptcy law. Chapter 7 is by far
the most commonly exercised bankruptcy option, accounting for more than 70 percent
7This is consistent with foreclosure law. If the value of the collateral exceeds the outstanding debt, the
bank must return the excess after liquidating the collateral and covering any associated foreclosure costs.
8The assumption of stochastic deficiency judgments is an abstraction to capture the decision of the bank
to sue a household motivated by the fact that banks do not pursue deficiency judgments for all households
who go into foreclosure even if it is legally allowed.
9Assuming that there is no additional penalty from foreclosure in no-recourse states yields a sharp char-
acterization of the infinite-dimensional mortgage pricing function. In the US, a foreclosure would show up
on the credit report of a household, potentially affecting the future ability to obtain a new mortgage. How-
ever, if households provide a sufficiently high down payment, the bad credit can be overcome. As such, it
is reasonable to assume no additional penalty. In the model, just foreclosed households tend to have low
wealth, and optimally choose not to purchase housing despite having access to credit, further mitigating the
issue.
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of all bankruptcies.10 The amount of home equity that can be kept in bankruptcy - the
state homestead exemption - is denoted by χ. The bankruptcy decision is made after
the foreclosure decision and deficiency judgment realization. The timing convention is
chosen to preclude the possibility of the household having an empty budget set after
both default decisions. If a household declares bankruptcy, in the current period the
following happens:
1. The household can keep home equity up to the exemption
2. Any non-exempt home equity is applied to unsecured debt
3. Unsecured debt is set to 0 and the household cannot accumulate bonds
4. The household cannot change its home equity balance
5. The household’s credit history state changes to bad
The restrictions on savings and home equity come from the process of liquidation
and exemptions. Households can sell their homes in bankruptcy and keep the exempt
equity only if they use or intend to use that equity to purchase another home. In
some states, e.g. Florida and Texas, exempt equity proceeds from the sale of a home
must be placed into a homestead account until the new homestead is purchased.
Households with bad credit histories are excluded from unsecured borrowing and
cannot declare bankruptcy, but they are not excluded from the mortgage market.
Further, households with bad credit histories face a proportional consumption penalty
λ to represent, among other things, the increased difficulty of getting a cell phone or
a lease, for households with a bankruptcy on a credit record. A household’s credit
history changes to a good history with probability α and remains bad with probability
1− α.
10The other option for households is Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter 13 involves a repayment of debts
over a 3-5 year period. Close to 50 percent of households who enter into Chapter 13 do not successfully
complete the repayment plan, and a significant fraction end up converting to Chapter 7. It is important to
note that the homestead exemption is still relevant for Chapter 13. Creditors must receive at least as much
repayment as they would under the discharge of debt in Chapter 7.
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1.2.3 Household Decision Problem
Households can be in one of two credit history states, H = {G,BC}, G represents
a good credit history and BC represents having a bad credit history. The relevant
state variables at the beginning of the period are the household portfolio, b, h,m,
credit history, H and shocks δ, y, z. Let X = (b, h,m, δ, y, z), which summarizes
the household state. Denote by a the cash-at-hand, or net resource household of a
household after the foreclosure and bankruptcy decisions, and η = max{phh(1− δ)−
m, 0} the non-negative home equity of a household after the default decisions. The
dynamic programming problem of the household can be written as follows:
An agent who begins the period with a good credit history, has lifetime utility
given by:
V G(b, h,m, δ, y, z) = max
F∈{0,1}
EJ max
{
WBF (ηF , y, z),W
NB
F (aF , z)
}
(1.1)
where EJ is the expectation over a deficiency judgment if the household goes in
to foreclosure, and WNBF and W
B
F are the value of not going bankrupt and going
bankrupt, respectively, conditional on the foreclosure choice. Conditional on choosing
not to go bankrupt (WNBF ), the households solves:
WNBF (aF , z) = max
c,s,m′,h′≥0,b′
{
U(c, s) + βE(δ′,y′,z′)|zV G(b′, h′,m′, δ′, y′, z′)
}
subj. to c+ pss+ [ph − ps]h′ −m′qm(b′, h′,m′, z, G) + b′qb(b′, h′,m′, z) ≤ aF
where: aF=0 = (1− δ)phh−m+ b+ y︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Foreclosure
and aF=1 = bF + y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreclosure
The household chooses contemporaneous consumption and new bond, housing and
mortgage positions. A household who went bankrupt (WBF ), and conditional on the
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foreclosure choice, solves:
WBF (ηF , y, z) = max
c,h,m′,h′≥0
{
U(c, s) + βE(δ′,y′,z′)|zV BC(b′, h′,m′, δ′, y′, z′)
}
subj. to c+ pss = y b
′ = 0
[ph − ps]h′ −m′qm(b′, h′,m′, z, BC) = ηF
where: ηF=0 = min{(1− δ)phh−m,χ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exempt home equity
and ηF=1 = 0
where now the household consumes only out of the period’s endowment, can’t save
or borrow in bonds and keeps the same amount of exempt home equity. V BC is the
value function of a household that starts the period with a bad credit history and is
given by:
V BC(b, h,m, δ, y, z) = max
F∈{0,1}
Eψ
 maxc,s,h′,m′,b′≥0U(c, s) + βE(δ′,y′,z′)|z
 αV G(X ′)+
(1− α)V BC(X ′)

subj. to λ(c+ pss) + [ph − ps]h′ − qmm′ + qbb′ ≤ aF
where: aF=0 = (1− δ)phh−m+ b+ y and aF=1 = bF + y
Notice that the timing is such that the housing services generated by the house
h′ can be traded in the same period as the purchase, which is why the effective per
unit cost of buying a house is ph − ps. If households are indifferent between either
going bankrupt or not, it is assumed they do not go bankrupt. If households are
indifferent between foreclosing or not foreclosing it is assumed they foreclose if they
have negative equity and do not foreclose if they have positive equity.11
The solutions to these four coupled Bellman equations imply binary decision rules
for foreclosure and bankruptcy, f ∗(X ′,H) and B∗J (X ′), respectively, (where a value of
11Note that the value functions for households with bad credit histories V BC or that chose not to go
bankrupt V NB , may not be well defined as written. Since cash at hand can be negative, it is possible
that there are no feasible choices (b′, h′,m′) that result in non-negative consumption (c, s). In that case,
households declare bankruptcy and receive no consumption for the period.
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1 implies default) where recall J is an indicator representing whether the household
received a deficiency judgment. In addition, the solutions also imply policy rules for
housing, mortgage and bond choice.
1.2.4 Real Estate Construction Sector
The real estate sector is populated by a continuum of competitive firms who possess
a linear, reversible technology to produce houses, H = Ch, where H is the output of
houses and Ch is the input of consumption good (which could be negative if there is
disinvestment in housing). The representative firm solves the following maximization
problem:
max
H,Ch
phH − Ch
subj. to H = Ch
Therefore, the equilibrium house price is given by ph = 1. In effect, the model has an
exogenous house price, but an endogenous rental price ps (which clears the market
for housing services) and thus endogenous house-price to rent ratios.
1.2.5 Financial Intermediaries
Banks can borrow at the risk-free interest rate, denoted rb, which they take as given.
Issuing debt, both secured and unsecured, is costly because of administrative and
screening costs. To capture these costs, I impose a proportional real resource cost ra
for issuing each unit of a mortgage or negative face value bond. Thus, the effective
cost of financing one unit of debt is rb + ra. It is assumed that agents simultaneously
apply for mortgages and unsecured loans and that banks can observe the portfolio
choices b′, h′,m′, persistent state z and the credit history. The banking sector is
competitive, and banks are assumed to make zero expected profit loan-by-loan (as in
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Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ŕıos-Rull (2007) for unsecured debt and Jeske,
Krueger, and Mitman (2011) for mortgages). The zero-profit assumption allows me
to analyze the mortgage and bond problems separately.
Mortgage Problem
The price for a mortgage depends on the foreclosure and bankruptcy decision rules of
the household. Banks have access to foreclosure and deficiency judgment technologies
as described in Section 2.3.1. The price of a mortgage of size m′ to purchase a
house of size h′ will reflect all of the expected possible outcomes. If the household
forecloses on a mortgage with face value m′ used to purchase a house of size h′, the
bank recovers the depreciated value of the house processed through the foreclosure
technology,12 γh′(1− δ′). In addition, with probability ψ the bank wins a deficiency
judgment, m′ − γh′, but only recovers that value if the household does not file for
bankruptcy. If a household goes bankrupt, the bank can recover any bonds held by
the household.13 Therefore, in general, the price of a mortgage will depend on all the
observable characteristics of the household and the bond position b′ in addition to
m′ and h′. The typical bank will only issue mortgage contracts with a non-positive
expected net-return:
qm(b
′, h′,m′, z, G)m′ ≥ 1
1 + rb + ra
× Ey′,δ′,z′|z
{
(1− f ∗(X ′)m′ + f ∗(X ′)× (1.2)
[
ψ
(
(1−B∗1(X ′))m′+B∗1(X ′)(γ(1− δ′)h′) + max{b′, 0})
)
+ (1− ψ)(γ(1− δ′)h′))
]}
where B∗1(X
′) is the bankrtupcy decision of a household after receiving a deficiency
judgment. A household with a bad credit history cannot declare bankruptcy, and thus
the mortgage price is characterized as above, but with B∗(·) = 0. For a household
12Since ph = 1, I omit it from the remainder of the analysis.
13The seizure of bonds is assumed to be efficient to represent the fact that secured debt is treated as senior
debt in bankruptcy, and thus is paid before fees and administrative costs.
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with a bad credit history, the price also takes into account that the foreclosure decision
is made after the realization of whether the household will enter the subsequent period
with a good credit history, so there is an additional expectation. The conditions for
the typical bank to issue a mortgage for those two cases can be found in the Appendix.
Unsecured Credit Problem
When households are saving in bonds, b′ ≥ 0, qb represents the price of buying a bond
that pays b′ units of consumption good tomorrow. There is no default risk on savings
and thus:
qb (b
′, g′,m′, z) ≤ 1
1 + rb
(1.3)
which from the zero profit condition immediately implies that the price only depends
on the risk-free rate, qb =
1
1+rb
when b′ ≥ 0.
The price of a bond with negative face value b′ depends on the household’s default
probability and its non-exempt assets. If a household declares bankruptcy and has
home equity in excess of the homestead exemption χ the bank can recover a fraction
of it. Let ξ′ denote the non-exempt portion of a household’s home equity, namely
ξ′ = max{h′(1 − δ′) − m′ − χ, 0}. Through the bankruptcy technology, the bank
can recover max{−b′, ζξ′} from a household that declares bankruptcy, where ζ ≤ 1
represents the bankruptcy recovery technology. The condition for the bank issuing
unsecured debt of size b′ to a household with characteristics X is therefore:
− b′qb (b′, h′,m′, z) ≥
1
1 + rb + ra
×
{
EJ ,y′,δ′,z′|z
[
−b′(1−B∗J (X ′)) +B∗J (X ′)ζξ′
]}
(1.4)
1.2.6 Equilibrium Definition
The pair (ψ, χ) summarizes the legal environment for the state. Each state is treated
as a small open economy for the purpose of the bond and mortgage market taking
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the risk-free rate rb as given. The housing market is closed, reflecting the fact that
housing services must be consumed in the same geographic location as the housing
good. Let µ denote the cross sectional distribution of households over the credit
history, cash at hand, income and home equity. I focus on a stationary recursive
equilibrium.
Definition Given (ψ, χ) and rb, a Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
comprises:
• Value functions for the households, {V : H× R3 × [δ, 1]× Y × Z → R},
{W : {B,NB,BC} × {0, 1} × R× Y × Z → R}
• Default decision rules and policy functions for the households:
{f ∗ : H× R3 × [δ, 1]× Y × Z → {0, 1}},
{B∗ : R3 × [δ, 1]× Y × Z × {0, 1} → {0, 1}}
and {c, s, b′,m′, h′ : {B,NB,BC} × R× Y × Z → R}
• Price ps, pricing functions {qm : H× R3 × Z → R+} and {qb : R3 × Z → R+}
• An invariant distribution: {µ∗ : {B,NB,BC} × R× Y × Z → R+}
such that:
1. Households Maximize: Given prices and the pricing functions, the value
functions solve (1.1), and c, s, b′, h′,m′ are the associated policy functions, and
B∗, f ∗ are the associated default rules.
2. Zero Profit Mortgages: Given f ∗, B∗, qm solves (1.2) with equality for any
contract traded in equilibrium
3. Zero Profit Unsecured Debt: Given B∗, qb solves (1.4) with equality for any
contract traded in equilibrium
4. Zero Profit Bonds: qb =
1
1+rb
when b′ ≥ 0.
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5. Rental Market Clearing:
∑
I∈{B,NB,BC}
∫
h′Idµ =
∑
I∈{B,NB,BC}
∫
sIdµ
6. Invariant Distribution: The distribution µ∗ is invariant with respect to the
Markov process induced by the exogenous Markov process z and the policy
functions m′, h′, b′, B∗, f ∗
1.3 Theoretical Results
The purpose of this section is to provide theoretical results that characterize house-
hold default decisions and interest rates on debt that will guide the interpretation
of the quantitative results. In addition, the theory will prove useful in the computa-
tion of equilibria. I characterize the bankruptcy and foreclosure decisions. Further,
I analyze how housing, foreclosure, and the homestead exemption affect the house-
hold bankruptcy decision. I fully characterize mortgage interest rates for no-recourse
states.
1.3.1 Existence and Characterization of the Household Problem
In order to prove the existence of a solution to the household problem, I need to
make an assumption on preferences. I assume that utility is bounded above and that
the utility of consuming zero is small enough that a household will always prefer to
go bankrupt rather than having zero consumption in a given period.14 Under this
assumption, which is formalized in the appendix, a solution to the household problem
exists. Further, consistent with the penalties associated with bankruptcy, a household
with a bad credit history ceterus paribus has lower lifetime utility than one with a
good credit history.
Proposition 1. Existence of a Solution to the Household Problem
14In my quantitative analysis I will assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function with CRRA
parameter greater than 1 which satisfies this condition.
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(1) The household value functions V H exist and are unique; (2) The value func-
tions are bounded and increasing in a; (3) A bad credit score reduces utility, i.e.
V G ≥ V BC
The proof of the existence of a solution to the household problem follows from
standard contraction mapping arguments (boundedness from below comes from the
option to default). The details of all proofs can be found in the appendix.
Now that I have shown a solution to the household problem exists, I proceed to
characterize the bankruptcy decision. Since the bankruptcy decision is made after the
foreclosure decision, similar to Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ŕıos-Rull (2007), I
can characterize the bankruptcy decision in terms of a bankruptcy set B∗(bF , η, ξ, z),
where bF is unsecured credit after deficiency judgments, η is home equity, and ξ is non-
exempt home equity. The bankruptcy set is the set of realizations of the endowment y
for which the household finds it optimal to declare bankruptcy as opposed to repaying
bF . The bankruptcy set depends on those four variables alone because they capture
the benefits of bankruptcy (the discharge of unsecured debt bF and preservation of
exempt equity η − ξ) as well as the costs (the loss of non-exempt equity ξ).
Proposition 2. Bankruptcy Characterization
(a) For any values of unsecured debt bF , home equity η, and non-exempt home equity
ξ, the bankruptcy set is either a closed interval, i.e. B∗(bF , η, ξ, z) = [yB, ȳB], or
empty, i.e. B∗(bF , η, ξ, z) = ∅.
(b) The bankruptcy set expands with indebtedness bF , i.e.
B∗(b̂F , η, ξ, z) ⊆ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z) for bF < b̂F .
The proposition is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.2(a). The intuition for this
result is that households with very low endowment realizations prefer to take on debt
to increase contemporaneous consumption above the period endowment (consumption
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(a) The bankruptcy set.
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(b) The bankruptcy set expands in home equity η.
Figure 1.2: Graphical illustration of Propositions 2 and 3.
in bankruptcy). Whereas households with high endowments prefer to maintain access
to credit, and thus repay, but may consume less than if they had declared bankruptcy.
Next, I characterize how the portfolio of the household affects the bankruptcy de-
cision. Unlike Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ŕıos-Rull (2007), the bankruptcy
decision depends on more than the net asset position of the household. Households
with more non-exempt home equity are less likely to go bankrupt. Intuitively, as
the household holds more non-exempt home equity the cost of going bankrupt in-
creases (more housing wealth would be lost), but the benefit of going bankruptcy
is constant. Thus, the set of endowment realizations for which the household goes
bankrupt shrinks. Having a substantial amount of non-exempt home equity effec-
tively increases the punishment of going bankrupt. This mechanism is important for
understanding the equilibrium price effects generated in the quantitative analysis.
Further, for a given net asset position a greater share in home equity increases the
chance of bankruptcy. This result is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.2(b). Keeping
the net asset position fixed but changing its composition does not affect the value of
repaying,15 but more home equity increases the value of going bankrupt. Therefore,
the set of endowment values for which the household goes bankrupt expands. These
15Since after repayment the relevant state variable for the household is the consolidated asset position.
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results are formalized in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. Home Equity, Exemptions and Bankruptcy
(a) The bankruptcy set contracts in non-exempt home equity ξ, i.e. B∗(bF , η, ξ1, z) ⊆
B∗(bF , η, ξ2, z), for ξ2 < ξ1.
(b) Holding net assets constant (i.e. fixing η + bF ) the bankruptcy set is expanding
in home equity, i.e. B∗(bF , η, ξ, z) ⊆ B
∗
(bF − x, η + x, ξ, z) for x > 0. Or
equivalently, the bankruptcy set is increasing in the difference of home equity
and debt η − bF .
(c) When home equity exceeds the homestead exemption, the bankruptcy set is de-
creasing in home equity, i.e. B∗(bF , η + x, ξ + x, z) ⊆ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z) for x > 0.
(d) When there is no homestead exemption, i.e. χ = 0, the bankruptcy set only
depends on the net asset position η + bF and the persistent income state z.
(e) The bankruptcy set is empty if net assets exceed the homestead exemption, i.e.
if η + bF > χ, then B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z) = ∅.
Having characterized the bankruptcy decision, working backwards I now analyze
the foreclosure decision. How foreclosure is related to bankruptcy depends crucially
on the probability of a deficiency judgment, ψ. In order to understand how ψ controls
the complementarity between foreclosure and bankruptcy, I first characterize when
households repay their mortgages for sure. Since the housing market is frictionless,
if the foreclosure technology is inefficient (γ < 1), households will always repay their
mortgages if the depreciated value of the house is greater than the face value of the
mortgage.
Proposition 4. If the foreclosure technology is inefficient, γ < 1, f ∗(X,H) = 0 for
all b, z, and y when h(1− δ) ≥ m.
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For two special cases the foreclosure decision follows a cutoff rule in the deprecia-
tion shock δ′. If banks cannot obtain deficiency judgments (i.e., no-recourse, ψ = 0),
households will choose to foreclose on their mortgages whenever they have negative
home equity. Since households face no additional cost of foreclosure, it is always opti-
mal to “walk away.” Thus, under no-recourse Proposition 4 becomes an if-and-only-if
statement - households only repay their mortgage when the value of the house ex-
ceeds the value of the mortgage (formalized in Proposition 5). In no-recourse states,
therefore, the foreclosure decision is independent of the bond position or income of
the household.
Proposition 5. If there is no recourse, ψ = 0, the foreclosure decision follows a
cutoff rule in δ, i.e. there exists δ∗(h,m) such that f ∗(X,H) = 1 for all δ ≥ δ∗(h,m)
and 0 otherwise for all b, y, z. Further, the cutoff depends only on the leverage κ = m
h
,
and δ∗(κ) = 1− κ.
Consider now the other extreme in which deficiency judgments always occur, ψ =
1. If the foreclosure technology is inefficient, a household will either repay, or both
foreclose and go bankrupt:
Proposition 6. If deficiency judgments always occur, ψ = 1, the foreclosure deci-
sion follows a cutoff rule in δ, which in general will depend on b, h,m, y, z. Further,
any household with a good credit history that chooses foreclosure will subsequently go
bankrupt. Households in bankruptcy or with bad credit history will optimally choose
b′, h′,m′ such that foreclosure is never optimal.
If foreclosure is inefficient, the household can repay by paying m−(1−δ)h or choose
foreclosure and have additional unsecured debt m− γ(1− δ)h. If the household does
not subsequently go bankrupt, it will always prefer to repay, since it yields a higher
net asset position. Therefore, a foreclosed household will subsequently go bankrupt
to erase the deficiency.
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Propositions 5 & 6 show that in the limiting cases of ψ the foreclosure decision
follows a cutoff rule. In addition, these limiting cases suggest that ψ partially controls
the complementarity between foreclosure and bankruptcy.16 In my quantitative anal-
ysis I find that higher values of ψ lead to a higher probability of declaring bankruptcy
conditional on choosing foreclosure.
1.3.2 Mortgage and Unsecured Interest Rates
Characterizing the intermediary pricing of mortgages and unsecured debt is limited
by the partial characterization of the household foreclosure decision. However, when
there is no recourse the sharp characterization of the foreclosure decision (Proposition
5), allows a full characterization of mortgage prices and a partial characterization of
unsecured debt prices.
Proposition 7. If there is no recourse, mortgages are priced exclusively based on
leverage:
qm (h
′,m′, b′, z,H;ψ = 0) = 1
1 + rb + ra
{
F (δ∗(κ′)) +
γ
κ′
∫ 1
δ∗(κ′)
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)
}
= qm(κ
′;ψ = 0)
where κ′ and δ′∗(κ′) are defined as in Proposition 5. This result is the same
as that obtained in Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2011). Note that qm(κ
′) is strictly
decreasing in κ′, thus mortgage interest rates are increasing in leverage κ′. The interest
rates are increasing to reflect the increasing risk of foreclosure.17
Proposition 8. If there is no recourse:
1. b′ ≤ b̂′ implies qb(b′, h′,m′, z) ≤ qb(b̂′, h′,m′, z).
16When ψ = 0 the foreclosure decision is independent of the subsequent bankruptcy decision, but when
ψ = 1 foreclosure always results in bankruptcy.
17In no-recourse states the mortgage interest rates are independent of the credit history of households,
since the bankruptcy decision has no effect on the ability of the bank to recover the housing collateral in the
case of foreclosure.
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2. If in addition the homestead exemption is zero, χ = 0:
(a) h′ ≤ ĥ′ implies qb(b′, h,m′, z) ≤ qb(b′, ĥ′,m′, z)
(b) m′ ≥ m̂′ implies qb(b′, h′,m, z) ≤ qb(b′, h′, m̂′, z)
From Proposition 2, since the bankruptcy set is expanding in indebtedness, the
price of unsecured debt will be decreasing in indebtedness. Further, from Proposition
3, if there is no homestead exemption, the bankruptcy set depends only on the net
asset position. Since the net asset position is increasing in the size of the house and
decreasing in the size of the mortgage, unsecured debt prices will increase in house
size and decrease in mortgage size. Recall that because of the timing convention,
decreasing prices qb are equivalent to increasing implied interest rates.
1.4 Calibration and Model Fit
The goal of the calibration is to assure that the model can account for aggregate facts
related to both secured and unsecured borrowing, foreclosure, and bankruptcy. In
order to capture the heterogeneity in state law but still match national level data I
treat each state as a small open economy and then aggregate state-level moments. I
allow states to vary only in the homestead exemption χ, whether there is recourse
(ψ > 0), and the level of median income,18 keeping technology and preference param-
eters constant across states. The model needs to be solved for every combination of
homestead exemption and recourse, χ and ψ.
To balance richness in variation with computational feasibility, I restrict the cur-
rent calibration to consider seven configurations of the homestead exemption and
recourse law. I allocate each state in the US to one of the seven bins - three home-
stead exemption bins for no-recourse states and four homestead exemption bins for
recourse states. For each bin I calculate the average homestead exemption and median
18The income process is the same across states modulo its median level.
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income, weighting by state populations. The relative weight of the seven economies in
calculating aggregate statistics is determined by the relative proportion of households
from those states. For ease of exposition, I refer to the seven binned economies by
the name of a representative state from the bin: Washington, California, Minnesota,
Maryland, Michigan, Massachusetts and Florida .19
The values for the homestead exemption χ are constructed from state laws and
state-level median household income estimates from the Current Population Survey
published by the U.S. Census Bureau. The values used for the homestead exemption
and income are taken from the year 2000 (see appendix for details). For each state,
median income is normalized to 1, so χ is in units of state median income. For
example, median household income in Pennsylvania was $40,106, with an exemption
of $30,000 for couples, yielding a χPA ≈ 0.75.
Good data on deficiency judgments do not exist, so I take the value of ψ as a
parameter to calibrate. Li and White (2009) analyze a sample of prime and sub-prime
mortgages and find that roughly 28% of households who have foreclosure proceedings
initiated against them also file for bankruptcy. I take this value as my target for
calibrating ψ.20
In addition to state-specific laws regarding bankruptcy, the legal environment is
described by α and λ, the parameters governing how long a household has a bad
credit record and the consumption penalty, respectively. By law, households cannot
file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy twice in any six year period. The Fair Credit Reporting
Act stipulates that bankruptcy filings cannot remain on a household’s record for
more than 10 years. Since the model period is one year, the logical bounds for α
are between [1/10, 1/6]. I set α = 1/6 to match the legal exclusion from being able
to declare bankruptcy since there is evidence Han and Li (2011) households regain
19The state policy parameters are summarized in Table A.1 in the appendix.
20Note that the discussion relating parameters to data targets is heuristic in the sense that all parameters
determine all endogenous variables jointly in the model. In the discussion I relate parameters with the
moments that they affect the most quantitatively.
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Table 1.1: Externally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target
Income Process
Persistence, ρ 0.98
Income process (Storesletten et al, 2004)Std. of persistent shocks, σν 0.3
Std. of transitory shocks σε 0.245
Legal Technology
Foreclosure technology, γ 0.78 Foreclosure Sale Loss
Bankruptcy technology, ζ 0.52 Distributions to Creditors
Clean credit history, α 0.167 File for Chapter 7 every 6 years
Interest Rates
Risk-free rate, rb 0.01 Risk-free rate
Cost of issuing debt, ra 11 BP Bank administration cost
Preferences
Cobb-Douglas parameter, θ 0.8590 Housing share of consumption 14.1%
access to credit while the bankruptcy notation still appears on their credit report.
The parameter λ is then determined jointly to match the unsecured share of household
debt. Data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the U.S. published by the Federal
Reserve (Table Z.1 D.3) indicate that consumer credit accounted for roughly 24% of
household debt outstanding from 1983 to 2004. Over that same period, approximately
37% of consumer credit consisted of revolving credit, which is the closest analogue to
unsecured debt in the model (non-revolving credit includes secured auto loans, student
loans, etc). I target an aggregate share of unsecured credit of 0.24× 0.37 = 0.089.21
I aggregate unsecured debt and total debt across the seven economies (weighted by
households and income) and compute the unsecured share.
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1.4.1 Preferences and Technology
Preferences: For the utility function I choose Cobb-Douglas preferences over con-
sumption and housing services nested in a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
function:
U (c, h) =
(
cθh1−θ
)(1−σ) − 1
1− σ
Notice that this implies the solution to the intra-temporal consumption optimization
problem is psh =
1−θ
θ
c, which allows me to independently calibrate θ to match the
share of housing in total consumption. According to NIPA data, the housing share of
total consumption has been relatively stable at 14.1% over the last forty years, thus
I set θ = 0.8590.
The CRRA parameter σ is calibrated jointly to match median net worth observed
in the data. I use the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances to compute the median
net-worth of prime age households (head age ≤ 50). Median net-worth divided by
median income is found to be 1.19. I restrict the analysis to households under age 50
because of strong life-cycle effects in housing and mortgage choice.22
I calibrate the time discount factor β to match the aggregate bankruptcy rate from
1995-2004. The American Bankruptcy Institute publish aggregate annual bankruptcy
filings, and I construct rates using data on the number of households from the Census.
Chakravarty and Rhee (1999) report that 16.4% of respondents in the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics who filed for bankruptcy listed excessive health-care bills as
the cause. Since I abstract from such expenditure shocks in the model, I target
100%−16.4% = 83.6% of the observed bankruptcy rate in the data.23 Tables 1.1 and
21This number is nearly identical to the ratio of unsecured credit to unsecured credit plus mortgage debt
measured in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances for prime age households.
22Households in an infinite horizon model more closely correspond to prime age households in the data.
23Himmelstein et al. 2009 attribute a much higher fraction of bankruptcies to health shocks because they
include health related job loss and income changes. Since those shocks are captured in the calibration of the
income process, I use the lower value.
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1.2 summarize the model parameterization.
Endowment Process: Following Storesletten et al. 2004, I set persistence of the
shock z, ρ = 0.98 and the variance to the innovations to σ2η = 0.09. Estimates for
the variance of log annual income range from 0.04 to 0.16 . I thus set σ2ε = 0.06,
generating a variance of log annual income of 0.15. Using the method of Tauchen
and Hussey (1991), I approximate the persistent component with a two state Markov
chain.
Foreclosure Technology: The foreclosure loss parameter, γ, is set to match the
additional depreciation incurred in a foreclosure (e.g., it captures effects such as de-
creased maintenance by the occupants). The average loss was estimated by Pennington-
Cross 2006 to be 22%. He estimates the loss by comparing revenue from foreclosed
home sales to a market price constructed via the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) repeat sales index. I therefore set γ = 0.78 for all states in the
model.
Bankruptcy Technology: In order to map the bankruptcy recovery rate from the
U.S. to the model, I must determine if 1) there is any loss in the forced sale of the
home in bankruptcy; and 2) what fraction of assets recovered are actually distributed
to creditors. First, note that if the house has been foreclosed the secured creditors
seize it and there is nothing for unsecured creditors to collect (see Proposition 4).
Campbell et al. 2011 estimate the discount due to bankruptcy in Massachussetts,
and find it to be less than 5 percent. Thus, if a homeowner has positive equity in
the home and declares bankruptcy, I assume that there is no loss in the sale of the
house. The proceeds of the sale are first used to repay secured creditors. Next, the
costs of administering the bankruptcy (including court costs, fees and administrative
expenses) are paid. Finally, unsecured creditors are repaid from anything that re-
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mains. The U.S. Department of Justice24 reports of roughly $10.5 billion collected
in asset cases from 1994-2000, only 52 percent was dispersed creditors. Thus, I set
the recovery parameter ζ = 0.52. The remaining 48 percent is assumed to cover the
unmodeled costs of administering bankruptcy.
The Depreciation Process: I calibrate the depreciation process to simultaneously
match foreclosure rates and house depreciation moments from the data. Consistent
with data from the Mortgage Banker’s Association on foreclosure rates from 1990-
2003, I target an aggregate foreclosure rate of 0.55 percent. I also target the mean
house depreciation, calculated at 1.48 percent annually, based on mean depreciation
of residential housing reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Using data on
repeat home sales, the OFHEO estimates both aggregate and purely idiosyncratic
components of house price risk.25 Since there is only idiosyncratic risk in the model,
I target the annual idiosyncratic house price volatility reported by the OFHEO of 10
percent.
I find that I need a fat tailed distribution to simultaneously match the price
volatility and foreclosure rates. I assume that the depreciation shock follows a gener-
alized Pareto distribution. The generalized Pareto distribution has three parameters,
a shape parameter, k, a scale parameter, σδ, and a cutoff parameter δ. The upper
bound for the support is set to 1, so that complete depreciation is possible. The
cumulative distribution function is: F (δ) = 1−
(
1 + k(δ−δ)
σδ
)(− 1k−1)
.
1.4.2 Model Fit
Aggregated statistics across the seven computed economies are listed in Table 1.3.
The model performs well accounting for non-targeted moments in the data. The
model slightly over-predicts average holdings of housing wealth. This result is not
24“Preliminary Report on Chapter 7 Asset Cases 1994 to 2000.”
25It models log house prices as a diffusion process consisting of a market price index and a house specific
random walk. The technical details can be found in Calhoun (1996).
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Table 1.2: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data Model
Preferences
Risk aversion, σ 2.751 Bankruptcy rate 1.06% 1.06%
Discount factor, β 0.943 Median net worth/income: 1.19 1.19
Depreciation Process
Shape parameter, k 0.688 Foreclosure rate 0.55% 0.55%
Scale paramete,r σδ 6.77× 10−3 Average depreciation 1.48% 1.48%
Cutoff parameter, δ 1.49× 10−3 House price variance 0.01 0.01
Legal Technology
Probability of Probability of bankruptcy
deficiency judgment, ψ 0.184 conditional on foreclosure 0.28 0.28
Consumption penalty, λ 5.68× 10−3 Revolving share of debt 8.9% 8.9%
surprising since median net worth is targeted in the calibration, but housing and
bonds are the only assets that households can hold in the model.26 The model does
successfully account for the fact that prime age households primarily allocate their
wealth in risky assets, as indicated by the low levels of bond holdings. The high
level of housing leads to an over-prediction of mortgage holdings and of unsecured
debt holding (by construction since the ratio is targeted). The model does well in
matching the fraction of households with zero or negative net-worth, the fraction of
households who have unsecured debt, and the fraction of bankrupt households with
positive home equity.
The presence of the housing asset allows the model to generate realistic interest
rates. The mean interest rate paid on unsecured debt in the model is 11.2%, very
close to the 12.3% reported in the SCF. The model is also able to successfully replicate
the default premium on mortgages. The mean mortgage interest rate in the model
is 1.24%, corresponding to a default premium of 24%. By comparison, the implied
default premium for a 1-year-adjustable rate mortgage (MORTGAGE1US from St.
26In the data, the median households have mainly housing wealth and not too much financial wealth
(which is highly concentrated among the rich).
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Table 1.3: Aggregate Results
Model Data Source
Housing, H 5.25 4.10 Residential Property, SCF 2004
Debt -3.88 -2.36 SCF 2004
Bonds, B+ 0.16 0.18 Savings/Bonds, SCF 2004
Unsecured debt, B− -0.34 -0.21 Unsecured Debt, SCF 2004
Mortgages M 3.54 1.93 Mortgage Debt, SCF 2004
Fraction of households 5.3% 6.7% SCF 2004
with net worth ≤ 0
Fraction of households 38% 33% SCF 2004
with Unsecured Debt
Fraction of bankrupt households 25% 33% SCF 2004
with positive home equity
Mean Interest Rate 11.2% 12.3% SCF 2004
Paid on Unsecured Debt
Mortgage Default Premium 24% 22% MORTGAGE1US, GS1 from FRED
Louis FRED) over the 1-year Treasury constant maturity rate (GS1) during the inter-
recession period March 1991-2001 was 22%.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Accounting for State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates
By calibrating the model to aggregate bankruptcy and foreclosure rates, I do not
directly target the effects that the homestead exemption and recourse laws have
on default rates. Thus, I can evaluate to what extent the cross-state variation in
bankruptcy rates in the data is predicted by the model. Further, the exercise pro-
vides an important source of model validation before proceeding to the policy analysis.
It is important to note that, in the model, the variation in policies is given exoge-
nously. Hynes, Malani, and Posner (2004) provide a detailed historical account of
the origins of property exemptions in bankruptcy. They find that historical exemp-
tion levels have more predictive power in explaining current exemption levels than
contemporaneous economic and political factors, and that historical exemptions were
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Table 1.4: Decomposing Bankruptcy Rates
bankratei = β0 + βLxL,i + βDxD,i + εi
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Demographic
log(Median household income) -0.0047 (0.0027)
Average household size 0.0099* (0.0028)
Weak garnishment law -0.0033* (0.0008)
Judicial Foreclosure -0.0018* (0.0008)
Bankruptcy & Foreclosure Law
Recourse 0.0029* (0.0010)
Homestead Exemption -0.0019* (0.0009)
Square of Homestead Exemption 0.0002 (0.0002)
Unlimited Exemption -0.0028* (0.0014)
Constant 0.0316 (0.0271)
R2 0.58
* indicates significance at 5% level
mainly driven by economic forces of the 19th and early 20th century. Thus, to the
extent that current economic conditions are independent of the economy a century
ago, I view treating state exemption levels as exogenous as defendable.
States vary in demographic and legal characteristics that are abstracted from in
the model, but which may be relevant to state default rates. In order to partially
control for that additional variation, in Figure 1.3(a), I plot mean model and data
bankruptcy rates for states binned by exemption level and recourse policy. The model
is able to capture the negative relationship between the homestead exemption and
bankruptcy rates and the positive relationship between recourse laws and bankruptcy
rates.
Figure 1.3(a) only presents conditional means. For a more careful accounting I
control for additional observables and compute what fraction of the residual variation
the model explains. First, I regress the state level bankruptcy rate on log median
household income, the average household size, a dummy indicating lenient garnish-
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(a) Bankruptcy rates in the data and model.
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(b) Fitted data versus model generated data.
Figure 1.3: Accounting for the cross-state variation in bankruptcy rates.
ment law, a dummy for judicial foreclose, a dummy for recourse, the homestead
exemption, the homestead exemption squared, a dummy for unlimited exemption,
and a constant. The coefficients on the legal variables are significant and indicate
that recourse increases bankruptcy rates and that more generous homestead exemp-
tions lower bankruptcy rates. The full coefficients are in Table 1.4. To compare my
model to the predictions from the regression, I compute the R2 between the fitted
bankruptcy rate using only the legal variables xL,iβ̂L and the model predictions mi.
I find that an R2 of 0.82, indicating that the model can explain more than 80 per-
cent of the variation attributable to variations in homestead exemptions and recourse
law. The predicted bankruptcy rates from the regression and from the model are
plotted in Figure 1.3(b). The model quantitatively matches the cross-state correla-
tion between policies and default rates. I find that the model can explain roughly
20 percent of the overall variation in bankruptcy rates (without controlling for state
level characteristics).
To illustrate the importance of studying foreclosure and bankruptcy together in
order to capture the cross-state variation in bankruptcy rate, I conduct the follow-
ing thought experiment: would a modified model without mortgages and foreclosure
capture the cross-state variation? To answer this question, I re-calibrate the model
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Figure 1.4: Data vs counterfactual model without mortgages and foreclosure.
without mortgages, dropping the targets related to mortgages and foreclosure. I plot
the conditional means in Figure ??. This version of the model does not reproduce
the observed negative relationship between bankruptcy rates and the homestead ex-
emption. This counterfactual analysis highlights the importance of modeling secured
and unsecured credit together.
1.5.2 The Household Default Decision
In order to understand how default policies lead to differences in default rates it is
important to understand when households choose to default. In Figure 1.5 I consider
a household in the Virginia economy (a recourse state with a $10,000 homestead ex-
emption), who had purchased a $200,000 house, had an 80% leverage mortgage and
took on $12,500 of unsecured debt. I plot the bankruptcy and foreclosure decisions as
a function of the realized home equity (after the price shock) and income realization.
The graph illustrates the complementarity and substitutability of the two types of
default. In the upper right quadrant, the household has positive home equity and
high income, so it repays its debt. However, if its income is lower and has only non-
exempt home equity it chooses to go bankrupt to discharge its unsecured debt, while
preserving its home equity. Households with low income and negative home equity
default on both their mortgages and unsecured debt. Whereas high income house-
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Figure 1.5: Household discrete choices with a house size equal to five times the median
income and an 80% leveraged mortgage.
holds with negative home equity only file for bankruptcy if they receive a deficiency
judgment.
Examining the household default problem alone cannot explain why bankruptcy
rates are lower when homestead exemptions are higher, since, from the household
perspective, more generous exemptions should lead to larger sets of income realiza-
tions for which the household will go bankrupt. Therefore the key mechanism must be
coming through an interest rate effect, which causes households to select into different
debt portfolios across the different states.
1.5.3 Effects of the Homestead Exemption
In this section I explore the general-equilibrium interest rate effects that arise from
different homestead exemptions. In the theoretical results, I proved that households
with less non-exempt home equity are more likely to go bankrupt. Since the prices
of unsecured credit reflect the implied default probabilities, a household with less
non-exempt home equity should face a higher cost of borrowing in unsecured credit
than one with more non-exempt home equity.
To illustrate this effect, I choose two households, one in Virginia and one in Michi-
gan (both recourse states) that have roughly median net worth and the high persistent
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Figure 1.6: Interest rates on unsecured debt for households of identical net worth in
Virginia and Michigan. The dots in both figures represent the optimal policy choices.
Notes: The household in Virginia optimally chooses a $265K house, $180K mortgage and $36K of
unsecured debt. The Michigan line in (a) represents the price schedule that the household would face if it
chose the same size house and mortgage as the Virginia household. The Michigan line in (b) represents the
price schedule given its optimal choice of housing and mortgage: $210K house, $155K mortgage and $6K of
unsecured debt.
income realization. Virginia has a $10K homestead exemption as compared to Michi-
gan’s $30K. The household in Virginia optimally chooses a portfolio consisting of a
$265K house, a $180K mortgage and $36K in unsecured credit. In Figure 1.6(a), I plot
the unsecured interest rate for other hypothetical amounts of unsecured borrowing for
the Virginia household. In addition, I plot the unsecured interest rate as a function of
unsecured debt for the household in Michigan, assuming the same choice of housing
and mortgage (note that the risk-free interest rate is the same in both states). Notice
that the interest rate in Michigan is significantly higher at the Virginia optimal choice
of $36K. This is due to the fact that in Michigan the household has more exempt
home equity and less non-exempt home equity. Both households would have $85K in
home equity. However, in Michigan $30K of that equity is exempt as compared to
$10K in Virginia. Imagine that the value of the home fell by 15%. Both households
would be left with slightly more than $45K in equity. If the household in Virginia
went bankrupt, it would have $36K in unsecured debt discharged, but would lose
$35K in non-exempt equity - for a financial benefit of $1K. The Michigan household,
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however, would get the same discharge, but only forfeit $15K, meaning a financial
benefit of bankruptcy of $21K. Thus, because of the difference in exemptions, the
Michigan household is more likely to go bankrupt and would have to pay a higher
interest rate on its unsecured debt.
At that interest rate, however, the Michigan household does not find it optimal
to take on $36K in debt. Since unsecured credit is more expensive, the overall cost
of borrowing is higher for the Michigan household. As a result, it optimally takes on
a lower level of debt. Since the household is borrowing less, it also optimally chooses
a smaller sized house and mortgage. The Michigan household chooses a $210K house
and $155K mortgage. In Figure 1.6(b), I plot the unsecured interest rates facing
the Michigan household under the optimal housing and mortgage choice.27 Since the
household has only $25K of non-exempt home equity, the interest rate rises rapidly
as unsecured debt approaches that level. The household optimally chooses a much
lower level of unsecured debt, about $6K, but at a comparable interest rate to the
Virginia household. Notice that in addition to the Michigan household taking on
less overall debt ($161K vs $180K) the composition of the debt is also different. The
Michigan household borrows almost exclusively in mortgage debt by taking on a more
highly leveraged mortgage (74% vs 68%). By buying a smaller house, the Michigan
household has less home equity, which further compounds the price effect of the higher
homestead exemption. Thus, the household finds it optimal to increase its leverage,
which only results in a small increase in the interest rate paid on the mortgage.28
The above discussion sheds light on why household portfolios are different across
states with different homestead exemptions, but does not directly answer why these
differences lead to different default rates. In all states, there are very low net worth
households that only borrow in unsecured credit, and have no housing or mortgage
27It should be understood that the household is making its choice of housing, mortgage and unsecured
credit simultaneously. The discussion of the choices as separate or sequential is merely to help illustrate the
intuition for the mechanism at hand.
28See Figure A.1 in the appendix for the mortgage interest rate schedule faced by the Michigan household
conditional on its housing and unsecured debt choice
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debt. The debt portfolios and default rates of these households are, to first order, un-
affected by the exemption, since they hold no housing. The equilibrium price effects of
the homestead exemption do, however, affect the fraction of households with housing
that choose to take on unsecured debt. Households with non-exempt home equity are
the ones that take advantage of cheap unsecured borrowing. As the homestead ex-
emption rises, the fraction of households that have non-exempt home equity falls. As
a result, some households stop borrowing unsecured and only take on mortgage debt.
Thus, the fraction of households who borrow unsecured, and therefore are at risk of
going bankrupt is smaller in high exemption states. This leads to lower bankruptcy
rates.29 The extensive margin choice of whether to take on unsecured debt drives the
majority of the variation in bankruptcy rates. Further, differences in the extensive
margin explain why states with higher interest rates also have lower default rates
(even though interest rates reflect default probabilities). In states with high exemp-
tions, conditional on borrowing unsecured households have a higher propensity to
default, but since fewer households are borrowing, the state bankruptcy rate is lower.
Foreclosure rates are higher in high exemption states because mortgage leverage is
higher and the probability of foreclosure is increasing with leverage. These effects can
be seen in the state level aggregates in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
Empirical Evidence for Unsecured Interest Rate Variation Across States
In the model, households in low exemption states pay on average lower interest rates
on unsecured debt than households in high exemption states. To compare the pre-
diction of the model to the data, I construct a measure of interest rate paid using the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from 1994-2003. For households that reported
having unsecured debt, I compute the effective interest rate by dividing the expendi-
29In recourse states even households that hold no unsecured debt but hold mortgages are at risk of
bankruptcy because of the deficiency judgments in foreclosure. However, quantitatively, these households
account for less than 1% of bankrupt households in recourse states.
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Table 1.5: Unsecured Interest Rates
Data (CEX) Model
Low Exemption 23.49% 7.93%
(1.13%) (0.56%)
High Exemption 27.64% 13.07%
(3.49%) (2.50%)
Notes: Data constructed by diving interest and finance charges by total debt and computing the mean across
households. The model means are the averages of 100 simulations of a sample of size N = 10, 760. Standard
errors are reported across simulations
ture on interest and finance charges by the amount of unsecured debt. While a crude
measure, to my knowledge the CEX is the only publicly available data source that
provides information on unsecured debt, interest and state of residence. There are a
total of 10,760 observations in my sample, so I simulate 100 samples of the same size
from the model. I report the means and standard errors across the simulations from
the model generated data. Because the CEX is not designed to be representative at
the state level, I divide states into high and low exemption states and then compare
the mean interest rates in Table 1.5. The interest rates are significantly higher in the
CEX (and are high relative to the 12.3 percent average interest rate reported in the
SCF), most likely due to the simplified measure being used and because the CEX also
includes finance charges. However, the direction and magnitude of the difference in
interest rates in the model is consistent with the data, providing additional evidence
for the mechanism.
Empirical Evidence for Mortgage Leverage Variation Across States
As examined in the previous section, homestead exemptions change the price of un-
secured debt. As a result households take on different portfolios of debt. The model
predicts that households in high exemption states take on more highly leveraged
mortgages than in low exemption states. To compare this prediction to the data,
I construct household mortgage leverage from the 2000 Residential Finance Survey
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Table 1.6: Mortgage Leverage
Data (RFS) Model
Low Exemption 67.03% 68.27%
(0.82%) (0.66%)
High Exemption 74.50% 74.10%
(5.23%) (0.52%)
Notes: Data constructed by dividing mortgage balances by current house value and computing the mean
across households. The model means are the averages of 100 simulations of a sample of size N = 4, 315.
Standard errors are reported across simulations
(RFS). I compute the leverage by summing across the balance on all mortgages out-
standing and diving by the current value of the home for all prime-aged households.
Since the RFS only includes state identifying information for twelve states (note that
those twelve states include 65 percent of all households in the US30) again I partition
the states between high and low exemption states. The mean leverage of households
with a mortgage and standard errors are reported in Table 1.6. I simulate households
from the model of the same sample size (N = 4, 315) and same states as the RFS 100
times and report the mean leverage and standard deviation across simulated means
also in Table 1.6. The model does remarkably well in matching the level of leverage
and its difference between high and low exemption states.
1.5.4 Effects of Recourse
Recourse has surprisingly little effect on foreclosure and mortgage interest rates. Re-
course and no recourse states with the same homestead exemption have nearly identi-
cal foreclosure rates. This is because recourse only has significant effects on two groups
of mortgage holders. The first are those with mortgages with very high leverage (¿90
percent). Those households have a large probability of being slightly underwater in
the next period, and households are more likely to repay slightly underwater mort-
gages in recourse states (as shown in Figure 1.5). However, very few households take
30The twelve states are: California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington.
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on mortgages with leverage over 90 percent (median leverage in the data and model
are both less than 70 percent), so in the aggregate this effect is marginal.
The other group of households affected by recourse are those with substantial
savings in bonds. Those households are less likely to foreclose because they have the
resources to repay an underwater mortgage and want to avoid a deficiency judgment.31
However, households that have substantial savings in bonds take on mortgages with
low leverages and thus have low probabilities of going into foreclosure. Further, only
a small fraction of households hold significant amounts of savings in bonds. Thus, the
marginal change in their interest rate and foreclosure probability is negligible when
aggregated at the state level.
In addition, the model predicts that recourse states will have higher bankruptcy
rates than no-recourse states. The result is intuitive, since in recourse states fore-
closing households face additional liability, which may trigger bankruptcy following
foreclosure. In addition, in recourse states 10-20 percent more households go bankrupt
conditional on foreclosure compared to no-recourse states. That number directly re-
flects the effect of the parameter ψ, the probability of a deficiency judgment. These
results are consistent with recent research by Li and White (2009) (see their Table 5)
that suggests that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy after foreclosure
in recourse states than no-recourse states.
Having shown that the model is an appropriate laboratory for studying bankruptcy
and foreclosure in the U.S., I proceed with policy analysis.
1.6 Policy Experiments
I now use the calibrated model to conduct two policy experiments. In the first policy
experiment, I consider the effects of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), the first major reform to bankruptcy in almost
31This is consistent with the interpretation of the effects of recourse found in Ghent and Kudlyak (2011).
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30 years. The reform made it more difficult for households earning more than the
median income in their state from filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The analysis
enables me to evaluate the hypothesis of Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2009) and Li,
White, and Zhu (2010) that BAPCPA contributed to the subsequent observed rise
in foreclosure rates. The second experiment is motivated by the ongoing debate in
the U.S. Congress whether to standardize homestead exemption policy. To inform
this policy debate, I use my calibrated model to quantitatively determine the optimal
joint homestead exemption and recourse policy from a utilitarian welfare perspective.
1.6.1 BAPCPA
To simulate the effects of BAPCPA, in the model households above median income
cannot file for bankruptcy, unless as a result they have non-positive consumption. I
compute the transition from the original steady state to the new steady state equi-
librium. I find that it takes several years for default, housing and debt to reach their
new steady state levels. Taking into account the transitional dynamics will therefore
be important for understanding the welfare implications of the policy.
Effects on Allocations
The aggregate implications of the reform are substantial, both in terms of default
rates and total borrowing in the economy, as shown in Table 1.7. Unsecured debt
increases 30 percent over approximately 10 years. The increase in unsecured debt is
small, however, relative to the increased indebtedness of households. After reform, as
more households take on unsecured debt, the fraction of households with non-positive
net worth almost triples to more than 15 percent. The percentage of households that
file for bankruptcy initially drops, and then rises rapidly and converges to a rate of
2.45 percent.32 Qualitatively, the initial drop and subsequent rise are consistent with
32The transitional dynamics are illustrated in Figure A.2(a)-A.2(c) in the appendix.
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Table 1.7: Aggregate Effects of BAPCPA
Baseline BAPCPA
Housing, H 5.25 5.21
Unsecured debt, B− -0.34 -0.46
Mortgages M 3.54 3.64
Fraction with net worth ≤ 0 5.3% 15.1%
Bankrupty Rate 1.06% 2.45%
Foreclosure Rate 0.55% 1.16%
bankruptcy rates post-BAPCPA, however the model predicts a much faster increase
in bankruptcy rates than observed. Foreclosure also more than doubles going from
0.55 percent to 1.15 percent of mortgages per year. How can a policy that is intended
to make it more difficult for households to go bankrupt result in higher bankruptcy
rates?
The reform significantly reduces the cost of unsecured borrowing. In Figure 1.7(a),
I plot the unsecured interest rates for the same household in Michigan as in the
previous section, one with roughly median net worth and high persistent income. The
household optimally chooses a portfolio consisting of $210K house, a $155K mortgage
and $6K of unsecured credit. Also in the figure, I plot the unsecured interest rates
that household would face if it chose the same size house and mortgage after the
BAPCPA reform. The interest rate schedule shifts significantly to the right, meaning
that the household faces lower interest rates. In addition, the interest rate schedule
remains low even when the total amount of debt borrowed exceeds non-exempt home
equity (the point at which the ex-ante financial gain from going bankrupt is positive).
This is as a result of the fact that if the household earns above median income in the
subsequent period it cannot go bankrupt even though there is a financial gain from
doing so. Households are also less likely to go bankrupt in order to maintaining access
to credit. Since interest rates are lower, access to credit is more valuable post-reform,
implying that a greater direct financial benefit is required for a household to choose
to go bankrupt.
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Figure 1.7: Interest rates on unsecured debt for a household in Michigan before and after
the BAPCPA reform. The dots represent the optimal policy choices of the household.
Notes: Before the reform, the household optimally chooses a $210K house, $155K mortgage and $6K of
unsecured debt. The BAPCPA line in (a) represents the price schedule that the household would face if it
chose the same size house and mortgage as before the reform. The BAPCPA line in (b) represents the
price schedule given the household’s optimal choice of housing and mortgage after the reform: $280K
house, $190K mortgage and $41K of unsecured debt.
Facing the lower cost of borrowing, the household in Michigan no longer finds it
optimal to take on $6K of unsecured credit. After the reform, the household takes
on a bigger house and mortgage, $280K and $190K respectively. Based on those
choices, the unsecured interest rates that the household faces are plotted in Figure
1.7(b). With the increased amount of home equity and the BAPCPA restrictions,
the household faces significantly lower borrowing costs and optimally chooses $41K
of unsecured credit. This type of change in behavior can explain the large increases
in unsecured debt taken on by households after the reform.
Increases in debt and lower interest rates alone do not fully account for the increase
in bankruptcies. The composition of who is taking on unsecured debt changes as
well. Before the reform, there were primarily two groups of households that took
on unsecured debt: those with very low net worth and those with substantial non-
exempt home equity. Households with only exempt home equity took on only small
amounts unsecured debt or none at all. After the reform that distribution changes.
The low net worth households continue to borrow only in unsecured debt. However,
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households with high income and only exempt home equity take on more unsecured
credit than before the reform. The persistence of income makes interest rates on
unsecured debt low, even though the financial benefit of going bankrupt is high. If
the household stays above median income, it simply repays or rolls over the debt.
However, if the household falls below median income, it files for bankruptcy because
the financial gain from doing so is large (since it keeps all of its home equity and
discharges substantial unsecured debt). Unsecured borrowing coupled with exempt
home equity essentially serves as insurance against below-median income realizations
in the subsequent period. These results contrast with those of Chatterjee, Corbae,
Nakajima, and Rı́os-Rull (2007) who find a slight decline in the bankruptcy rate after
imposing the income restriction for filing. The difference highlights the importance
of considering exempt assets (mainly houses) as well as liabilities in any analysis of
the effects of bankruptcy policy.
Effect of Homestead Exemption under BAPCPA
Before the reform, higher homestead exemptions lead to lower bankruptcy rates. After
BAPCPA, the relationship is reversed - higher levels of the homestead exemption lead
to higher levels of bankruptcy.33
The income restriction imposed under BAPCPA significantly mitigates the price
effect of higher exemptions because high income households are prevented from go-
ing bankrupt even when there is a financial benefit of doing so. As described in the
previous section, unsecured credit and exempt home equity can mimic an insurance
contract against low income realizations. The level of insurance provided is lim-
ited by the level of the exemption (the maximum amount households can keep after
bankruptcy). Therefore, households in high exemption states take on unsecured debt
and increase home equity, leading to increased bankruptcy rates.
33The state by state default rates are presented in Table A.4 the Appendix.
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Welfare Consequences of the Reform
Despite higher levels of bankruptcy and foreclosure, households on average are made
strictly better off from the reform. Taking into account transitional dynamics, the
average consumption equivalent welfare gain across households from adopting the
policy is 1.4 percent of lifetime consumption (this is a utilitarian welfare measure).
The reason why households benefit from the reform is that they are excluded from
going bankrupt in states of the world where the gain is relatively small, but allowed
to go bankrupt when the gain is large. Furthermore, with the exempt asset they are
able to do better than just not having to repay the debt - they can also essentially
transfer resources to the bankruptcy state through exempt housing. Since income
is persistent, the cost of this “insurance” is fairly low for households above median
income, so more households use it and end up going bankrupt more often, but are
better off by doing so.
1.6.2 Optimal Homestead Exemption and Recourse Policy
In my second policy experiment, I ask how the government should optimally set the
homestead exemption and recourse policy to maximize utilitarian welfare, taking into
account the transitional effects of switching to a new policy. In the real world the
federal government has the power to adopt a uniform bankruptcy law, but in the past
has allowed states to opt-out of the federally mandated exemptions.
In order to solve for the optimal policy, I take as my initial condition the economy
along the transition path induced by the passage of BAPCPA. I solve for the policy
that maximizes current welfare taking into account the new transition path induced
by the change in exemption and recourse law. I find that the optimal joint policy
prescribes no recourse and a homestead exemption of roughly one quarter of median
state income.
Eliminating recourse may at first seem counterintuitive. However, households in
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this economy face two types of uncorrelated risk: house price risk and income risk.
Having no recourse mortgages allows the two debt instruments to more effectively
span the space of possible shocks. When there is recourse, housing risk could result
in bankruptcy which reduces the ability of the household to use savings or unsecured
debt to insure against income risk. A no-recourse mortgage policy is in some sense
regressive, however, as the households that benefit the most are high income and high
net worth households that have large homes and large mortgages. Lower net worth
households get less insurance, but face the higher borrowing cost.
The intuition for why a positive homestead exemption is optimal relates to the dis-
cussion in the previous section on how unsecured debt can provide insurance against
a drop in income. The trade-off between price and insurance is lower after BAPCPA,
however, since default is costly, it is optimal to keep the exemption relatively low,
yielding lower bankruptcy and foreclosure rates. In addition, the lower exemption
disproportionately benefits households with low wealth, since their assets are mostly
exempt. Since I have adopted a utilitarian welfare function, setting the exemption to
benefit mostly low net worth households may represent a trade-off with no-recourse
mortgages, which disproportionately benefit high net worth households.
The welfare gains from adopting the optimal exemption and recourse policy are
non-negligible - on average households gain 0.4 percent of average lifetime consump-
tion by the switching to the optimal policy. The gains are not uniform across states, as
the states with recourse and high exemptions see the largest welfare gains. The welfare
gains are also heterogeneous across households. For example, high net worth house-
holds benefit most from adopting no-recourse mortgages, and lower income households
with unsecured debt and home equity benefit from the lower exemption.
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1.7 Conclusions
The option to default provides an important channel for insurance for households in
an incomplete markets world. In the wake of the 2005 reform and the financial crisis of
2008 there has been fierce debate over how the government should regulate consumer
credit markets. In this paper, I have shown that household behavior fundamentally
links secured and unsecured credit, and foreclosure and bankruptcy. From the per-
spective of these findings, researchers and policy makers, therefore, ought to take into
account both channels of default when analyzing consumer credit; otherwise they risk
misstating the overall effect on household behavior and welfare. I illustrated this by
showing that the model can capture the cross state variation in bankruptcy rates only
when foreclosure is incorporated. Moreover, the evaluation of the 2005 BAPCPA re-
form showed that it had the unintended consequence of raising both bankruptcy and
foreclosure rates.
The framework I developed opens up exciting avenues for future research. First,
aggregate house price risk could be incorporated into the model. The model with
aggregate risk could be used to evaluate mortgage modification policies intended to
mitigate the effects of large house price drops. In particular, the model provides
the necessary framework to evaluate proposed reforms to bankruptcy that would
allow bankruptcy judges to modify the principal balances on mortgages (commonly
referred to as ”cramdowns”). Second, one could use the model to explain aggregate
house price changes. Moving from an endowment economy to a production economy
with aggregate risk and frictions on housing would generate endogenous movements
in house prices. I defer this to future work.
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Chapter 2
Housing, Mortgage Bailout Guarantees and the
Macroeconomy
A modified version of this chapter originally appeared as ? and is co-authored with
Karsten Jeske and Dirk Krueger.
The United States displays one of the highest home ownership rates in the world
at close to 70%, and owner-occupied houses constitute the most important asset for
most U.S. households. Part of the attractiveness of owner-occupied housing stems
from a variety of subsidies the government provides to homeowners. In addition to
tax-deductible mortgage interest payments and the fact that implicit income from
housing capital (i.e. the imputed rental-equivalent) is not taxable, a third subsidy
arises from government intervention in the mortgage market. In the US close to
50% of residential mortgages are held by so-called Government-Sponsored Enterprises
(GSE’s), totaling more that $5 trillion in value. In September 2008, the US Treasury
took conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after huge losses following the
collapse of house prices. Since then, the US government has provided about $180
billion (see FHFA, 2012) to help GSE’s remain solvent. Policy makers are currently
faced with deciding the future of GSE’s and the role of the government in providing
insurance in the mortgage market.
What are the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of government guar-
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antees for GSE’s, and what is the optimal degree of such bailout guarantees? We
model the consequences of this bailout guarantee as a tax-financed mortgage inter-
est rate subsidy. Prior to their bailout in 2008, the GSE’s could borrow at interest
rates close to that on U.S. government debt, despite the fact that they were heavily
exposed to aggregate house price risk (as has become abundantly clear during the
recent crisis). The absence of a significant risk premium for the GSE’s debt can be
attributed to the then implicit government bailout guarantee these institutions en-
joyed. Currently the GSE’s are explicitly backed by the US government and as a
consequence enjoy lower borrowing costs than private companies. To the extent that
part of the interest advantage of GSE’s is passed through to homeowners, there exists
a mortgage interest rate subsidy from the federal government to homeowners.
The aggregate and redistributive consequences of this subsidy are evaluated by
constructing a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with incomplete mar-
kets in the tradition of Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). This
model is augmented by a housing sector and we allow households to borrow against
their real estate wealth positions through collateralized mortgages. In the model
households can default on their mortgages, with the consequence of losing their
homes. Competitive mortgage companies price the default risk into the mortgage
interest rates they offer. The implicit (prior to 2008) or explicit (since 2008) support
of GSE’s is modeled as a tax-financed direct subsidy to mortgage interest rates. The
stationary economy can be interpreted as a world in which the government taxes
income every period and either saves the proceeds in an effort to smooth out the
spending shock triggered by a potential insolvency of the GSE’s, or alternatively, is
able to buy insurance against that shock from the outside world via, say, a market for
credit derivatives. Under this interpretation the tax revenues constitute the required
funds to cover the necessary insurance premium.
In addition to addressing the applied policy question stated above, a second contri-
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bution of the paper is the theoretical characterization of mortgage interest rates in the
general equilibrium model with foreclosure. First, it shown that mortgages are priced
exclusively based on leverage, with more highly levered households paying higher in-
terest rates. This result is important because it provides a concise characterization of
the mortgage price function which allows to easily deal with the continuous choice by
households of mortgage contracts with endogenous interest rates. It also facilitates
the efficient computation of an equilibrium in the model. Second, a minimum down
payment requirement arises endogenously in our model. Finally, a partial character-
ization of the household decision problem is provided that delivers insights into why
households might simultaneously want to save in low interest bearing risk-free bonds
and borrow in mortgages that carry higher interest rates. The model provides a use-
ful and tractable framework for future analyses of the housing and mortgage market
with collateralized default, and consequently might be of independent interest.
The quantitative results can be described as follows. First, comparing allocations
in stationary equilibria with and without the policy, a tax-financed interest rate sub-
sidy of 30 basis points1 leads to a large increase in mortgage origination, but has
little effect on investment in housing assets or in the equilibrium construction of real
estate. The mortgage subsidy does not significantly change the share of households
with positive holdings of real estate, because on one hand the subsidy makes real es-
tate ownership more attractive, but on the other hand the higher required taxes lower
after-tax income and thus discourage home ownership for low-income and low-asset
households. However, the subsidy does significantly affect the distribution of leverage
in the economy by increasing both the fraction of households that have positive mort-
gage debt and the level of leverage, conditional on holding a mortgage. This suggests
that the government subsidy of the GSE’s may have contributed to the increase in
1Lucas and McDonald (2010) argue for a default premium of the GSE’s and assumed by the government
of 20 to 30 basis points. Thirty basis points is chosen, the high end of their range, but still lower than the
estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2001) or those implied by Passmore (2005).
Several studies (e.g., Passmore, Sherlund and Burgess (2005) and Blinder, Flannery, and Kamihachi
(2004)) have argued that a significant portion, if not all of the subsidy, is passed on to homeowners.
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mortgage debt and household leverage prior to the housing bust, which in turn may
have exacerbated the economic impact of the recent decline in house prices.
Second, using a steady state utilitarian social welfare function, the welfare impli-
cations of the subsidy are significantly negative, on the order of 0.5% of consumption
equivalent variation. This aggregate statistic, however, masks substantial heterogene-
ity across households differing in income and wealth. Low-wealth households prefer
to live in a world without the subsidy since they hold little housing and mortgages,
and thus do not benefit from the interest rate subsidy, but bear part of the tax bill
required to finance it. In contrast, wealthy households have larger homes and mort-
gages, and thus the benefits accruing to them outweigh the fiscal burden of the policy.
Using the same social welfare function theoptimal interest rate subsidy is found to be
small but positive, at 9.375 basis points.
2.0.1 Related Literature
The paper aims at making two contributions, and thus is related to two broad strands
of the literature. On the substantive side, it provides a quantitative, model-based
analysis of the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of mortgage interest
rate subsidies through government guarantees of the GSE’s. It therefore complements
empirical work that evaluates the importance of the GSE’s and their government
guarantee for the housing and mortgage market. Frame and Wall (2002a,b) and
more recently Acharya et al. (2011) provide a thorough summary of the institutional
details surrounding GSE’s. The empirical estimates of Lucas and McDonald (2010)
that quantified the borrowing interest rate advantage of GSE’s to between 20 and 30
basis points are used to motivate the policy thought experiment.
More broadly, the paper contributes to the literature that studies the positive and
normative implications of government housing subsidies on equilibrium allocations.
Along this dimension, it is most closely related to the pioneering study by Gervais
55
(2002) who constructs a heterogeneous household general equilibrium life cycle model
to evaluate the effects of the other two main government housing subsidies: the tax-
deductibility of mortgage interest rates and the fact that the implicit income from
owner-occupied housing capital is not subject to income taxation. Our contribution,
relative to his, is to introduce mortgage default (foreclosure) into a dynamic general
equilibrium model, and to use it to study a third, and hitherto perhaps somewhat
overlooked government housing subsidy policy
A second, model-building and theoretical contribution of the paper is to develop
an equilibrium model with mortgage debt and foreclosure in which mortgage inter-
est rates are determined by competition of financial intermediaries, and fully reflect
equilibrium default probabilities. In this regard, the model can be seen as a natural
extension of the literature on uncollateralized debt and equilibrium default pioneered
by Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits et al. (2007). More broadly, our model shares
many elements with the recent model-based quantitative housing literature.2 For ex-
ample, Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009), Ŕıos- Rull and Sánchez-Marcos
(2008) and Favilukis, Ludvigson and van Nieuwerburgh (2012) incorporate a housing
and mortgage choices into a general equilibrium framework. Similarly, Gruber and
Martin (2003) also study the distributional effects of the inclusion of housing wealth
in a general equilibrium model, but do not address the role of government housing
subsidies.
Especially relevant for the purpose of our analysis are the three recent papers
by Corbae and Quintin (2011), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011), and Garriga and
Schlagenhauf (2009) that build general equilibrium models of housing that also feature
equilibrium mortgage default, in order to evaluate the effects of the drop in house
prices and a change in housing supply on equilibrium foreclosure rates. Their focus
is mainly to understand the underlying reasons for, and consequences of the recent
2For a brief survey of this literature, see Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011).
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foreclosure crisis3 in the U.S. whereas our purpose is to study the effects of a specific
government housing market policy. Our paper is complementary to theirs in terms of
focus, but also in terms of the details of how mortgages and foreclosure are modeled.
In these papers mortgages are long term contracts whereas we permit households
to costlessly refinance in every period. This modeling choice, in conjunction with
perfect competition in the mortgage market allows us to obtain a sharp analytical
characterization of equilibrium mortgage interest rates and default behavior in our
model.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and defines equilibrium in an economy with a housing and mortgage market. Section
3 characterizes equilibria. Section 4 describes the calibration of our economy. Section
5 details the numerical results by comparing steady states in economies with and
without a mortgage interest subsidy. Section 6 concludes the paper, and all proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2.1 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of infinitely lived house-
holds, a continuum of competitive banks and a continuum of housing construction
companies. The analysis proceeds by immediately describing the economy recursively.
2.1.1 Households
Preferences: Households derive period utility U(c, h) from nondurable consump-
tion c and housing services h, which can be purchased at a price Pl (relative to the
3An important empirically oriented literature has recently studied the causes and consequences of the
recent boom in foreclosures in the U.S. See e.g. Campbell et al. (2011), Gerardi et al. (2010) or Mian et al.
(2011).
4Krainer et al. (2009) construct a continuous time mortgage valuation model and also provide a partial
analytical characterization of the interest rate and asset value of mortgages, as a function of mortgage
leverage.
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numeraire consumption good). Households discount the future with discount factor
β and maximize expected utility.
Endowments: Households receive an idiosyncratic endowment of the perishable con-
sumption good given by y ∈ Y. These endowments follow a finite state Markov chain
with transition probabilities π(y′|y) and unique invariant distribution Π(y). Denote
by ȳ =
∑
y∈Y yΠ(y) the average endowment. The terms endowment and (labor) in-
come are used interchangeably throughout the remainder of the paper, and a law of
large number is assumed to apply, so that π and Π also denote deterministic fractions
of households receiving a particular income shock y.
The government levies a proportional tax τ on labor income to finance an interest
rate subsidy, if such a policy is in place.
Assets: In addition to consumption and housing services the household spends in-
come to purchase two types of assets, one-period bonds b′ and perfectly divisible
houses g′. The price of bonds is denoted by Pb and the price of houses by Ph. Houses
are risky assets: they are subject to idiosyncratic house price shocks. Let F (δ′)
denote the continuously differentiable cumulative distribution function of the house
price depreciation rate δ′ tomorrow, which has support D = [δ, 1] with δ ≤ 0. A
negative value of δ indicates positive house price appreciation. The realization of δ is
independent across time for every household, and that a law of large number applies,
so that F (.) is also the economy-wide distribution of house price shocks. One unit of
the housing asset generates one unit of housing services. A house purchased in the
current period can immediately be rented out to generate rental income in the same
period as the purchase. By assumption households are prohibited from selling bonds
and houses short.
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Mortgages: Households can borrow against their real estate position using one-
period mortgage debt.5 Let m′ denote the size of the mortgage, and Pm the con-
temporaneous receipts of resources (that is, of the consumption good) for each unit
of mortgage issued today and to be repaid in the subsequent period. The “price”
Pm will be determined in equilibrium by competition of banks through a zero profit
condition, and will in general depend on the characteristics of households as well as
the size of the mortgage m′ and size of the collateral g′ against which the mortgage
is issued. The gross mortgage interest rate is then simply given by Rm = 1/Pm.
Households that come into the next period with housing assets g′ and a mortgage
m′ possess the option, after having observed the idiosyncratic house price appreciation
shock δ′, of defaulting on their mortgages, at the cost of losing their entire housing
collateral. There are no other costs associated with mortgage default. This assump-
tion, together with modeling mortgages as short-term contracts, immediately implies
that households will choose to default whenever the amount owed on the mortgage is
greater than the value of the house after the realization of the price shock, that is, if
and only if6 m′ > Ph(1− δ′)g′.
As a consequence, the ex-ante default probability of a household at mortgage
origination, that is, prior to observing the shock, is simply a function of the size of
the mortgage m′ and today’s value of the collateral g′Ph. As argued below, this will
imply that in equilibrium the price of a mortgage Pm today will only be a function
of (m′, g′), a fact we will already use when now specifying the household problem in
recursive formulation.
5Our assumption abstracts from transaction costs of refinancing a mortgage or obtaining a home equity
line of credit. Long-term mortgages in addition protect households from inflation risk and prevent banks from
adjusting interest rates based on changing household characteristics (such as income), providing additional
insurance to households. In our real model inflation risk is absent. In principle, financial intermediaries
could condition interest rates of our one-period mortgages on income (and thus adjust them in response to
income shocks), but in equilibrium (shown later) they will not. We therefore think that, in the context of
our model, assuming short-term debt is a defendable assumption. As demonstrated below, the payoff is a
sharp analytical characterization of equilibrium mortgage interest rates and foreclosure behavior.
6We make the assumption that a household indifferent between defaulting or not will choose not to
default.
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2.1.2 Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem
Let a denote cash at hand, that is, after tax income plus the value from all assets
brought into the period, after the current income and house price shocks (y, δ) have
materialized. The individual state of a household consists of s = (a, y). The cross-
sectional distribution over individual states is denoted by µ. Since the analysis is
restricted to stationary equilibria in which µ is constant over time, in what follows
the dependence of aggregate prices and quantities on µ is left implicit.
The dynamic programming problem of a household consists of choosing consump-
tion c, housing services h and financial and housing assets (b′, g′) as well as mortgages
m′ to solve:
v(a, y) = max
c,h,b′,m′,g′≥0
{
U(c, h) + β
∑
y′
π(y′|y)
∫ 1
δ
v(a′, y′)dF (δ′)
}
s.t. (2.1)
c+ b′Pb + hPl + g
′Ph −m′Pm (g′,m′) = a+ g′Pl (2.2)
a′(δ′, y′,m′, g′) = b′ + max{0, Ph(1− δ′)g′ −m′)}+ (1− τ)y′ (2.3)
Note that because of the assumption that newly purchased housing assets can imme-
diately be rented out, rental income g′Pl from newly purchased housing assets enters
the current period budget constraint. Tomorrow’s cash at hand a′ is equal to the
sum of after tax labor income (1 − τ)y′, the amount of bonds b′ brought into the
period and the net value of real estate. If the household owes less than the realized
value of her housing asset, she does not default and the net value of real estate equals
Ph(1−δ′)g′−m′. For bad realization of the house price shock δ′ the mortgage is under
water, the household defaults and is left with zero housing wealth.
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2.1.3 The Real Estate Construction Sector
The representative firms in the perfectly competitive real estate construction sector
face the linear technology I = Ch, where I is the output of newly build and perfectly
divisible houses of a representative firm and Ch is the input of the consumption good.
Note that we assume that this technology is reversible, that is, real estate companies
can turn houses back into consumption goods using the same technology, although this
does not happen in the equilibrium of our calibrated economies. Thus the problem
of a representative firm reads as
max
s.t. I=Ch
PhI − Ch (2.4)
and the equilibrium house price necessarily satisfies Ph = 1. In effect, ours is therefore
a model with exogenous house prices normalized to Ph = 1, but endogenous rents (and
thus endogenous house-price to rent ratios), and perfectly elastic supply of the housing
asset from the real estate companies, at the exogenous house price Ph = 1.
2.1.4 The Banking Sector
Let rb denote the risk free interest rate on one-period bonds, to be determined in
general equilibrium. Competitive banks take their costs Pb =
1
1+rb
of re-financing as
given. In addition, issuing mortgages is costly; let rw be the percentage real resource
cost, per unit of mortgage issued, to the bank. This cost captures screening costs,
administrative costs as well as maintenance costs of the mortgage (such as preparing
and mailing a quarterly mortgage balance).7 In addition, in order to insure mortgages
against the (unmodeled) aggregate component of mortgage default risk, banks need
to purchase insurance at a cost θ for each dollar of mortgage originated. This θ can
be interpreted as a real resource cost that is transferred to an unmodeled insurance
7In addition to realism the cost rw > 0 insures that the interest paid on a mortgage that is repaid with
probability one is still higher than the risk-free rate on bonds, which avoids an indeterminacy in the household
maximization problem (since with rw = 0 bonds and zero-default mortgages are perfect substitutes).
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company abroad. It will enter the aggregate resource constraint of the economy.
The government can subsidize mortgages using labor income taxes. The mortgage
subsidy is modeled as an interest rate subsidy φ for each unit of mortgage issued.
Thus the effective cost of the banking sector for financing one dollar of mortgage
equals (1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ).
In the perfectly competitive banking sector, risk-neutral banks compete for cus-
tomers loan by loan, as in Chatterjee et al. (2007), in the context of uncollateralized
debt. Banks will only originate mortgages that yield non-negative profits in expec-
tation. Banks, when making their origination decision, take into account the fact
that a household may default on its mortgage. When a household does so, the bank
seizes the housing collateral worth (1− δ′)g′. However, the foreclosure technology is
possibly inefficient, and therefore that the bank only recovers a fraction γ ≤ 1 of the
value of the collateral.
In order to define a typical banks’ problem the optimal default choice of a house-
hold has to be characterized. As discussed in section 2.1.1 the household defaults if
and only if her mortgage is under water. Thus for a household with housing assets
g′ and a mortgage m′ there is a cutoff level for house price depreciation δ∗(m′, g′)
at which a household is indifferent between defaulting and not defaulting on her
mortgage. This cutoff is determined as m′ = (1− δ∗(m′, g′))g′, and thus explicitly, as
δ∗(m′, g′) = δ∗(κ′) = 1− m
′
g′
= 1− κ′ (2.5)
where κ′ = m
′
g′
is defined as the leverage (for g′ > 0) of a mortgage m′ backed by real
estate g′. Thus the household defaults for all house price depreciation realizations
δ′ > δ∗(κ′). Since the foreclosure decision of a household does not depend on bond
holdings b′ chosen today or current income y, in equilibrium the receipts Pm will not
depend on these quantities either.
Using the characterization of the household default decision, the set of mortgage
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contracts that the bank will originate can be characterized. A bank will originate a
mortgage if and only if:
m′Pm (g
′,m′) ≤
{
m′F (δ∗(κ′)) + γg′
∫ 1
δ∗(κ′)
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)
}
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
(2.6)
=
m′Ψ(κ′)
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
(2.7)
The left hand side m′Pm (g
′,m′) is the amount the bank pays out to a household
that takes on a mortgage of size m′ collateralized by g′ housing assets. The term
m′Ψ(κ′), the term in {}-brackets in equation (2.6), denotes the receipts tomorrow
for the bank from the mortgage. With probability F (δ∗(κ′)) the household receives
a house price shock δ′ that makes default suboptimal in which case she repays the
full face value of the mortgage m′. For all price shocks δ′ > δ∗(κ′) the household
defaults and the bank retrieves γ(1 − δ′)g′ by foreclosing and selling off the house.
The term Ψ(κ′) measures the expected revenue for the bank tomorrow for each dollar
of a mortgage with leverage κ′ issued today. For each dollar of mortgage issued
today the costs of funds to the bank are 1 + rb, the direct costs of maintaining one
dollar worth of mortgage are rw, the insurance costs per dollar of mortgage are θ
and the subsidy per dollar is φ, so that the effective discount factor of the bank is
given by 1
(1+rb)(1+rw+θ−φ)
. Perfect competition requires that for all mortgages offered
in equilibrium the inequality in (2.6) holds as equality.
Notice that one direct and obvious consequence of equation (2.6) is that
Pm (g
′ = 0,m′) = 0 for all m′ > 0, that is, a mortgage m′ > 0 without collateral, i.e.
with g′ = 0, will not generate any funds for the household today. Without collateral
(g′ = 0) and m′ > 0 the household will default on the mortgage for sure tomorrow
and foreclosure will not generate any revenues for the bank. Therefore the right-hand
size of equation (2.6) equals zero, and thus Pm (g
′ = 0,m′) = 0.
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A financial intermediary that issues a mortgage of size m′ with leverage κ′ = m′/g′
issues bonds of value m′Pm(g
′,m′)(1+rw+θ−φ) today, transfers m′Pm(m′, g′) to the
household, uses rwm
′Pm resources for mortgage origination, transfers θm
′Pm to the
international insurance agency and receives a transfer φm′Pm from the government.
Tomorrow it repays the bonds (including interest) with the expected receipts m′Ψ(κ′)
from the mortgage to break even.
2.1.5 The Government
As stated above, the government levies income taxes at a flat rate τ on households to
finance the mortgage interest rate subsidy. The tax revenues of the government are
given by τ ȳ. In the baseline economy, we model the bailout guarantee provided by
the government as an interest rate subsidy equal to the cost of insurance φ = θ per
unit of mortgage issued. We interpret this as the government levying income taxes
to provide insurance to banks against systemic (i.e. aggregate) mortgage risk. For a
loan of type (m′, g′) the subsidy by the government is given by
sub(m′, g′) = θm′Pm(g
′,m′;φ = θ) (2.8)
and the total economy-wide subsidy is
G =
∫
sub(m′, g′)dµ (2.9)
Note that G also measures the amount of resources expended on insurance against
aggregate shocks, either by the households directly (in case of no bailout policy) or
by the government.
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2.1.6 Equilibrium
We are now ready to define a stationary recursive Competitive Equilibrium for the
benchmark economy. Let S = R+ × Y denote the individual state space.
Definition Given a government subsidy policy φ a Stationary Recursive Com-
petitive Equilibrium are value and policy functions for the households, v, c, h, b′,m′,
g′ : S → R, policies for the real estate construction sector I, Ch, prices Pl, Pb, a mort-
gage pricing function Pm : R+ × R+ → R, a government tax rate τ and government
spending G, as well as a stationary measure µ such that: (1) Given prices Pl, Pb, Pm
and government policies the value function solves (2.1) and c, h, b′,m′, g′ are the as-
sociated policy functions. (2) Policies I, Ch solve the maximization problem (2.4) of
the real estate construction company. (3) Given Pb and Pm, (2.6) holds with equality
for all m′, g′. (4) The tax rate function τ satisfies τ = G/ȳ and government spending
G satisfies (2.9), given the functions m′, Pm. (5) The rental market clears:∫
g′(s)dµ =
∫
h(s)dµ. (2.10)
(6) The bond market clears:
Pb
∫
b′(s)dµ = (1 + rw + θ − φ)
∫
Pm(g
′,m′;φ)m′(s)dµ. (2.11)
(7) The goods market clears:
∫
c(s)dµ+ Ch + (rw + θ − φ)
∫
Pm(g
′,m′;φ)m′dµ+G = ȳ, (2.12)
where
Ch = I =
∫
g′(s)
[
1−
∫ δ∗(κ′(s))
δ
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)− γ
∫ 1
δ∗(κ′(s))
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)
]
dµ
(2.13)
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is gross investment in the housing stock. The measure µ is invariant with respect
to the Markov process induced by the exogenous Markov process π and the policy
functions m′, g′, b′.
For the policy experiments aggregate economy-wide welfare is measured via a
Utilitarian social welfare function in the steady state, defined as
WEL =
∫
v(s)µ(ds) (2.14)
where µ is the invariant measure over the state space for cash at hand and income,
s = (a, y).
2.2 Theoretical Results
In this section theoretical properties of our model are stated that provide insights
into the forces that determine optimal household portfolio and leverage choices. In
addition, the properties are useful in the computation of an equilibrium.
2.2.1 Mortgage Interest Rates
Recall that the implied net real interest rate from a mortgage m′ with collateral g′
and receipts Pm(g
′,m′) is rm(g
′,m′) = 1/Pm(g
′,m′)− 1. From equation (2.6) and the
fact that competition requires profits for all mortgages issued in equilibrium to be
zero we immediately obtain a characterization of equilibrium mortgage interest rates:
Proposition 9. In any steady-state equilibrium, mortgages originated with positive
collateral g′ > 0 have the following properties: (1) They are priced exclusively based on
leverage κ′ = m
′
g′
, that is Pm(m
′, g′) = Pm(κ
′) and rm(g
′,m′) = rm(κ
′); (2) Pm(κ
′) is
decreasing in κ′, and strictly decreasing if the household defaults with positive probabil-
ity. Thus mortgage interest rates rm(κ
′) are increasing in leverage κ′; and (3) House-
holds that default with positive probability tomorrow receive Pm(κ
′) < 1
(1+rb)(1+rw+θ−φ)
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today, that is, they borrow at a risk premium 1 + rm(κ
′) > (1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
that is strictly increasing in leverage κ′.
This characterization of equilibrium mortgage interest rates now allows to obtain
an endogenous upper bound for the leverage chosen by households.
2.2.2 Endogenous Down Payment Requirement
It is straightforward to show that it is never strictly beneficial for a household to
purchase a mortgage with a leverage higher than the level that leads to subsequent
default with probability one. Define the leverage that leads to certain default by κ̄,
which is equal to 1− δ, from equation (2.5). There exists a tighter endogenous upper
bound on leverage κ∗ < κ̄ that households will never choose to exceed in equilibrium.
This result also implies that it is never optimal for the household to lever up to the
point in which default occurs with probability 1. Furthermore, at least with δ = 0,
any mortgage chosen by households in equilibrium requires a positive down payment.
Proposition 10. If F (δ) is C2 and log-concave with support [δ, 1], δ ≤ 0 and foreclo-
sure is inefficient (γ < 1), there exists an endogenous borrowing limit κ∗. It is never
optimal for a household to choose leverage κ > κ∗ at equilibrium mortgage prices Pm.
Further, κ∗ < κ̄. In addition, if δ = 0, then κ∗ < 1, that is, there is an endogenous
minimum down payment 1− κ∗ > 0.
Log-concavity of the distribution guarantees that the resources received from a
mortgage m′ today, m′Pm(κ
′), will be concave in m′. This fact, combined with the
smoothness assumption on the distribution of the house price shocks F (.), guarantees
that the leverage that maximizes resources today will be strictly less than the leverage
that leads which to certain default. By increasing leverage beyond the level that
maximizes resources today, the household receives strictly less resources today and
has to repay weakly more resources tomorrow, implying that it can never be optimal
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for the household to take on leverage above the level that maximizes contemporaneous
resources received from the mortgage. Note that the (truncated) Pareto distribution
used in our quantitative analysis for F (δ) is C2 and log-concave.
2.2.3 Existence of a Solution to the Household Problem
It is now shown that the recursive problem of the household has a unique solution.
In order to do so it is helpful to split the household problem into a static problem
that optimally allocates a given amount of resources between consumption and rental
expenditures, and a dynamic consumption-saving and portfolio choice problem.8
As a function of the rental price Pl and total expenditures consumption c, define
the indirect static utility function u as the solution to:
u(c;Pl) = max
c̃,h≥0
U(c̃, h) s.t. (2.15)
c̃+ Plh = c (2.16)
Note that, in slight abuse of notation, c now denotes total expenditures c̃ + Plh as
opposed to just nondurable consumption (as it was defined in previous sections).
The dynamic household maximization problem can then be rewritten as:
v(s) = max
c,b′,m′,g′≥0
{
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′
π(y′|y)
∫ ∞
δ
v(s′)dF (δ′)
}
(2.17)
s.t. c+ b′Pb + g
′ [1− Pl]−m′Pm(κ′) = a (2.18)
a′(δ′, h′,m′, g′) = b′ + max{0, (1− δ′)g′ −m′)}+ (1− τ)y′ (2.19)
In the appendix it is shown that the recursive problem of the household has a
unique solution:
8Clearly this separation hinges crucially on the existence of frictionless housing and rental markets and
the perfect substitutability of owner occupied housing and rentals in providing housing service flows.
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Proposition 11. Suppose that u(.;Pl) is unbounded from below and bounded from
above. Then recursive problem of the household has a unique solution v(a, y) that is
strictly increasing in its first argument a.
The fact that the utility function is bounded from above guarantees that even as
the cash at hand of a household diverges, the value function will remain bounded.
Therefore, since the utility function is unbounded from below, it will always be opti-
mal to set consumption expenditures c strictly away from zero, since contemporaneous
utility diverges to negative infinity as consumption goes to zero, but the continuation
value is bounded for all levels of saving. Note that if the utility function U will be
of CRRA form with risk aversion coefficient σ > 1 (with Cobb-Douglas aggregator
between consumption and housing) as in our quantitative analysis, then the indirect
utility function u satisfies the assumptions made in proposition 11.
2.2.4 Characterization of the Household Problem
A partial characterization of the household problem is now provided. Define as
P (κ′) := 1− Pl − κ′Pm(κ′) (2.20)
the net per unit resources required to purchase g′ housing assets, partially financed
by a mortgage with leverage κ′ = m′/g′. Note that
g′P (κ′) = (1− Pl)g′ −m′Pm(m′/g′). (2.21)
Using this definition the following holds:
Proposition 12. If u(c;Pl) is differentiable in c, then for any state s for which it is
optimal to choose an interior solution to the portfolio choice problem (g′, b′,m′ > 0)
in the current and subsequent period, the Euler equation governing for the household
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is given by:
[Pb + P
′(κ′)]u′(c(a, y);Pl) = [1− F (1− κ′)] β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)u′(c(b′ + (1− τ)y′, y′);Pl)
(2.22)
Further, at any such point the optimal leverage κ′ chosen by the household is deter-
mined by:
P (κ′)− (1 + κ′)P ′(κ′) = 1− Pl (2.23)
This partial characterization helps illustrate why households might simultaneously
choose to borrow and save. First, note from Proposition 1 that when the default
probability is zero, in the benchmark case with subsidy, households can borrow at a
rate rb + rw and save in bonds at rate rb. If rw were to equal zero, there would be
an indeterminacy between saving and borrowing, conditional on choosing mortgages
with zero default probability. Having a positive cost of issuing a mortgage, rw > 0,
eliminates that indeterminacy and creates a wedge between the borrowing and saving
rate, even in the absence of default. However, even when there is a wedge in the
interest rates between borrowing and saving, it may be optimal for households to
simultaneously save and hold mortgages (i.e. borrow).
Equation (2.22) emerges by inserting the first order condition for mortgages m′
into the first order condition for risk-free bonds b′ (and using the envelope condition).
It equates the costs and benefits from a joint marginal increase in bond holdings b′
and mortgages m′ (holding housing g′ constant). On the cost side, an extra bond
costs Pb, and a simultaneous increase in mortgages by one unit brings revenue
Pm(κ
′) +
m′
g′
P ′m(κ
′) = −P ′(κ′) > 0 (2.24)
and thus the net cost of this marginal variation is the left-hand side of equation
(2.22), Pb + P
′(κ′). In utility terms, the cost amounts to [Pb + P
′(κ′)]u′(c). One can
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interpret Pb + P
′(κ′) as the insurance premium of borrowing in mortgages to save at
the risk free rate. On the benefit side, in states δ′ in which the household does not
default, she has to pay back the extra unit of the mortgage, but receives the extra
bond payoff, which nets out to zero. For states δ′ in which the household defaults,
however, she still receives the extra unit of consumption from the bond payoff (which
the household values at u′(c′)), but does not have to repay the extra unit of the
mortgage. The risk-free bonds thus provide insurance against low consumption in
default states. The default probability is given by
1− F (δ∗(κ′)) = 1− F (1− κ′). (2.25)
Thus the expected benefit, in utility terms, from the joint marginal variation in b′,m′
is given by the right hand side of equation (2.22). This equation therefore shows why a
household would simultaneously save at a low risk-free rate and borrow (in defaultable
mortgages) at a higher rate: this strategy, together with the default option, provides
insurance against low consumption in high δ′ states, for which the household is willing
to pay an insurance premium.
Equation (2.23) then shows that conditional on wanting to “borrow to save” there
is a unique optimal value κ′ at which to do so. Thus the proposition predicts that
the optimal policy function for leverage κ′ is flat over that region of the state space
for which the household finds it optimal to “borrow to save”. Our quantitative anal-
ysis below will demonstrate that this is indeed the optimal portfolio strategy for a
significant part of the state space.
2.2.5 Bounds on the Equilibrium Rental Price of Housing
After having partially characterized the household problem an upper bound is derived
on the rental price Pl, one of the two prices to be determined in general equilibrium.
9
9The equilibrium bond price Pb satisfies Pb < 1/β, as in Aiyagari (1994).
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For all feasible choices of the household it has to be the case that P (κ′) = 1 −
Pl − κ′Pm(κ′) ≥ 0, otherwise the household can obtain a positive cash flow today
by buying a house with a mortgage; the default option on the mortgage guarantees
that the cash flow from the house tomorrow is non-negative. Thus, the requirement
of absence of this arbitrage opportunity in equilibrium requires P (κ′) ≥ 0 for all κ′,
and, in particular, for κ′ = κ̄. Thus
P (κ′ = κ̄) = 1− Pl − κ̄Pm(κ′ = κ̄) ≥ 0 (2.26)
which implies
P (κ̄) = 1− Pl − κ̄Pm(κ̄) = 1− Pl −
(
1
(1 + rb)(1 + rw)
)
γ(1− E(δ′)) ≥ 0 or
Pl ≤ 1−
(
1
(1 + rb)(1 + rw)
)
γ(1− E(δ′)) = rb + rw + rbrw + γE(δ
′) + 1− γ
(1 + rb)(1 + rw)
(2.27)
which places an upper bound on the equilibrium rental price.10
Appendix B.1.4 includes a discussion of why the riskiness of the housing asset puts
also puts a lower bound on the expected return from housing, and thus a lower bound
on the rental price Pl, which given in our quantitative applications by Pl ≥ rb+E(δ
′)
1+rb
.
These bounds bracket the equilibrium rental price and are thus very useful for the
computation of the model. Equipped with the theoretical characterization of house-
hold portfolio behavior, of the high-dimensional equilibrium mortgage interest rate
function rm(κ
′) and the bounds for the equilibrium rental price Pl, we now proceed to
the quantitative assessment of the aggregate and distributional consequences of the
government interest rate subsidy.
10If γ = 1, this condition simply states that the rental price Pl cannot be larger than the user cost of
housing, inclusive of the cost rw of originating mortgages
rb+rw+rbrw+E(δ
′)
(1+rb)(1+rw)
.
72
2.3 Calibration
The model is mapped to the US during the years 2000-2006, a period prior to when the
implicit bailout guarantee turned explicit. Some parameters are selected exogenously;
the remaining parameters are calibrated jointly in the model.
2.3.1 Technology and Endowments
Income process: For a continuous state AR(1) process of the form
log y′ = ρ log y + (1− ρ2)0.5ε (2.28)
with E (ε) = 0 and E (ε2) = σ2e , the unconditional standard deviation is σe and the
one-period autocorrelation (persistence) is ρ. Estimates for ρ in the literature center
around values close to 1. Motivated by Storesletten et al. (2004) ρ = 0.98 is selected.
Estimates for σε range from 0.2 to 0.4 (see e.g. Aiyagari, 1994), and σε = 0.3 is chosen.
The AR(1) process is approximated with a 5 state Markov chain using Tauchen and
Hussey’s (1991) procedure. B.2.2 gives the values for the income realizations, Markov
transition matrix π and the invariant distribution Π.
Foreclosure technology: Two recent studies, Pennington-Cross (2006) and Camp-
bell, Giglio and Pathak (2011), estimate the default loss parameter γ. Pennington-
Cross studies liquidation sales revenue from foreclosed houses and compares it to
market prices constructed via the OFHEO repeat sales index. Campbell, Giglio and
Pathak have access to zip code level data in Massachusetts and compare foreclosed
home sales to regional prices. Pennington-Cross finds that the average loss in fore-
closure is 22% as opposed to 27% in Campbell, Giglio and Pathak. Since they use
data from only one state, as compared to national estimates from Pennington-Cross
(and their estimates are relatively close anyhow), the lower value is chosen, hence
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γ = 0.78.
The depreciation process: The house value price depreciation process is calibrated
to attain realistic levels of default in the model while at the same time generating
the statistical properties of idiosyncratic house price appreciation and depreciation
rates observed in the data. Since the analysis conducted is steady state, the aggregate
component of house price fluctuations and secular aggregate house price growth are
abstracted from.
According to the Mortgage Banker Association (MBA (2006)), the quarterly fore-
closure rate has been about 0.4 percent in between 2000 and 2006. Abstracting from
the possibility that one house may go in and out of foreclosure multiple times within
one given year, this implies that on an annual basis, banks start foreclosure proceed-
ings on about 1.6 percent of their mortgages. The ratio of mortgages in foreclosure
that eventually end in liquidation was about 25 percent in 2005, according to MBA
(2006). Most homeowners avoid liquidation by either selling their property, refinanc-
ing their mortgage or just paying off the arrears. Consequently, only about 0.4 percent
of mortgages actually end up in liquidation, in the way our model envisions it. Given
the unusually strong aggregate home price appreciation over the 2000-06 period this
figure is viewed as a lower bound on the long-run foreclosure rate (that rate certainly
increased strongly in subsequent years) and thus a default rate of 0.5 percent of all
mortgages is targeted.
Two empirical moments of house price depreciation are targeted, the mean and
the standard deviation. The mean depreciation for residential housing according to
the Bureau of Economic Analysis was 1.48% between 1960 and 2002 (with standard
deviation 0.05%), computed as consumption of fixed capital in the housing sector
(Table 7.4.5) divided by the capital stock of residential housing. With respect to the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic house price depreciation shocks, we utilize data
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). OFHEO models
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house prices as a diffusion process and estimates within-state and within-region annual
house price volatility. The technical details can be found in the paper by Calhoun
(1996). The broad range for the eight census regions is an annual volatility of 9−10%
in the years 1998-2004. The upper bound σδ = 0.10 is used to account for the fact that
nationwide house price volatility is slightly higher than the within-region volatility.
Using a log-normal distribution for house price appreciation of real estate in our
model, with the mean and standard deviation as stated above, does not generate a
sufficiently large share of foreclosures, since, at least within the context of our model,
the right tail of the distribution appears to be too thin to reproduce the empirical
foreclosure target. In order to obtain more empirically realistic levels of mortgage
default a generalized Pareto distribution is used(which has a fatter right tail, relative
to a log-normal distribution) whose probability distribution function is given by:
f (δ) =
1
σδ
(
1 +
k(δ − δ)
σδ
)(− 1k−1)
(2.29)
With this parametric form for the house price depreciation distribution there are
three parameters k, σδ, δ to pin down three moments: the mean depreciation rate, its
standard deviation and the equilibrium share of mortgages in default that the model
generates endogenously.11
2.3.2 Preferences
For the period utility function, a CRRA form with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator be-
tween nondurable consumption and housing services is assumed.
U (c̃, h) =
(c̃αh1−α)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
(2.30)
11It is understood that, strictly speaking, all parameters determine all endogenous variables jointly.
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Note that this functional form implies an indirect utility function of
u(c;Pl) =
Φ(Pl)c
1−σ − 1
1− σ
(2.31)
where Φ(Pl) =
(
αα(1− α)1−αPα−1l
)1−σ
.
The parameter α is chosen such that the share of housing in total consumption
expenditures matches NIPA data, according to which this share has been fairly steady
at 14.1% over the last 40 years, with a standard deviation of only about 0.5%. This
yields a value of α = 0.8590.
The time discount parameter β and the CRRA parameter σ are endogenously
calibrated to match an equilibrium risk free rate of 1% and a median household
leverage of 61% in the benchmark economy. Data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer
Finances is used and our attention is restricted to households with heads aged 50
and younger, in order to control for strong life-cycle trends in leverage. Household
leverage is then computed using data on houses owned and mortgages owed on those
homes. The median leverage is calculated to be 61% from these SCF data. The
resulting preference parameters are (β, σ) = (0.919, 3.912).
2.3.3 Mortgage Parameters
For the interest rate subsidy it is assumed that the pass-through of the subsidy is
100%, in order to make the case for the subsidies most favorable. The size of the
subsidy is chosen to match the estimated implicit interest rate differential of 30 basis
points that the GSE’s enjoyed during the period of their implicit guarantee by the
government, see Lucas and McDonald (2010). Finally a mortgage administration cost
rw of 10 basis points is chosen, equal one third of the mortgage subsidy. This choice
corresponds to an annual cost of $100 for servicing a $100,000 mortgage. Tables 1
and 2 summarize our parameterization of the model.
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2.4 Results
Before analyzing the effects of the bailout policy by comparing the equilibria with
and without the policy in place it is instructive to explain household behavior in the
baseline economy. In figures 2.1 and 2.2 the housing and leverage policy functions of
households are plotted under both policy scenarios, as a function of cash at hand a,
conditional on the lowest and highest realizations y1 and y5 of current labor income
y. Note that by the definition of cash at hand, a ≥ y, and thus the policy functions
for y = y5 starts to the right (along the x-axis) of that for y = y1.
From figure 2.1 observe that, with the subsidy, purchases of housing assets are
monotonically increasing in cash at hand. Figure 2.2 displays the fact that leverage
is high (at close to 80%) for households with little wealth under this policy scenario.
Leverage then drops quickly, as cash at hand increases, to around 61% and remains
constant at that level. From the threshold for cash at hand for which a leverage of 61%
is optimal onwards households no longer reduce leverage with increasing “wealth” a,
but start purchasing bonds, as can be seen from the bond policy function for the
subsidy case, displayed in figure 2.3. As cash at hand increases further leverage
remains constant, and the holdings of bonds b′, the housing asset g′ and mortgages
m′ rise.
This behavior is exactly what proposition 12 above predicts: households with high
wealth both borrow through high-interest mortgages and save with low-interest bear-
ing bonds. These households want to take advantage of the high return on housing,
but would also like to insure consumption against adverse house price shocks. Posi-
tive bond holdings are essentially consumption insurance against bad δ′ realizations
that might trigger default and would thus reduce total wealth to zero, in the absence
of positive bond holdings. If in addition labor income tomorrow is low, y′ = y1, then
a portfolio mix without positive bond holdings would lead to very low consumption
realization in bad idiosyncratic states of the world (e.g. y′ = y1 and high δ
′). In order
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to maintain a level of consumption above that of labor income it is therefore optimal
to hold bonds as insurance. Note that equation (2.23) determines uniquely the con-
stant (in cash at hand a) optimal leverage of these households, which is calculated to
be 61% in the baseline model.12
2.4.1 Effects of Removing the Subsidy on Household Behavior
Now the bailout policy is evaluated, comparing steady state equilibria of economies
with and without a tax-financed mortgage interest rates subsidy of 30 basis points.
First the change in household behavior induced by the removal of the subsidy is
analyzed, and then its aggregate, distributional and welfare implications are discussed.
The main economic impact on households from removing the subsidy is to make
mortgages less attractive by increasing the effective interest rate. The most notable
difference in household choices can thus be seen in the leverage and bond policy func-
tions in figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively, where each of the two panels plots the policy
functions for both cases (subsidy, no subsidy) against cash at hand, for a given cur-
rent income level y ∈ {y1, y5}. Observe that for households with low levels of cash at
hand the change in behavior induced by the removal of the subsidy is modest: under
both policy scenarios households with little wealth take on highly leveraged mort-
gages and hold no bonds. As households get wealthier, however, without the subsidy
leverage decreases monotonically to zero. In the absence of the mortgage interest
subsidy wealthy households do not simultaneously hold bonds and mortgages, since
12Note that since asset poor households do not buy any bonds, households allocate a larger share of their
portfolios to bonds as cash at hand increases. This behavior of households may sound counterintuitive at
first, but is consistent with results from the portfolio choice literature (see e.g. Cocco et al. (2005) or
Haliassos and Michaelides (2001)). These papers argue that it should be households with high cash at hand
that hold a higher share of their portfolio in the save asset since these households have high financial relative
to human wealth (the present discounted value of future labor income). Consequently, these households
expect to finance their current and future consumption primarily with capital income, whereas low cash-at-
hand people tend to rely mostly on their labor income. Thus it is relatively more important for the high
cash at hand people not to be exposed to large financial asset return risk. In fact, since idiosyncratic labor
income shocks and house depreciation shocks are uncorrelated in our model, housing is not a bad asset for
hedging labor income risk (of course the bond is even better in this regard, but it has a lower expected
return).
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the wedge in the interest rate between saving and borrowing (even absent default risk)
increases from 10 to 40 basis points. Thus the change in the policy induces a massive
reduction in leverage for wealthier households, and thus a substantial reduction in
mortgage debt held by these households.
As figure 2.1 shows, the effect on the housing choice is much smaller though. These
two observations also imply that the removal subsidy causes a shift in the balance of
the household portfolio away from bonds and towards home equity as seen in figure 2.4.
As a consequence of this general shift in households’ portfolio composition, the share
of bonds in the net worth portfolio of the median household declines substantially:
whereas this household holds 60.7% of its net worth in bonds with the mortgage
subsidy, this share drops to 5.8% without the subsidy.
2.4.2 Aggregate Effects of Removing the Subsidy
How the change in household behavior translates into the main macroeconomic ag-
gregates is summarized in table 2.3. Aggregate mortgages taken out by households
decline sharply, by 91%. Despite this, the overall impact on aggregate investment
into housing is actually slightly positive: the stock of housing properties increases by
2.38%. Household labor income net of taxes increases by 0.97%, exactly the amount
required to finance the interest rate subsidy in equilibrium.
The behavioral changes induced by a change in the subsidy in turn have signif-
icant general equilibrium price effects. Since the supply of housing increases, the
equilibrium rental price of housing decreases, by slightly more than one percent. The
equilibrium risk-free interest rate rb declines by a substantial 48 basis points in re-
sponse to the removal of the subsidy since the demand for loans to finance house
purchases collapses. Note that the effective equilibrium interest rate on borrowing,
holding leverage constant, actually decreases by 18 basis points in the absence of the
subsidy, since the 30 basis point increase due to the removal of the subsidy is more
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than offset by the general equilibrium. This highlights that the key margin governing
household asset and portfolio choice is not so much the absolute cost of borrowing
or return on saving, but the wedge between the borrowing and saving rate. With the
subsidy, and for a mortgage with zero default risk, the difference in interest rates on
saving and borrowing was 10 basis points, equal to the per dollar cost rw of originat-
ing and maintaining the mortgage. Without the subsidy, the effective interest rate
on borrowing is 40 basis points higher than (and thus almost double) than that of
saving. This massive reduction in the attractiveness of mortgage borrowing is also
reflected in a decline in aggregate default rates which fall from 0.51% to 0.41% per
year. Note that since foreclosure is costly in terms of resources (banks only recover
a fraction γ of the value of the home), the reduction in foreclosure rates due to the
removal of the subsidy will be a key factor in the welfare evaluation of the change of
the government’s policy.
Given that the subsidy only benefits home owners one would expect that removing
it has important consequences for the distribution of home ownership, wealth and
welfare. Since the only asset in positive net supply is real estate and, as was already
documented, the stock of houses increases by 2.71% due to the removal of the subsidy,
so does total wealth in the economy. However, median net worth falls, about 1.4%.
This rising gap between average and median wealth suggests that the distribution of
wealth becomes more dispersed without the subsidy, which is confirmed by a mild
increase in the Gini coefficient for (net) wealth from 0.471 to 0.478. Figure 2.5 which
displays the stationary wealth distributions with and without policy suggests that
this is mainly due to a larger fraction of households at the borrowing constraint
and a slightly fatter right tail of the wealth distribution in the scenario without the
subsidy. Thus if wealth inequality is a direct concern of policy makers the removal
of the subsidy is counterproductive along this dimension, although the effects of the
subsidy policy on wealth inequality is quantitatively small.
80
Another potential rationale for (indirectly) subsidizing mortgage interest rates
on the part of the government is to increase home ownership rates in the economy.
Table 2.3 shows that if this is indeed the ultimate goal of the government, it is
successful, according to our model. The fraction of households that own some real
estate, µ(g′ > 0), is slightly higher with than without the interest rate subsidy. The
fraction of households that own at least as much real estate as they use for their own
housing service consumption, µ(g′ > h) increases more substantially, from 40% to
44% with the subsidy. Even though in our model owning real estate is not directly
linked to using that same real estate as owner occupied housing13, the fraction of
households with g′ ≥ h is perhaps the best proxy of home ownership rates in our
model, and it is negatively affected by the removal of the government subsidy.
2.4.3 Welfare and Distributional Implications of the Policy
The welfare consequences of the reform are now discussed. Removing the mortgage
interest rate subsidy increases aggregate steady state welfare, as measured by con-
sumption equivalent variation (CEV), by a non-negligible 0.5%. That is, household
consumption (of both nondurables and housing services) in the steady state with
the subsidy has to be increased by this percentage in all states of the world and for
all households, such that a household is indifferent ex ante (that is, prior to knowing
what part of the distribution he will be born into) between being born into the steady
state with or without the subsidy.14
Figure 2.6 sheds some light which households which characteristics (a, y) benefit
from the subsidy. The figure plots the steady state consumption equivalent gain
13In our model nothing links the housing stock g′ a household owns to the housing services h she consumes,
but it is convenient for the interpretation of our results to make that association.
14Steady state welfare comparisons can be problematic since they ignore the welfare consequences of the
transition path towards the new steady state (and thus the cost of additional accumulation of physical capital
or the stock of housing). In our model without capital the only transitional cost stems from building up
the modest extra 2.4% of the housing stock. One therefore might expect the welfare gains from removing
the policy to be somewhat smaller, but still positive in the aggregate, once the transitional costs are fully
accounted for.
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for households with different income realizations against cash at hand.15 This plot
should be understood as a quantitative answer to the following hypothetical question:
in which economy would someone with state (a, y) prefer to start her life, an economy
with or without subsidy? Our results indicate that the welfare gains from the subsidy
are monotonically increasing in wealth, with wealth-poor households preferring to
start life in the economy without subsidy while households with high wealth benefit
from the subsidy. Similarly, holding wealth fixed higher current income households
view the mortgage interest rate subsidy more favorably than income-poor households.
The heterogeneity in the welfare assessment of the policy across households is due
to the following factors. First, the subsidy keeps interest rates on the financial assets
of wealthy households high (since the subsidy fuels a stronger mortgage demand), and
second, it provides these households (which invest in bonds and leverage substantially
in real estate) with a direct interest rate subsidy for this investment strategy. Poorer
households, on the other hand, derive a larger share of their current resources from
labor income which is subject to the income tax that finances the mortgage rate
subsidy. Thus these households would prefer having the subsidy and the tax that
comes with it removed. This is especially true if their wealth is so low that debt-
financed investment into real estate becomes suboptimal for the household, and thus
the subsidy does not apply to them.
We conclude (and view this as perhaps our most important normative finding)
that masking the aggregate moderate welfare gains from removing the policy is a
substantial heterogeneity in the welfare assessment of this policy across the popu-
lation. The disagreement between households is quantitatively sizable: the poorest
member of society would pay in excess of 1% of lifetime consumption to get rid off
the policy, whereas households with wealth twice the average would lose more than
1% from the same policy reform.
15The same comments about ignoring the welfare effects along the transition apply, as before.
82
2.4.4 The Optimal Size of the Mortgage Interest Rate Subsidy
The previous discussion begs the question what size of a (potentially negative) subsidy
is optimal, given the utilitarian steady state social welfare function employed above.
The answer is not obvious in a model with incomplete markets and rich household
heterogeneity, but is straightforward to derive computationally. A smaller (relative
to the benchmark) but positive subsidy of 9 and 3/8 basis points maximizes social
welfare. Table 2.4, column 3, displays the aggregate and distributional consequences
of implementing the optimal subsidy. In order to understand why, in figure 2.6 con-
sumption equivalent variation (CEV) for households with different characteristics is
plotted and the optimal subsidy of 9 and 3/8 basis points, side by side with the CEV’s
from an elimination of the subsidy. Recall that the CEV’s measure the welfare gains
(or losses), relative to the benchmark case, a subsidy of 30 basis points. Notice that
with the zero subsidy the CEV plots are steeper, relative to the 93
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basis point sub-
sidy. Low income, low CAH households benefit more from the complete removal of
the subsidy, mainly because of the decrease in tax burden. However, examining the
difference in household portfolio choices it becomes clear why a positive subsidy is
optimal. In the baseline economy high CAH households take on large mortgages,
subsidized by the government. However, as the value of the subsidy falls, these high
CAH households no longer exhibit the ”borrow-to-save” behavior. Essentially the
lower subsidy disincentivizes wealthy households from trying to get ”government fi-
nanced” insurance. However, it still allows lower CAH households to engage in this
strategy. The optimal subsidy imposes a small tax burden on the very low CAH, but
still subsidizes ”middle class” households for obtaining insurance against catastrophic
house depreciation shocks. Using a utilitarian social welfare function to aggregate the
welfare gains and losses then delivers the optimal subsidy rate. Of course it is impor-
tant to note, in comparing the status quo, the optimal policy and the no-subsidy case,
that neither policy Pareto-dominates another policy, and what we term “optimal” is
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only socially optimal under our specific (but very commonly used in the literature)
social welfare function.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
This subsection contains a discussion of two strong assumptions that have been made
so far and to what extent they affect our substantive positive and normative conclu-
sions. First, a production economy is introduced. Second, assets that allow for the
diversification of house price risk are introduced.
2.5.1 Other Assets in Positive Supply: Introducing Capital
In the model discussed so far the only asset in positive net supply was risky housing.
This assumption helped us to isolate the role of mortgages and foreclosure in hedging
idiosyncratic house price risk. The analysis is extended to a production economy
with physical capital as in Aiyagari (1994), but with risky real estate and housing
services, as in the benchmark economy. Appendix B.3.1 discusses the details of the
model and its calibration, and table 2.4, columns 4 and 5, summarize the results. In
a nutshell, as the table shows, the introduction of physical capital leaves the results
of the policy analysis qualitatively, and to a large extent quantitatively unchanged
if we re-calibrate the model to be consistent with the same targets as was the model
without capital.16 Note, though, that the risk free interest rate in the economy with
capital is somewhat less sensitive to the removal of the subsidy due to the curvature
in the production function.
The one quantitative exception are the welfare gains from the removal of the sub-
16Such re-calibration to match the same median leverage ratio and risk free interest rate requires increasing
the risk aversion and prudence parameter σ from 3.9 to 7.5, and reducing the time discount factor β from 0.92
to 0.89. Under the old calibration, but in the model with capital, the appendix shows that since households
save predominantly in riskless capital, the demand for riskless assets and mortgages completely collapses.
It is our belief that this economy is not a useful laboratory to analysis the hypothetical policy reform since
it results in the counterfactual absence of any meaningful mortgage market. And of course, if there are no
mortgages traded in equilibrium, a policy that subsidizes these mortgages has no effect.
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sidy, which are significantly larger in the economy with capital, thus reinforcing the
normative point we wish to make. The key difference to the economy without capital
is a larger value of the risk aversion (prudence) parameter σ, which induces house-
holds to save more in order to absorb the additional supply of assets (the physical
capital stock), but also implies a larger curvature in the utility and thus value func-
tion of households. Thus a policy reform (such as the removal of the subsidy) that
redistributes from rich (high income and cash at hand) to poor households constitutes
larger aggregate welfare gains, under our utilitarian social welfare function.
2.5.2 Diversification of Idiosyncratic House Price Risk
In our model with idiosyncratic house price risk households have a strong incentive
to pool that risk, something that the benchmark version of the model rules out, in
the same way explicit insurance against the idiosyncratic income risk households face
is ruled out, in line with the standard incomplete markets literature. Although it
is empirically plausible to assume that idiosyncratic house price risk cannot be fully
diversified through trading state-contingent claims that pay off contingent on individ-
ual house-specific price shocks, this importance assumption is now briefly explored
in two ways. First, a version of the model with a housing mutual fund is analyzed.
Second, sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to the variance of the house
price shock, in effect assuming that a certain share of house price risk can be fully
diversified.
First, consider an extended version of the model where a representative, competi-
tively behaving mutual fund buys a portfolio of houses of positive measure, rents them
out and sells the depreciated portfolio of houses tomorrow. Given that the mutual
fund holds a positive measure of houses, the expected depreciation rate on its port-
folio is risk-free and equal to E(δ). Households can purchase three assets, financial
assets and mortgage-financed individual houses (exactly as in the benchmark model)
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as well as the mutual fund. Given that the mutual fund has a risk-free investment
strategy, the return on the mutual fund has to equal that of risk free bonds in equi-
librium. This in turn implies an equilibrium rental rate of Pl =
rb+E(δ)
1+rb
, equal to the
user cost of housing (see appendix B.3.2). Note that households are still permitted to
buy individual houses financed by mortgages, and might do so given the option-like
mortgage cum foreclosure contracts available to them.
However, as table 2.4, columns 8 and 9 show, in this version essentially the entire
housing stock (more than 99.9%) is held by the mutual fund, the mortgage market
shuts down, and thus the removal of the interest rate subsidy has no effect on the
equilibrium (since no mortgages are traded with and without the subsidy). Also
note that households would be willing to pay 1.7% of permanent consumption (as
measured by the CEV ) to be borne into the economy with the mutual fund, relative
to the economy without it, signaling large welfare gains from completing markets with
respect to idiosyncratic house price risk.
Second, a version of the model is computed in which the variance of the house
price shocks was reduced to half its original size, σ̂2δ = 0.5σ
2
δ = 0.005, assuming that
the other half is perfectly diversifiable through financial assets we do not spell out
explicitly. As table 2.4, columns 6 and 7, display, all qualitative findings remain intact
under this specification, but the quantitative welfare effects shrink significantly. This
is due to substantially the same reason as for the introduction of the housing mutual
fund. With lower house price risk households, especially those with large housing
positions and cash at hand, now tend to own real estate outright, rather than finance
it with mortgages (since there is less housing risk to hedge, the foreclosure option is
less attractive). As house price risk is reduced further, the economy converges to the
housing mutual fund economy discussed above.
Thus, and in contrast to introducing capital and production, the assumed presence
of significant undiversifiable house price risk is important, quantitatively but even
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qualitatively, for our positive and welfare results. In light of the substantial welfare
gains that could be achieved by such diversification an investigation of the causes for
why markets diversifying this risk do not exist or are imperfect seems an important
area of work; see Shiller (2008) for a discussion.
2.6 Conclusions
The future of the GSE’s and the role of the government in mortgage market remains
a key question facing policy makers. We have constructed an equilibrium model of
mortgage debt and foreclosures and use it to evaluate the aggregate and distributional
consequences of a stylized bailout guarantee for GSE’s. This guarantee leads to exces-
sive mortgage origination, higher leverage and larger foreclosure rates in equilibrium,
compared to a world without such a policy. The steady state aggregate welfare gains
from abolishing the guarantee are significantly positive, and poor households would
strongly benefit from such a reform.
An extension to a nonstationary model with endogenous house prices would lend
itself to a quantitative evaluation of how much of the run-up in household mort-
gage debt and house prices in the early 2000’s can be attributed to the government’s
involvement with the GSE’s. It could also be used to study the distributional conse-
quences of the collapse in house prices in a world with high household leverage that is
at least partially induced by this involvement. Such an analysis is deferred to future
work.
Note: This table presents the parameters calibrated endogenously in the model
via a moment matching procedure to match the relevant moments in US data.
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Table 2.1: Endogenously Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
σ Risk Aversion 3.912 Median Leverage
β Time Discount Factor 0.919 Risk-free Rate
k Pareto shape parameter 0.7302 Foreclosure Rate
σδ Pareto scale parameter 0.0078 House price volatility
δ Pareto threshold paramter -0.0077 Average price depreciation
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Table 2.2: Exogenously Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
Ah Technology Const. in Housing Constr. 1.0 none (normalized)
ρ Income Persistence 0.98 Storesletten at al (2004)
σe Income Variance 0.3 Storesletten at al (2004)
γ Foreclosure Technology 0.78 Pennington and Cross (2004)
α Share Parameter on Nondur. Cons. 0.8590 Exp. Share in BEA
φ Implicit Interest Rate Subsidy 30 BP Lucas and McDonald (2010)
rw Mortgage administration fee 10 BP
Note: This table presents the parameters calibrated exogenously (taken from the
relevant literature).
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Table 2.3: Quantitative Results: Consequences of Removing the Subsidy
Variable Subsidy No Subsidy Difference
% Sub 30bp 0bp -100%
Sub/ȳ 0.97% 0% -100%
Pl 0.0281 0.0278 -1.1%
rb 1.0% 0.518% -0.482%
H 5.327 5.454 2.38%
M 3.231 0.319 -91.3%
Default share 0.51% 0.41% -19.6%
Mean Net Worth 5.327 5.454 2.38%
Median Bond Portfolio Share 60.7% 5.8% -90.4%
Wealth Gini 0.471 0.478 1.49%
µ (g′ > 0) 96.74% 96.66 -0.08%
µ (g′ > h) 43.51% 39.77% -8.60%
CEV -0.6297 -0.6206 0.5%∗
?Computed as consumption equivalent variation, that is
(EVno subs/EVsubs)
1/(1−σ)
Note: This table presents relevant aggregate statistics from the baseline economy
with the mortgage subsidy and compares it to the economy with the subsidy removed.
The welfare comparison is presented in consumption equivalent variation.
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Figure 2.1: Housing Policy Function With and Without Subsidy
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Note: This figure compares the optimal housing choice for a household in the baseline
economy and the economy without the subsidy for different levels of cash at hand for the
highest and lowest persistent income states.
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Figure 2.2: Leverage Policy Function With and Without Subsidy
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Note: This figure compares the optimal leverage choice for a household in the baseline
economy and the economy without the subsidy for different levels of cash at hand for the
highest and lowest persistent income states.
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Figure 2.3: Bonds Policy Function With and Without Subsidy
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Note: This figure compares the optimal bond choice for a household in the baseline
economy and the economy without the subsidy for different levels of cash at hand for the
highest and lowest persistent income states.
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Figure 2.4: Home Equity Policy Function With and Without Subsidy
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Note: This figure compares the home equity held by a household in the baseline economy
and the economy without the subsidy for different levels of cash at hand for the highest and
lowest persistent income states.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution over Cash at Hand with and without Subsidy
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Note: This figure compares the steady state distributions over cash at hand in the
baseline economy and the economy without the subsidy.
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Figure 2.6: Welfare Comparison
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Note: This figure compares welfare in consumption equivalent variation
terms between households in the baseline economy, the economy without
the subsidy and the economy with optimal subsidy, for different levels of
cash at hand for the four of the five persistent income states.
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Chapter 3
Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in
the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects
A modified version of this chapter originally appeared as Hagedorn, Karahan, Mitman,
and Manovskii (2013) and is co-authored with Marcus Hagedorn, Fatih Karahan and
Iourii Manovskii.
Unemployment in the U.S. rose dramatically during the Great Recession and has
remained at an unusually high level for a long time. The policy response involved
an unprecedented extension of unemployment benefits with benefit duration rising
from the usual 26 weeks to as long as 99 weeks. The motivation for this policy was
to provide “income support for a vulnerable group after they have lost their jobs
through no fault of their own” as well as “needed support for the fragile economy.”1
The effectiveness of this policy response was questioned by Barro (2010) and Mul-
ligan (2012), among others. Because unemployment benefit extensions represent an
implicit tax on market work, they subsidize unemployment and discourage labor sup-
ply. This may offset some of the stimulative effect ascribed to such policies and ex-
plain the persistently high unemployment since the end of the Great Recession. Yet,
careful microeconomic studies, reviewed below, have found only very small effects of
1“Unemployment Insurance Extensions and Reforms in the American Jobs Act,” the report by the Pres-
ident’s Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic Council, the Domestic Policy Council, and
the Department of Labor, December 2011.
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unemployment benefit extensions on labor supply.
These studies, however, did not assess the possibility that extensions of unemploy-
ment benefits have a large impact on labor demand. Consider the following stylized
decomposition:
Job finding rateit = sit︸︷︷︸
search intensity
× f(θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
finding rate per unit of s
(3.1)
In other words, the probability that an individual i finds a job in a given time period t
depends on how hard that individual searches and how selective he is in his acceptance
decisions, which is captured by the “search effort” component sit. It also depends
on the aggregate labor market conditions θt that determine how easy it is to locate
jobs by expending a unit of search effort. To use an extreme example, if there are
no job vacancies created by employers, f(θt) = 0, no amount of search effort by an
unemployed worker would yield a positive probability of obtaining a job.
Changes in unemployment benefit policies affect both the search intensity of un-
employed workers and the aggregate job finding rate per unit of search effort through
general equilibrium effects. Indeed, in the classic equilibrium search framework of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the primary analytical device used by economists to
study the determination of unemployment, the response of unemployment to changes
in benefits is mainly driven by the response of employers’ decisions of whether and
how many jobs to create and not by the impact on workers’ job search and accep-
tance decisions. The logic of the model is simple. Everything else equal, extending
unemployment benefits exerts an upward pressure on the equilibrium wage. This
lowers the profits employers receive from filled jobs, leading to a decline in vacancy
creation. Lower vacancies imply a lower job finding rate for workers, which leads to
an increase in unemployment. Surprisingly, there is little direct empirical evidence
on the quantitative magnitude of these effects available in the literature. We attempt
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to fill this gap in the literature in this paper.
Our empirical strategy exploits a policy discontinuity at state borders to identify
the effects of unemployment insurance policies on unemployment. While we discuss
the institutional features of the U.S. unemployment insurance system in detail be-
low, its key property is that unemployment insurance policies are determined at the
state level and apply to all locations within a state. One cannot infer the effects of
benefit extensions by simply relating benefit duration to unemployment in a panel of
states because of the potential policy endogeneity: it might be the states that have
a large increase in unemployment that expand benefit eligibility as opposed to raises
in benefits leading to higher unemployment. We show, however, that the endogeneity
problem can be overcome by comparing the evolution of unemployment in counties
that border each other but belong to different states.2 Locations separated by a
state border are expected to have similar labor markets due to the same geography,
climate, access to transportation, agglomeration benefits, access to specialized labor
and supplies, etc. Indeed, we provide direct evidence that economic shocks do not
stop at the state border but evolve smoothly across borders. The key feature that
sets these locations apart is the difference in policies on the two sides of the border.
This policy discontinuity allows to identify its labor market implications. A funda-
mentally similar identification strategy was used, among others, by Holmes (1998) to
identify the impact of right-to-work laws on location of manufacturing industry and
by Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) to identify the effect of minimum wage laws on
earnings and employment of low-wage workers. We explicitly control for the effects of
other policy changes at the state level (that could be correlated with the expansion
of unemployment benefit durations) to ensure that our estimates isolate the effects
of unemployment benefit extensions.
In Section 3.1 of the paper we extend this empirical strategy to accommodate
2A Map of U.S. state and county borders can be found in Appendix Figure C.2.
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features of the policies that we are interested in evaluating (and verify the successful
performance of these extensions in the data generated by an estimated equilibrium
search model in Section 3.4) as follows:
1. The decisions of firms to create jobs are forward looking. Thus, they might be
affected not only by the existing policy but also by the expectation of possible
future policy changes. We derive a quasi-difference estimator of the effect of
UI policies on variables such as vacancies and unemployment that controls for
the effect of expectations. Among other things, this allows us to generalize
our findings and estimate the effect of a temporary or permanent change in
unemployment benefit duration.
2. Our estimation is based on a panel of border counties over the period of the
Great Recession. Numerous shocks and policy changes have affected the ag-
gregate economy but their impact was likely heterogeneous across county pairs.
For example, shocks to and changing regulations of the financial system, while
aggregate in nature, might have had a particularly strong impact on the coun-
ties on the border of New York and New Jersey, while the auto industry bailout
likely had a larger impact on counties surrounding the border between Michigan
and Indiana or Ohio. Similarly, the aggregate financial crisis potentially had
different impact on the states depending on their different foreclosure laws. To
obtain consistent estimates of unemployment benefit extensions despite hetero-
geneous impacts of the aggregate shocks we follow Bai (2009) and use a flexible
interactive effects model.
3. An analysis based on a comparison of border counties belonging to states with
different policy regimes must account for the possibility that residents of both
counties may direct their job search efforts to the county with better labor mar-
ket prospects. In Section 3.5 we will show that these mobility decisions can be
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measured in the data from the observed labor market flows. The estimates re-
ported in that section imply that individuals do not systematically change their
location of employment in response to changes in unemployment benefits across
states during the Great Recession. This is perhaps not surprising. Residents of
the border counties face a trade-off between receiving higher wages with lower
job finding probability in a county belonging to the state with higher benefit
eligibility and receiving lower wages with higher job finding probability in the
state with lower benefits (note that benefits depend on state of employment,
and not on the state of residence). Moreover, the difference in the available du-
ration of benefits across border counties is relatively small and may not justify
larger commuting expenses. Thus, while we fully control for the response of the
location of employment to changes in benefits in Section 3.5, this modification
of the analysis turns out to be inconsequential. This leads us to work with a
simpler and more transparent specification that ignores mobility decisions in the
early parts of the paper.
Following the description of the main data sources we use, in Section 3.3 we mea-
sure the effects of unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment. We find that
unemployment rises dramatically in the border counties belonging to the states that
expanded unemployment benefit duration as compared to the counties just across the
state border. The quantitative magnitude of this effect is so large that our estimates
imply that benefit extensions can quantitatively account for much of the unemploy-
ment dynamics following the Great Recession.
In Section 3.4 we assess whether the mechanisms embedded in the standard equi-
librium labor market search model can provide a coherent rationalization of the large
effect of unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment that we document. The
data suggest an affirmative answer. Consistent with implications of the equilibrium
search model, we find that border counties with longer benefit extensions have sig-
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nificantly higher wages, lower vacancy rates, and lower employment. The estimated
magnitudes of these changes are also quantitatively consistent with the model.
Our estimate of the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on employment
is based on the difference across border counties. It is desirable to be able to use
the resulting coefficient to predict the effect of a nation-wide extension. A potential
concern is that when some states extend benefits more than others, economic activity
may reallocate to states with, say, lower benefits. This reallocation is picked up
by our estimates but will be absent when the policy is changed everywhere. Our
results in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide evidence against such a concern. First we find
large negative effect of unemployment benefit extensions on employment in sectors
commonly considered non-tradable and thus not subject to reallocation. Second, we
find that unemployed workers do not change the strategy of which county to look for
work in response to changes in benefits.
Finally, in Section 3.6 we briefly consider the implications of our findings for
macroeconomic time-series. In particular, we summarize the results in Mitman and
Rabinovich (2013), who introduced unemployment benefit extensions into the Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) model calibrated to match the effect of unemployment benefit
extensions on unemployment documented in this paper. The model matches nearly
perfectly the dynamics of unemployment over the last 60 years. Moreover, the exten-
sions of unemployment benefits generate the apparent shift in the Beveridge curve
after the Great Recession that was widely interpreted in the literature as a sign of
increased mismatch in the labor market, see Diamond (2013) for a review.
3.0.1 Brief Overview of the Related Literature
We organize the discussion of the related literature on the effects of unemployment
benefit extensions on unemployment around the illustrative decomposition in Equa-
tion (3.1). As is customary in the literature, we label the impact of benefits on the
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search intensity of an unemployed worker, holding aggregate conditions fixed, the
“micro” effect. In contrast, the “macro” effect measures the effect of benefits on the
job finding rate per unit of search effort.
Seminal Empirical Contributions
The empirical literature on the effects of unemployment benefit extensions is based
on the seminal contributions by Moffitt (1985a), Katz and Meyer (1990a), Meyer
(1990a), and Card and Levine (2000).3 These authors used administrative data on
unemployment benefit recipients and exploited the cross-state variation in unemploy-
ment benefit extensions to measure the effect of the extensions on the hazard rate
of leaving compensated unemployment.4 These estimates were interpreted using a
partial equilibrium search model as measuring how individual search efforts respond
to changes in benefits holding labor market conditions constant. As these studies
focused on a relatively small subsample of unemployed workers who collect benefits,
and the authors could not measure the impact of benefit extensions on the search
effort of those who do not receive benefits, they could not assess the impact of benefit
extensions on overall unemployment.
Micro Effects
In recent, innovative work, Rothstein (2011a) estimates the partial equilibrium effects
of the unemployment benefit extensions on labor market outcomes during the Great
Recession. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) on individual un-
employment duration, he exploits the cross-state variation in unemployment benefit
extensions to identify how unemployment benefit durations impact individual search
behavior. Importantly, Rothstein (2011a) goes to great lengths to ”absorb labor de-
3Krueger and Meyer (2002a) provide a survey of other important contributions to this literature.
4While this hazard was originally interpreted as measuring transitions form unemployment into employ-
ment, such an interpretation was recently questioned by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007).
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mand conditions” – that is, he controls for any changes in job creation to isolate solely
the effect on worker search. For example, in one specification he uses unemployed
workers who are ineligible for UI benefits as a control group. If unemployment bene-
fits have a large effect on job creation, the job finding rate of all unemployed workers
would drop significantly, but comparing ineligible to eligible would only capture the
difference in behavioral response of search effort between workers, not the possibly
much larger macro effect. Rothstein (2011a) concludes that the micro elasticity of
unemployment duration to unemployment benefits is relatively small, with the esti-
mates implying that only a small fraction of the persistent increase in unemployment
after the Great Recession can be attributed to a decline in worker search effort.
In this paper, we aim to exploit the same heterogeneity in policy as in Rothstein
(2011a), but with the goal of identifying the labor demand or macro elasticity of
unemployment benefits that was beyond the scope of his analysis. We see our work
as highly complementary and helping provide the complete picture on the effect of
benefit extensions.
Another recent paper, Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender (2012) estimates the
disincentive effect of unemployment benefits over the business cycle. Using detailed
administrative data from Germany they exploit a policy discontinuity based on the
age of workers on the day they become unemployed. The months of unemployment
benefits a worker is eligible for changes discontinuously at two age cutoffs. Using a
regression discontinuity design they are able to estimate the change in the behavioral
response due to increased benefit eligibility, and how this response varies with business
cycle conditions. They find a small disincentive effect overall that does not vary much
with business cycle conditions. However, it is important to note that they also hold
constant all market-level factors, and identify only the micro elasticity.
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Macro Effects
Starting with the pioneering work of Millard and Mortensen (1997), the evidence on
the magnitude of the macro effect is predominantly based on the estimation of struc-
tural models.5 Clearly, the firm’s vacancy creation decision is based on comparing the
cost of creating a job to the profits the firm expects to obtain from hiring the worker.
The profit is the difference between a worker’s productivity and the wage. Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008a) have shown that the fluctuations in aggregate labor produc-
tivity of the magnitude observed in the data can account for the observed business
cycle fluctuations of aggregate unemployment and vacancies using the Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) model. This implies that the amount of job vacancies is highly re-
sponsive to the relatively small business cycle frequency changes in productivity. The
flip side of this argument is that changes in unemployment benefit policies that affect
wages can have a similar impact on profits also implying a large response of vacancies,
and, as a consequence, of unemployment. The persuasiveness of these arguments de-
pends, however, on whether one agrees with the parameter values estimated by these
authors. Key among them is the flow utility obtained by unemployed workers. This
parameter is difficult to measure directly but its value is crucial for the amount of
amplification delivered by the search model. Our objective in this paper is to directly
measure the impact of unemployment benefits on the labor market variables of in-
terest without having to rely on the estimates of the flow utility of the unemployed
and without having to fully specify the model. Our empirical strategy is, however,
consistent with a fully specified model.
5One line of research, reviewed in e.g., Costain and Reiter (2008), has studied the effects of unemployment
benefits on unemployment using cross-country regressions. While this literature typically finds much larger
effects than those implied by the micro studies, these estimates are relatively hard to interpret given the
endogeneity problems and heterogeneity across countries that is difficult to control for.
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3.1 Empirical Methodology
3.1.1 Identification via Border Counties: Controlling for Expectations
To estimate the macroeconomic effects of unemployment insurance on a variable xt
such as vacancies or unemployment, we first estimate the effect on labor market tight-
ness, θt, defined as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and therefore look at firms’
job creation decision. In the standard Pissarides (2000) model, firms’ period t profits
from employing a worker are given by the difference between workers’ marginal prod-
uct and the wage. The wage, in turn, is affected by the generosity of unemployment
benefits available to the worker. Thus, up to a log-linear approximation with respect
to the two state variables of the model, firms’ profits from employing a worker are
given by:
log(πt) = γz log(zt)− γb log(bt), (3.2)
where zt is workers’ productivity and bt are benefits. γz and γb are unknown coeffi-
cients which the standard theory implies should both be positive, although we do not
impose such a restriction. The value of a filled job for the firm is:
Jt = πt + β(1− st)EtJt+1, (3.3)
where β is the discount factor, st is the exogenous probability that the job ends and
Et is the expectation operator using information available at time t. Free entry into
vacancy posting implies that the expected cost of posting a vacancy is equal to the
value of a filled job. The job creation decision is then
q(θt)Jt = c, (3.4)
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where q(θt) is the probability to fill a vacancy and c is the the cost of maintaining a
vacancy. This approximately yields
log(θt) = κ̃ log(Jt). (3.5)
We now approximate log(Jt) as a function of log(πt), log(Jt+1) and an expectational
error log(ηt) around the steady state with a constant π = J(1−β(1− s)), so that the
previous equation reads
log(θt) = κ̃
π
J
log(πt) + κ̃β(1− st) log(Jt+1) + log(ηt). (3.6)
Using π/J = (1 − β(1 − s)) and the job creation decision for t + 1, log(θt+1) =
κ̃ log(Jt+1), yields
log(θt) = κ̃(1− β(1− s)) log(πt) + β(1− st) log(θt+1) + log(ηt). (3.7)
In quarterly data variables such as unemployment are well approximated by a linear
function of log(θ):6
log(xt) = λx log(θt), (3.8)
so that we obtain the quasi-difference
x̃t := log(xt)− β(1− st) log(xt+1) = κ̃λx(1− β(1− s)) log(πt) + λx log(ηt). (3.9)
Now, denote by p the border-county pair. Then, substituting Equation (3.2) into
6See, e.g., Hall (2005), Shimer (2007). Below we verify that this approximation also performs well in a
calibrated equilibrium search model with unemployment benefit extensions.
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Equation (3.9) and differencing between border counties within a pair yields:
∆x̃p,t = α∆bp,t + ∆εp,t, (3.10)
where ∆ the difference operator over counties in the same pair. More specifically, if
counties i and j are in the same border-county pair p, then ∆x̃p,t = x̃p,i,t− x̃p,j,t, and,
with a slight abuse of notation, ∆bp,t = log(bp,i,t)− log(bp,j,t).
After we describe the structure of the error term ∆εp,t in Section 3.1.2, Equation
(3.10) can be estimated in the data to recover the coefficient of interest α, which
equals, using equations (3.2) and (3.9),
− γbλxκ̃(1− β(1− s)). (3.11)
Dividing this coefficient by the measurable factor (1−β(1− s)) yields the permanent
percentage change of a variable x in response to a permanent one percentage change in
the policy variable b, −γbλxκ̃. More generally, the effect of increasing benefit duration
from ω1 to ω2 weeks for n time periods is given by
α̂× 1− (β(1− s))
n
1− β(1− s)
× (log(ω2)− log(ω1)) . (3.12)
Equation (3.10), which will form the basis of our empirical strategy, differs from
the standard specification in the literature in that the left-hand-side variable is the
quasi-difference x̃p,t as opposed to simply xp,t. This is essential in our application
because vacancy posting decisions by employers are forward looking and are affected
by the expectations of future changes in benefits. Moreover, the expectations of the
future path of benefits might depend on the benefit level today. For example, suppose
raising benefit levels leads to a rise in unemployment. If the benefit level and the
duration are increasing in state unemployment, an increase in benefits today makes it
then more likely that benefits would be increased further in the future. Since vacancy
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creation and, consequently, unemployment respond to this change in expectations, it
is clear that the coefficient α in a regression with xp,t on the left-hand side will be a
biased estimator of the effect of the current benefit structure on the current variable
of interest, such as unemployment.
To clarify how our estimation strategy controls for expectations, recall that our
quasi-difference is defined as x̃t := log(xt) − β(1 − st) log(xt+1). This works because
market tightness in period t, θt, depends on expected profits Jt and thus on the whole
expected sequence of future benefit levels in t, t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . Shifting by one period,
market tightness θt+1 depends on expected profits in period t + 1, Jt+1, and thus on
the expected sequence of benefit levels in t + 1, t + 2, . . . Since profits in periods t
and t + 1 are related by the simple accounting identity, Jt = πt + β(1 − st)EtJt+1,
market tightness θt depends on current profits πt (affected by bt) and on market
tightness θt+1 which is linearly related to EtJt+1 and depends on the sequence of
benefits (bt+1, bt+2, . . .). As a result, a change in current benefits bt affects current
profits, current vacancy creation and thus the quasi-differenced market tightness. In
contrast, changes in future benefits, say bt+1, affect both θt and θt+1. The effect of
bt+1 on θt is discounted by β(1− st). The effect of bt+1 on θt+1 is not discounted, but
is multiplied by β(1 − st) when constructing the quasi-difference. Thus, the effect
of a change in bt+1 cancels out in the quasi-difference. By the same logic, the quasi-
difference eliminates the effect of a change in bt+2, bt+3, . . . Thus, our specification
allows us to obtain an unbiased estimate of the coefficient α - the effect of a current
change in benefits on current profits and current market tightness - despite a forward
looking nature of the job creation decision.7
In order to ascertain the accuracy of our specification, In Section 3.4.4 we will
compare the predicted permanent effect estimated using the proposed method to the
actual permanent effect in a calibrated Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model. We
7Obviously, this issue cannot be resolved by including future values of benefits into the regression be-
cause they represent a realized path and will bias all the coefficients due to their correlation with today’s
expectation error.
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find that our empirical specification is very accurate in model generated data.
3.1.2 Interactive Effects
The term ∆εp,t in Equation (3.10) contains the expectation error and the permanent
differences in x̃ across border counties caused by, e.g., permanent differences in tax
policies across states they belong to. Moreover, as we mentioned in the Introduction,
various shocks have affected the aggregate economy during the Great Recession. But
the same aggregate shocks are likely to have a heterogeneous impact on different bor-
der county pairs. In this case, estimating the panel regression in Equation (3.10),
perhaps with a set of county pair and time fixed effects, might be problematic for
inference (see Andrews (2005) for the discussion of this problem in a cross-sectional
regression). Fortunately, Bai (2009) has shown that consistency and proper infer-
ence can be obtained in a panel data context, such as ours, through the use of an
interactive-effects estimator. In particular, we decompose the error term in Equation
(3.10) as
∆εp,t = λ
′
pFt + νp,t, (3.13)
where λp (r × 1) is a vector of pair-specific factor loadings and Ft (r × 1) is a vector
of time-specific common factors. Our baseline specification can then be written as
∆x̃p,t = α∆bp,t + λ
′
pFt + νp,t. (3.14)
As is shown in Bai (2009), this model incorporates additive time and county pair
fixed effects as special cases. It is, however, much more general and allows for a very
flexible model of the heterogeneous time trends at the county pair level. The key to
estimating α consistently is to treat the unobserved factors and factor loadings as
parameters to be estimated. Our implementation is based on an iterative two-stage
estimator described in Appendix C.1.
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Estimating the Number of Factors
To implement this estimator, we need to specify the number of factors. Bai and Ng
(2002) have shown that the number of factors in pure factor models can be consistently
estimated based on the information criterion approach. Bai (2009) shows that their
argument can be adapted to panel data models with interactive fixed effects. Thus,
we define our criterion CP as a function of the number of factors k as:
CP (k) = σ̂2(k) + σ̂2(k̄)
[
k (N + T )− k2
] log (NT )
NT
,
where k̄ ≥ r is the maximum number of factors, N is the number of pairs, T is the
number of time observations, σ̂2(k) is the mean squared error, defined as
σ̂2(k) =
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(
∆x̃p,t − a∆bp,t − λ
′
i (k)Ft (k)
)2
,
and Ft (k) and λ
′
i (k) are the estimated factors and their loadings, respectively, when
k factors are estimated. To avoid collinearity, we set k̄ to the minimum of seven and
T − 1, one less than the total number of time observations. Our estimator for the
number of factors is then given by
k̂ = arg min
k≤k̄
CP (k).
Standard Errors
To properly compute standard errors, we need to take into account potential corre-
lation in the residuals across counties and over time. There are two possible sources
of correlation. First, the outcomes that we are interested in (unemployment, vacan-
cies, wages, etc.) are highly serially correlated. This aspect of the data may cause
serial correlation in the errors. Second, the fact that some counties appear in multi-
ple county-pairs results in an almost mechanical correlation across county pairs. To
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account for these sources of correlation in the residuals, we follow Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan (2004) and use the block-bootstrap to compute standard errors.
3.2 Data
Data on unemployment among the residents in each county are from the Local
Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.8
County-level data on private sector employment (the number of jobs located in a
county) and wages are from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI).9 QWI is de-
rived from the Local Employment Dynamics, which is a partnership between state
labor market information agencies and the Census Bureau. QWI supplies data for all
counties except those in Massachusetts. Data availability varies substantially across
states until 2004 Q4. Thus, for our main empirical analysis we will restrict attention
to quarters beginning with 2005 Q1.10
To identify the role of unemployment benefit extensions on labor market outcomes,
we focus our analysis on a sample of county pairs that are in different states and share
a border.11 There are 1,107 such pairs for which we have complete data.
Data on unemployment benefit durations in each state is based on trigger reports
provided by the Department of Labor. These reports contain detailed information
for each of the states regarding the eligibility and adoption of the two unemployment
insurance programs over our primary sample period: Extended Benefits program
(EB) and Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08).12
The EB program allows for 13 or 20 weeks of extra benefits in states with ele-
vated unemployment rates. The EB program is a joint state and federal program.
8ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/time.series/la/
9http://lehd.ces.census.gov/datatools/qwiapp.html
10There are some implausible high frequency changes in county-level employment in QWI data. Thus,
when using these data, we restrict the sample to observations where employment changes by no more than
15% from one quarter to the next. All results are robust to the choice of this cut-off.
11Data on county pairs are provided by Arindrajit Dube and were used in Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010).
12See http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/trigger/ for trigger reports on the EB program and
http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/euc trigger/ for reports on the EUC08 program.
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The federal government pays for half of the cost, and determines a set of ”triggers”
related to the insured and total unemployment state rates that the states can adopt
to qualify for extended benefits. At the onset of the recession, many states chose to
opt out of the program or only adopt high triggers.13 The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 turned this into a federally funded program (with 100%
Federal funding currently scheduled to expire on December 31, 2013). Following this,
many states joined the program and several states adopted lower triggers to qualify
for the program.
The EUC08 program enacted in June 2008, on the other hand, has been a federal
program since its onset. The program started by allowing for an extra 13 weeks of
benefits to all states and was gradually expanded to have 4 tiers, providing potentially
53 weeks of federally financed additional benefits. The availability of each tier is
dependent on state unemployment rates.14 The trigger reports contain the specifics
of when each state was eligible and activated the EB program and different tiers of
the EUC08 program. We have constructed the data through December 2012.
There is a substantial heterogeneity in the actual unemployment benefit durations
across time and across the U.S. states. Appendix Figure C.3 presents some snapshots
that illustrate the extent of this variation. Among 1,107 border county pairs used in
our analysis, 1,079 have different benefits for at least one quarter. The median county
pair has different benefit durations for 11 quarters during 2008-2012. The difference
in available benefit duration within a county-pair ranges from 0 to 17 quarters.
Some of the data series used in the analysis are available at a monthly frequency
while others are quarterly. Therefore, we aggregate all monthly data to obtain quar-
terly frequency. Logs are taken after aggregation. When constructing the quasi-
differences at the quarterly frequency, we set β = 0.99 and use the separation rate
measured from JOLTS data.15
13Wright (1986) studies unemployment benefit extensions in a voting equilibrium.
14This discussion is based on Rothstein (2011a).
15http://www.bls.gov/jlt/
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Table 3.1: Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Unemployment
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weeks of 0.0602 0.0592 0.1528 0.1193 0.0638 0.0629 0.0635 0.0579
Benefits (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State GDP 0.0039 -0.0740
per Worker (0.690) (0.000)
N. factors 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 3
Observations 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988 17,312 2,352 30,988 48,611
R-squared 0.4598 0.4601 0.565 0.642 0.490 0.642 0.473 0.405
Note - p-values (in parentheses) calculated via bootstrap. Bold font indicates p < 0.01.
Column (1) - Baseline sample,
Column (2) - Baseline sample controlling for State GDP per worker,
Column (3) - Scrambled border county pairs sample,
Column (4) - Scrambled border county pairs sample controlling for State GDP per worker,
Column (5) - Sample of border counties with similar industrial composition,
Column (6) - Sample of border counties within the same Core Based Statistical Areas,
Column (7) - Baseline sample with perfect foresight measure of available benefits,
Column (8) - Baseline results using data from 2001 recession only.
3.3 Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Unemployment
3.3.1 Baseline Empirical Results
Column (1) of Table 3.1 contains the results of the estimation of the effect of un-
employment benefit duration on unemployment using the baseline specification in
Equation (3.14). We find that changes in unemployment benefits have large and sta-
tistically significant short-run effect on unemployment: a 1% rise in benefit duration
for only one quarter increases unemployment rate by 0.06 log points. Equation (3.12)
helps us extrapolate these effects and estimate the effect of a permanent increase in
benefit durations. Using the average quarterly separation rate of 10% in JOLTS data,
we find that the effect of permanently (n = ∞) increasing benefits from ω1 = 26 to
ω2 = 99 weeks is quite sizable: The effect on unemployment is 110%, meaning that
such a permanent increase would increase the long-run average unemployment rate
from 5% to 10.5%.
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During the Great Recession, unemployment benefits have been on average at 82.5
weeks for approximately 16 quarters. Evaluating Equation (3.12) at ω1 = 26, ω2 =
82.5, and n = 16 yields 0.62. Translating this to rates, would predict a rise in
unemployment from 5% to 8.6%.16
When comparing the magnitude of this effect to the experience in the data, it is
important to keep in mind that it is based on the difference across pairs of border
counties. Thus, the effects of various other shocks or policies that affect these counties
symmetrically are differenced out. For example, the 2% reduction to an employee’s
share of Social Security payroll taxes implemented in all states in 2011 and 2012
might have had a substantial negative impact on unemployment, counteracting some
of the effects of unemployment benefit extensions.
3.3.2 Testing for Endogeneity
In this section we formalize the potential endogeneity problem as well as develop and
implement a test to detect its presence. We begin, however, by outlining the origin of
the problem informally using an intuitive example. To help fix ideas, the example is
stark and imposes stronger conditions than those actually required for identification.
Imagine a border county pair consisting of county a belonging to state A and
county b belonging to state B. State A also has some geographic area A that excludes
county a. We now consider two cases.
Case 1. Continuous economic conditions at the state border.
Suppose there is a large shock affecting the economy ofA. The economic effects of this
shock might spread geographically to reach county a. However, there is no particular
reason for them to stop upon reaching the state border. Thus, they will continue
spreading and would affect county b similarly to their effect on county a. If this is
the case, there is no endogeneity problem in our baseline specification (3.14) as the
16log(0.05) + 0.62 = log(0.086).
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difference in unemployment between counties a and b is due solely to the difference
in benefit policies, perhaps triggered by the developments in A. With geographically
continuous economic fundamentals, shocks directly to counties a and b also do not
create an endogeneity problem even if either one or both counties are large enough
to trigger a changes in policies in the corresponding states.
Case 2. Discontinuous economic conditions at the state border.
The endogeneity problem can arise only if shocks to e.g., productivity, stop when
reaching a state border. In this case, a shock to A may affect, say, productivity in
county a and trigger a change in unemployment benefit policy in state A. In contrast,
this shock stops when reaching the state border so that neither b’s productivity nor
B’s benefit policy is affected. In this case, the difference in unemployment between
counties a and b is driven by both the difference in productivities and the difference in
benefits, with the latter at least partially induced by the difference in productivities.
In this case, the estimate of the effect of benefits would be biased if the difference in
state productivities is not controlled for.
As we mentioned, this stark intuitive example helps fix ideas at the cost of impos-
ing stronger conditions than those actually required for identification. For example,
an endogeneity problem would not arise even if there are discontinuous idiosyncratic
shocks to counties a or b as long as these shocks do not affect the state average con-
ditions and do not trigger changes in benefit policy at the state level. This is not a
very strong restriction as the median border county has only one half of one percent
of its state’s employment.
We now turn to a more formal exposition. The identifying assumption of our em-
pirical strategy is that the error term νp,t in estimation equation (3.14) is uncorrelated
with benefits ∆bp,t. The variable x at the county level is driven by benefits b, the time
varying factors F and county-specific factors such as county-productivity and demand
which are unobserved and are part of the term νp,t. The assumption that νp,t is not
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correlated with benefits then means that the differences in productivity, demand, etc.
across border counties are not correlated with the benefits across the same counties.
Since benefits are a function of state level variables, for this assumption to be valid,
the difference in county level productivity, demand, etc. has to be uncorrelated with
the corresponding differences at the state level, i.e.
Corr(νp,t,∆zp) = 0, (3.15)
where z is state level productivity and ∆zp is the difference in productivity across
states. To test this assumption, we can decompose the term νp,t into a part that
depends on the state, ∆zp, and another part that depends on county-specific factors
only, ν̃p,t,
νp,t = χ∆zp + ν̃p,t, (3.16)
so that we rewrite the empirical specification as
∆x̃p,t = α∆bp,t + λ
′
pFt + χ∆zp + ν̃p,t (3.17)
for a (possibly) nonzero coefficient χ.
The economics behind this specification should by now be clear. Unemployment
benefit extensions are determined at the state level and thus depend on a state’s
economic conditions such as state level productivity z. Thus, a negative state-level
shock to z can cause unemployment to increase in all the counties in the state and
simultaneously lead to an extension of benefits. When we do not control for z and
χ 6= 0, the estimated coefficient α would be biased in specification (3.17). One way
to ensure that χ = 0 would be to assume that the two counties in a pair are identical
so that νp,t is pure measurement error. Our identifying assumption (3.15) is weaker
than this as we allow counties to be different but only in terms of county-specific
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factors. State-related factors cancel when we take differences, that is χ = 0. In other
words, we allow for county-specific shocks but require that state-shocks affect the
two counties symmetrically so that the difference in state-shocks does not affect the
difference of x across the two counties.
To test for this type of endogeneity, we implement specification (3.17). If our
empirical methodology suffers from this bias, we would expect the coefficient on ∆zp
to be statistically different from zero, χ 6= 0, and, more importantly, the coefficient α
on benefit duration to change drastically and perhaps lose its statistical significance.17
We define state productivity as real gross state product per worker. We obtain data
on state real GDP at an annual frequency from the Regional Economic Accounts at
the Bureau of Economic Analysis18 and interpolate it at quarterly frequency. We
then divide quarterly state GDP by quarterly state employment. The results are
provided in Column (2) of Table 3.1. Note that including the difference in state
productivity has almost no effect on the estimate of the effect of benefit duration on
unemployment. These results provide clear evidence that our findings are not driven
by a mechanical relationship between the economic conditions at the state level and
the duration of unemployment benefits.
One may also consider whether the difference in state-level unemployment rates
can be used in place of ∆zp when testing for endogeneity. We explain in Appendix
C.2 why this would not constitute a valid test.
3.3.3 Scrambled Border County Pairs
In the previous section we tested for endogeneity by implementing equation (3.17)
and found a negligible effect on the estimated effect of benefit extensions, α and
that the effect on difference in state productivities, χ, is not statistically different
17We can expect to see some impact on the estimate as there might be at least some correlation between
the measured productivities of the county and of the state it belongs to since the number of counties in a
state may be too small for the Law of Large Numbers to apply.
18http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index regional.cfm
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from zero. The results lent empirical support to our identification assumption (3.15),
implying that our benchmark sample is well described by Case 1 from the example
in the preceding section.
Suppose, instead, that we randomly assign counties to pairs. That is, instead
of pairing neighboring counties from different states, pairs are formed by randomly
matching counties from the original set of the border counties. This mechanically
introduces a discontinuity in economic conditions across the constructed “border”
county pairs, so that Case 2 described in the preceding section applies with the
associated endogeneity bias. Consider again the example of county a from state A
being matched to county b from state B. With randomly assigned pairs, however,
counties a and b do not border each other so that shocks to, say productivity of area
A of state A affect productivity in county a but not in county b. If these shocks
also affect economic conditions in state A, they would also be correlated with the
difference in policies between States A and B. This invalidates our identification
assumption (3.15).
Consequently, estimating our benchmark specification (3.14) on a scrambled bor-
der county sample would yield a biased coefficient of interest α because νp,t is cor-
related with ∆bp,t since both are correlated with ∆zp. The empirical results of the
estimation are in Column (3) of Table 3.1 and show that the estimate of α is indeed
substantially upward biased on a sample of randomly paired counties.
Next, we add the difference in state-level productivities to this regression as in
specification (3.17). We expect to find a negative χ because the endogeneity problem
induced by the random pairing of counties. Adding state level productivity however
alleviates the endogeneity problem and diminishes the bias in estimating α. The bias
is not expected to fully disappear when we add state level productivity since we do
not control for other state variables, such as state demand, which are also correlated
with νp,t leading to a bias, albeit a smaller one. Results in Column (4) of Table 3.1
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confirm this logic.
3.3.4 Border Counties with Similar Industrial Composition
As pointed out by Holmes (1998), the density of manufacturing industry employment
varies systematically across counties within border pairs that belong to states with
different right-to-work legislation. Manufacturing industries and thus states with a
large manufacturing sector have more cyclical unemployment. They may also have a
more cyclical unemployment benefit policy, potentially giving rise to the endogeneity
problem. If this cyclical heterogeneity across states is sufficiently empirically impor-
tant, however, our interactive effects estimator picks it up through assigning a higher
loading on the cyclical aggregate factor for more cyclical states.
As an additional and more general check, we now investigate whether differences
in industrial composition affect our results. To this aim, we repeat the benchmark
analysis on a subset of border counties with similar industrial composition. If the
industrial composition affected our results, we would expect a different result in the
subsample than in the full sample. We obtain data on county employment by industry
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System.19
Using sample average industry employment shares within each county, we construct
the l2-distance between border counties within each pair. The results, presented in
Column (5) of Table 3.1, are based on the sample of 50% of county pairs with the
most similar industrial composition out of all border county pairs. The effect of
unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment on this subsample is similar to
the one found in our full sample.
19http://www.bea.gov/regional/
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3.3.5 Border Counties within the same CBSAs
The degree of economic integration varies across county border pairs. This is relevant
for the following reason. If two border counties have a fully integrated labor market
with perfect mobility of workers, the residence and employment decisions are sepa-
rated. In other words, the decision in which of the two counties to (look for) work is
independent of the decision in which of the counties to live. Thus, in response to a
change in benefits, say, in one of the states, residents of both counties adopt the same
strategy of which county to work in. As unemployment is measured by the place of
residence, it will be the same in both counties. Thus, our estimate of the effect of
unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment would be severely biased toward
zero.
In Section 3.5 we will present evidence that workers do not change the location
of employment in response to changes in benefits and that labor markets in border
counties are well approximated as closed economies. Here we explore whether the
potential bias is large by restricting attention to a subset of border counties with
most integrated labor markets. To do so, we repeat the analysis on a restricted sample
of border counties that belong to the same Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs).
CBSAs represent a geographic entity associated with at least one core of 10,000 or
more population, plus adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic
integration with the core (see Office of Management and Budget (2010) for detailed
criteria). The results, presented in Column (6) of Table 3.1, imply similar effect
of unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment to the one found in our full
sample.
3.3.6 Alternative Benefit Duration Measure
Our baseline measure of weeks of benefits available corresponds to the number of
weeks a newly unemployed worker can expect to receive if current policies and ag-
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gregate conditions remained in force for the duration of the unemployment spell. An
alternative, albeit extreme, assumption is that individuals have a perfect foresight of
the future path of benefits.
To construct the perfect foresight measure of available benefits, for a worker who
becomes unemployed in a given week, we compute the realized maximum number of
weeks available to him during the course of his unemployment spell (this takes into
account extensions that are enacted after the spell begins).
The following example illustrates the construction of the two measures of benefit
duration. Consider October 2009 in California. At the time, up to 26 regular weeks
were available, in addition to 20 weeks in Tier 1 and 13 weeks in Tier 2 of EUC08 and
20 weeks in EB. Thus, under our baseline specification the measure of weeks available
would be 26+20+13+20=79 weeks. In November of 2009, the weeks available were
expanded up to 99 total (two additional tiers were added) and the program continued
to be extended at those benefit levels through September of 2012. So the perfect fore-
sight measure would assign 99 weeks available to a worker that became unemployed
in 2009.
The results based on the perfect foresight measure of available benefit duration
are reported in Columns (7) of Table 3.1. Similar to the results based on the baseline
measure of benefit availability, they continue to imply a quantitatively large impact
of unemployment benefit duration on unemployment.
3.3.7 The 2001 Recession
The Great Recession was unusually severe and accompanied by a financial crisis.
This suggests that our findings of the large effect of unemployment benefit extensions
on unemployment might be specific to this recession. To assess this hypothesis, we
repeated the analysis using the data on benefit extensions during the much milder
2001 recession (using the 1996-2004 sample). In order to extend our analysis to
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the 2001 recession we need to quantify the difference in benefits during that time
period. In addition to EB, the federal government enacted the Temporary Emergency
Unemployment Compensation Program (TEUC), which provided up to 26 weeks of
additional benefits depending on state conditions. We obtain data on weeks available
from BLS trigger reports.20 As JOLTS data are only available beginning in December
2000, prior to that we set the separation rate equal to its average value in the available
JOLTS data. The results of this experiment, reported in Column (8) of Table 3.1,
imply that the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment is the
same in both recessions.
3.3.8 Controlling for Other State-Level Policies
In this section we control for government tax and transfer policies that might be
correlated with unemployment and unemployment benefit extensions at the county
or state levels.
Controlling for the Expansion of Food-Stamps Programs
Mulligan (2012) has argued that in addition to unemployment benefit extensions, the
Department of Agriculture’s food-stamp program, now known as the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP, was also expanded considerably following
the Great Recession. It is possible that the expansion of this program at the state
level was correlated with unemployment benefit extensions so that the results reported
above combine the effects of these programs. We now isolate their impacts.
Food-stamps were originally designed as a means-tested program for the poor.
During the Great Recession the Federal government has allowed states to adopt broad
eligibility criteria that effectively eliminated the asset test and states received waivers
from work requirements for the participants in the program. As a result, the par-
20http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/teuc/
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Table 3.2: Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Unemployment:
Controlling for State SNAP and Foreclosure Policies
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks of 0.0607 0.0542 0.0586 0.0627
Benefits (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SNAP Broad 0.0100
Eligibility (0.000)
SNAP 0.0056
Spending (0.190)
Foreclosure 0.0025
Policy (0.470)
Number of Factors 2 2 2 2
Observations 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988
R-squared 0.460 0.464 0.463 0.465
Note - p-values (in parentheses) calculated via bootstrap.
Bold font indicates p < 0.01.
ticipation in the program increased dramatically so that by 2010 half of non-elderly
households with an unemployed head or spouse were receiving food stamps, with
substantial variation across states.
To asses the extent to which the effects of unemployment benefit extensions doc-
umented above are affected by the expansion of food-stamps program eligibility, we
obtained USDA’s SNAP Policy Database which documents policy choices of each
state at monthly frequency.21 We construct a dummy variable equal to one during
all periods when states use broad-based categorical eligibility to increase or elimi-
nate the asset test and/or to increase the gross income limit for virtually all SNAP
applicants. The variable is zero otherwise. We include this variable in our baseline
regression and report the results in Column (2) of Table 3.2. The results confirm
the argument in Mulligan (2012) that the expansion of food-stamps eligibility repre-
21http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/snap-policy-database.aspx
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sents a marginal tax on working and thus leads to an increase in unemployment. It
is, however, only weakly correlated with unemployment benefit extensions and thus
does not significantly affect our estimate of their impact.
In addition, we control for the actual state-level spending on SNAP benefits that
we obtained from the Regional accounts of the BEA. The results reported in Column
(3) of Table 3.2 confirm our findings in Column (2) of Table 3.2 which were based on
statutory rule changes.
Controlling for Variation in State Foreclosure Policies
The Great Recession has began with a sharp but heterogeneous across states decline
in house prices. The government has responded by introducing various mortgage
modification programs with the objective of helping underwater mortgagors. Various
of these programs were either asset-tested or designed to write down mortgage prin-
ciple to ensure that housing costs do not exceed a certain proportion of household
income. In a series of papers, Mulligan (2008, 2009, 2010) has noted that this repre-
sents an implicit subsidy to unemployed workers. Moreover, Herkenhoff and Ohanian
(2013) have argued that the duration of the foreclosure process has been extended
considerably following the Great Recession and that unemployed mortgagors use their
ability to skip payments without being foreclosed upon as an implicit loan subsidy
negatively affecting their job search and acceptance decisions.
Cordell, Geng, Goodman, and Yang (2013) use proprietary data to measure the
heterogeneity in foreclosure delay following the Great Recession across states. They
find that in judicial states, in which state law requires a court action to foreclose, the
delay is much larger than in statutory foreclosure states that do not require judicial
intervention. Our use of the interactive effects estimator was specifically motivated
by the concerns that aggregate shocks, such as shocks to house prices, may have
heterogeneous impacts across border-county pairs depending, in part, on their state
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foreclosure law. To verify the performance of the estimator, we define a dummy
variable taking the value of one for border counties belonging to states with judicial
foreclosure laws and zero otherwise. We then include in the benchmark specification
the difference of the value of this dummy between border counties i and j in pair
p. The results reported in Column (4) of Table 3.2 indicate that this variable (the
difference of the two dummies) is not statistically significant and does not affect the
estimate of the effect of unemployment benefit extensions. This finding does not
imply that foreclosure delay was not an important determinant of unemployment. It
only means that our interactive effects estimator accounted for some of this aspect of
heterogeneity across states and it did not impart a bias on our estimate of the effect
of unemployment benefit extensions.
Controlling for the Effect of Stimulus Spending
In the specification of Column (2) of Table 3.3 we control for the effects of stimulus
spending. We use data on actual county level spending arising from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) - commonly referred to as the “stimulus
package.” We obtain an accounting of all stimulus spending at the zip code level
under the ARRA.22 We then match counties to zip codes. We run our specification
both in levels and by dividing the spending by the population in the county, obtained
from the Census. We find that that controlling for ARRA spending does not affect
our estimate of the effect of unemployment benefit extensions.23
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Table 3.3: Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Unemployment:
Controlling for State Tax and Spending Policies
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Weeks of 0.0607 0.0610 0.0552 0.0590 0.0599 0.0613 0.0609 0.0591 0.0606
Benefits (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Variable in Levels Variable Relative to GDP
Stimulus 0.0008 0.0007?
Spending (0.000) (0.210)
Total Tax 0.0035 -0.0047
Revenue (0.005) (0.140)
Sales Tax 0.0004 0.0005
Revenue (0.245) (0.720)
Income Tax 0.0002 -0.0044
Revenue (0.360) (0.095)
# Factors 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Obs. 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988
R-squared 0.460 0.463 0.464 0.465 0.461 0.465 0.461 0.465 0.460
Note - p-values (in parentheses) calculated via bootstrap. Bold font indicates p < 0.01.
?-Relative to county population
Controlling for State Tax Policies
To control for the variation in state-level tax policies we obtained detailed Census
Bureau data on quarterly tax revenues for each state.24 We consider whether effective
total or sales tax rates have co-moved systematically with unemployment benefit
durations. We find no support for this hypothesis. The results reported in Table 3.3
imply that directly controlling for these effective tax rates has virtually no impact on
our estimates of the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment.
Our analysis was based on effective tax rates for two reasons. First, the statutory
rates have not changed systematically over our sample period. Despite many states
having balanced budget laws, expansions of unemployment benefits have not required
22www.recovery.gov.
23The coefficient on spending however has to be interpreted with caution. It is conceivable, in contrast to
unemployment benefits which depend on economic conditions at the state level, that spending at the county
level depends on the economic conditions at the county level. In this case the coefficient on spending will
be biased.
24http://www.census.gov/govs/qtax/
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changes in tax rates as extensions were mostly federally financed. Second, there are
numerous state programs targeted to attract businesses that offer tax deductions to
individual firms. For competitive reasons details of such policies are rarely disclosed.
We can effectively measure them, however, by focusing on actual tax receipts.
Controlling for Other State Policies
While we found no evidence that the effects of unemployment benefit extensions on
unemployment are a proxy for changes in other tax policies, we now consider whether
they could be driven by other state policies, such as changes in regulatory or litigation
environment. For this purpose we obtain data from three prominent indexes of state
policies - U.S. State Business Policy Index (SBSI), State Business Tax Climate Index
(SBTCI), and BHI State Competitiveness Index (BHI).25 The construction of these
indexes is based on a well-documented methodology, the data is available annually
over our sample period, and can be made consistent over time. A more detailed
description of these indexes, the analysis of their predictive performance for state
economic outcomes, and references to other academic evaluations can be found in
Kolko, Neumark, and Mejia (2013).
The motivation for using these broad policy indexes was provided in Holmes
(1998), who found that controlling for a similar (but no longer available) index of
state policies accounted for the positive relationship between right-to-work laws and
manufacturing employment. This suggests that the conclusion about the effects of
one policy may be misleading without taking into account other state policies re-
flected in a broad index. In contrast, the results reported in Table 3.4 imply that
controlling for such indexes does not affect the measured impact of unemployment
benefit extensions on unemployment.
25www.sbecouncil.org, www.taxfoundation.org, www.beaconhill.org, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Unemployment:
Controlling for Other State Policies
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks of 0.0602 0.0602 0.0615 0.0588
Benefits (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SBSI -0.0059
(0.105)
SBTCI -0.0024
(0.260)
BHI -0.0039
(0.175)
Number of Factors 2 2 2 2
Observations 30,988 30,988 30,988 30,988
R-squared 0.460 0.462 0.464 0.462
Note - p-values (in parentheses) calculated via bootstrap.
Bold font indicates p < 0.01.
3.4 The Role of Macro Effects
In equilibrium labor market search models, the dynamics of unemployment over the
business cycle and the response of unemployment to changes in policies are primarily
driven by employers’ vacancy creation decisions. Consider, for example, an increase
in unemployment benefit duration. Having access to longer spells of benefits improves
the outside option of workers and leads to an increase in the equilibrium wage. This
lowers the accounting profits of firms and reduces vacancy posting to restore the
equilibrium relationship between the cost of firm entry and the expected profits.
Lower vacancy creation leads to a decline in labor market tightness, defined as the
ratio of vacancies to unemployment. This lowers the job finding rate of workers and
results in an increase in unemployment.
In this section, we present evidence on the empirical relevance of these macro
effects. In particular, we document the effect of unemployment benefit extensions
130
Table 3.5: Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Job Creation
VARIABLES Vacancies Tightness Employment Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks of -0.0631 -0.1067 -0.0051 0.0128
Benefits (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.025)
N. factors 2 2 2 2
Observations 29,492 29,492 29,600 29,549
R-squared 0.175 0.178 0.933 0.457
Note - p-values (in parentheses) calculated via bootstrap.
Bold font indicates p < 0.05.
on vacancy creation, employment, and wages in the data. We also compare the
magnitude of these empirical findings to those in a calibrated equilibrium search
model.
3.4.1 Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Vacancy Creation
We begin by considering the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on vacancy
posting by employers and on labor market tightness using the basic specification in
Equation (3.14). We obtain vacancy data from the Help Wanted OnLine (HWOL)
dataset provided by The Conference Board (TCB). This dataset is a monthly se-
ries that covers the universe of vacancies advertised on around 16,000 online job
boards and online newspaper editions. The HWOL database started in May 2005
and replaced the Help-Wanted Advertising Index of print advertising also collected
by TCB.26 For a more detailed description of the data, some of the measurement
issues, and a comparison with the well-known JOLTS data, see Sahin, Song, Topa,
and Violante (2012).
The results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.5. We find that changes
in unemployment benefits have a large and statistically significant short-run effect on
26For detailed information on survey methodology, coverage, and concepts see the Technical Notes at
http://www.conference-board.org/data/helpwantedonline.cfm.
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vacancy creation: a 1% rise in benefit duration for only one quarter lowers the number
of vacancies by 0.063 log points and labor market tightness by 0.107 log points.
In the standard equilibrium search model, the matching function implies a tight
relationship between changes in unemployment, vacancies, and tightness. As we have
obtained independent estimates of the effects of benefit extensions on these variables,
it is of interest whether their magnitudes are mutually consistent. The following
calculation establishes that this is indeed the case.
Assuming that the matching function is of the commonly used Cobb-Douglas type,
M(u, v) = µv1−γuγ,
allows us to relate the change in tightness to the change in unemployment. Since the
job finding rate is given by
f = µθ1−γ,
the implied change in f induced by a change in benefits equals −(1 − γ) × 0.1067.
Since the elasticity of the steady-state unemployment rate u w.r.t f equals 1−u, the
implied change in u (due to the change in tightness induced by the change in benefits)
equals
(1− u)(1− γ)× 0.1067.
For standard values of γ = 0.4, 0.5, assuming u = 0.05, the implied change equals
0.06 (γ = 0.4) and 0.05 (γ = 0.5) respectively, values close to the actual change in
unemployment reported in Table 3.1.
3.4.2 Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Employment
In Column (3) of Table 3.5 we report the effect of unemployment benefit extensions
on employment. We find a large negative effect implying that a rise in unemployment
associated with an extension of unemployment benefits is similar in magnitude to the
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decline in employment. This finding challenges the wisdom of relying on unemploy-
ment benefit extensions as a policy to stimulate aggregate demand. The large decline
in employment associated with such policies is likely to substantially dampen any
potential stimulative effects.
A hypothesis often mentioned in the literature, see, e.g., Solon (1979) and Roth-
stein (2011a), is that the rise in unemployment in response to unemployment benefit
extensions might be driven by measurement issues. In particular, workers who col-
lect benefits claim to be actively searching for a job in response to surveys used to
determine the unemployment rate, while in reality they are not. In other words, had
benefits not been extended, these workers would have reported themselves as being
out of the labor force. The decline in the vacancy rates and employment documented
here provides evidence against this hypothesis. In fact, if we consider the same cal-
culation as in Section 4.1, we can compute the effect on employment of extending
benefits to 82.5 weeks for 16 quarters as:
−0.0051× 1− (β(1− s))
16
1− β(1− s)
× (log(82.5)− log(26)) = 0.62.
Translating this into levels, this would predict a drop in the employment rate from
95% to 90.8%. This 4.2 percentage point decrease is slightly larger, but of a compa-
rable magnitude to the 3.6 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate found
above.
Note that our estimate of the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on em-
ployment is based on the difference across border counties. We then use the resulting
coefficient to predict the effect of a nation-wide extension. A potential concern with
such a procedure is that when some states extend benefits more than others, eco-
nomic activity and, thus, employment may reallocate to states with lower benefits.
This reallocation is picked up by our estimates but would be absent if the policy was
changed nation-wide. We find no empirical justification for such a concern. In partic-
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ular, we apply our empirical methodology to measure the change in employment in
sectors producing output that is plausibly non-tradable across states, such as retail
or food services. If the change in employment is driven to an important degree by
reallocation, we would not expect benefit extensions to have a large effect on these
sectors. Instead, we find that a 1% rise in benefit duration for one quarter leads to
a decline of employment by 0.013 and 0.015 log points in retail and food services
sectors, respectively. Both effects are statisically significant at 1%.
3.4.3 Unemployment Benefit Extensions and Wages
We have established that extensions of unemployment benefits lead to a decline in
job creation by employers. In a standard equilibrium search model such a response
is induced by the fact that longer expected benefit eligibility improves the outside
option of workers and leads to an increase in the equilibrium wage. We now assess
whether this equilibrium effect is consistent with the data.
Consider the wage of a worker i in county a in pair p which depends on county
productivity za, county market tightness θa, benefits ba and idiosyncratic productivity
φi:
log(wit) = β0 + βz log(z
a
t ) + βθ log(θ
a
t ) + βb log(b
a
t ) + log(φ
i
t) + η
i
t, (3.18)
where η is a measurement error. Theory predicts that the equilibrium wage, condi-
tional on county productivity, demand, etc, increases when UI becomes more gen-
erous. It is important to emphasize that we are referring to the response of the
equilibrium wage, which is also negatively affected by a drop in market tightness
caused by a negative response of job creation to the policy change. The fact that
the equilibrium wage combines the positive direct effect of benefit extensions and
the negative effect induced by the equilibrium response of job creation, makes the
identification of the net equilibrium effect on wages more demanding on the data.
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The crucial issue in studying the dynamics of wages is selection. The idiosyncratic
productivity of workers moving from non-employment to employment or from job to
job depend on business cycle conditions (Gertler and Trigari (2009), Haefke, Sonntag,
and van Rens (2012) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013)). Idiosyncratic productivity
can be decomposed into permanent ability µi, job specific productivity κi and a
stochastic component εi:
log(φit) = log(µ
i
t) + log(κ
i
t) + log(ε
i
t). (3.19)
The decision of a non-employed to accept a job depends on zt, µ
i
t, the job-specific
productivity κ̂ as well as on benefits b. The decision of a worker to switch jobs depends
on the worker’s current job specific productivity κit and the job-specific productivity
in the new job κ̂. Productivity κ̂ is a random draw of a distribution F . A worker who
has received N offers during a period accepts the highest draw κ, which is distributed
according to FN . Since the FN are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance,
the expected value of κ is increasing in N and is thus increasing in the number
of vacancies. A more generous unemployment insurance system leads to a drop in
vacancy posting and therefore to fewer offers and a lower expected value of κ. By the
Law of Large Numbers, workers starting a new job in a recession or when benefits
are high then have a lower average value of κ than workers starting a job when many
offers are available such as in a boom or when benefits are low. Thus, if we regress
wages on benefits we also pick up the impact of benefits on the average value of κ.27
To deal with this issue, we follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) and consider job
stayers, defined as workers who have the same job in period t and t+ 1 and thus also
27Benefits may also affect κ by making liquidity constrained workers more selective in the jobs they accept.
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the same value of κ. Taking differences across time for a job stayer yields
log(wit+1)− log(wit)
= βz(log(z
a
t+1)− log(zat )) + βθ(log(θat+1)− log(θat )) + βb(log(bat+1)− log(bat ))(3.20)
+ log(εit+1)− log(εit) + ηit+1 − ηit,
that is the terms µi and κi drop out. We therefore consider a group of workers who
worked in period t and t+ 1 for the same employer with average wages wat,t in period
t and wat,t+1 in period t + 1. Theory then predicts that regressing the difference in
wages log(wat,t+1) − log(wat,t) on the difference in benefits, log(bat+1) − log(bat ), yields
a positive coefficient. We again have to control for the endogeneity of policy and to
this end we again invoke assumption (3.15) and consider the difference across paired
border counties. Taking differences across counties a and b in the same pair p of
log(wat,t+1)− log(wat,t) and log(wbt,t+1)− log(wbt,t) yields
(log(wat,t+1)− log(wat,t))− (log(wbt,t+1)− log(wbt,t))
= βθ((log(θ
a
t+1)− log(θat ))− (log(θbt+1)− log(θbt ))) (3.21)
+ βb(log(b
a
t+1)− log(bat ))− (log(bbt+1)− log(bbt))) + ϑt,
where ϑt collects all error terms and stochastic components unrelated to policy. We
then regress this double difference of wages on the double difference in benefits. This
captures the equilibrium wage response since benefits b are correlated with θ and
regressing wages on benefits only captures both the direct effect of benefits on wages
as well as the indirect effect of benefits on market tightness θ. We obtain not only
the direct effect βb but the equilibrium response which is a linear combination of βb
and βθ.
To implement this procedure, we obtain wage data from the QWI that allows
us to measure wages of job stayers. The QWI provides a measure of full quarter
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employment - workers who remained employed at the same firm for the entire quarter
- and average wage earnings of full quarter employees. However, in quarter t the
measure of full quarter employment also includes workers who will separate in t+ 1,
and in quarter t the measure includes new hires from quarter t. Thus, to isolate the
wages of stayers we difference out the average wages of t+1 separators (also available
from QWI) from the average wages in t and difference out the average t new hire
wages from the average wages in t+ 1. This yields the true average wages of stayers
in quarters t and t+ 1.
Column (4) of Table 3.5 shows the result. We find that wages statistically sig-
nificantly increase in response to an increase in benefits. Note that the increase in
wages that we document provides strong evidence for the general equilibrium effects.
Indeed, if higher unemployment was not caused by unemployment benefit extensions,
one would expect wages to be lower in counties with higher unemployment.
To assess the quantitative magnitude of this estimate consider a typical county
pair in the Great Recession. The estimate implies that a county with 70 weeks of
benefits has a 0.3% higher level of wages than a county with 50 weeks of benefits,
everything else equal.
3.4.4 Validation using Model-Generated Data
In this Section we evaluate the performance of our empirical method on data generated
by a calibrated equilibrium search model. The model is an extension of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) to allow for unemployment benefit expiration.
To address the border county design, the model features a nested state-county
structure. In particular, there is a stochastic process for state’s productivity.28 The
28The literature based on the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model typically uses aggregate productivity
as the standard stochastic process inducing aggregate fluctuations. Richer stochastic structures can be
considered and identified in a more fully specified DSGE model. This can be necessary, depending on the
purpose of the analysis. The associated complications, however, appear inessential for our purpose here,
which is to assess the performance of our estimator.
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unemployment benefit policy depends on the endogenous unemployment level in the
state economy. The county economy takes the endogenously induced joint stochas-
tic process for state unemployment, productivity and benefits as exogenous. The
assumption is that counties are ”small” relative to the state of which they are apart.
Preferences, technology and frictions are the same across the state and county
economies.
Agents. In any given period, a worker can be either employed (matched with a firm)
or unemployed. Risk-neutral workers maximize expected lifetime utility
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtct,
where E0 is the period-0 expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, ct
denotes consumption in period t. An unemployed worker produces h, which stands for
the combined value of leisure and home production. In addition, unemployed workers
may be eligible for benefits b. Unemployed workers who are eligible for benefits lose
eligibility stochastically at rate et(·), which depends on the state unemployment rate
as specified below.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize profits. Workers and firms have the same
discount factor β. A firm can be either matched to a worker or vacant. A firm posting
a vacancy incurs a flow cost k.
Matching. The number of new matches in period t is given by M(ut, vt), where ut
is the number of unemployed in period t, and vt is the number of vacancies. The
matching function is assumed to be constant returns to scale, and strictly increasing
and strictly concave in both arguments. We define θt = vt/ut as the market tightness
in period t. We then define the job-finding probability as f(θt) = M(ut, vt)/ut =
M(1, θt) and the probability of filling a vacancy as q(θt) = M(ut, vt)/vt = M(1/θt, 1).
By the assumptions on M made above, the function f(θt) is increasing in θt and q(θt)
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is decreasing in θt. Existing matches are destroyed with exogenous job separation
probability δ.
Production. A matched worker-firm pair produces output zt, which follows a first
order Markov process. Firms pay workers a wage wt, determined through Nash bar-
gaining with workers’ bargaining power ξ. Thus, the period profit of a matched firm
is given by πt = zt − wt.
State Economy
In the state economy the benefit expiration policy depends on the state unemploy-
ment rate, et(u
S
t ). We assume ineligible workers regain eligibility as soon as they are
matched with a firm. The relevant state variables for the state economy are thus
the exogenous state productivity zSt and the endogenous unemployment rate u
S
t . Let
ΩSt = (z
S
t , u
S
t ). The state law of motion for employment is therefore:
LSt+1(Ω
S
t ) = (1− δ)LSt + f(θSt )
(
1− LSt
)
(3.22)
and uSt = 1− LSt .
Value Functions. The flow value for a firm employing a worker is
JSt (Ω
S
t ) = z
S
t − wSt + β (1− δ)EJt+1(ΩSt+1) (3.23)
and the flow value of a vacant firm is:
V St (Ω
S
t ) = −k + βq
(
θSt
)
EJt+1(ΩSt+1), (3.24)
where k is the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy. The surplus for a firm employing
a worker is thus JSt − V St .
139
The value functions for workers can be written as:
W St (Ω
S
t ) = w
S
t + β (1− δ)EW St+1 + βδ
(
1− et(ΩSt )
)
EUS,Et+1 (ΩSt+1)
+βδet(Ω
S
t )EU
S,I
t+1(Ω
S
t+1), (3.25)
US,Et (Ω
S
t ) = h+ b+ βf
(
θSt
)
EW St+1(ΩSt+1) + β
(
1− f
(
θSt
)) (
1− et(ΩSt )
)
EUS,Et+1 (ΩSt+1)
+β
(
1− f
(
θSt
))
et(Ω
S
t )EU
S,I
t+1(Ω
S
t+1), (3.26)
US,It (Ω
S
t ) = h+ βf
(
θSt
)
EWt+1(ΩSt+1) + β
(
1− f
(
θSt
))
EUS,It+1(ΩSt+1), (3.27)
where W St s the value of a job for a worker, U
S,E
t is the value of unemployment for
an agent eligible for benefits and US,I is the value of unemployment for a non-eligible
agent. Define the surplus of being employed as ∆S,Et = W
S
t − U
S,E
t . Also define the
surplus for an unemployed worker of being eligible: ΦSt = U
S,E
t − U
S,I
t . The laws of
motion for these quantities are:
∆S,Et (Ω
S
t ) = w
S
t − h− b+ β
(
1− δ − f
(
θSt
))
E∆S,Et+1(ΩSt+1)
+β
(
1− δ − f
(
θSt
))
et(Ω
S
t )EΦSt+1(ΩSt+1), (3.28)
ΦSt (Ω
S
t ) = b+ β
(
1− f
(
θSt
)) (
1− et(ΩSt )
)
ΦSt+1(Ω
S
t+1). (3.29)
The wage is chosen to maximize:
(
∆S,Et
(
ΩSt
))ξ (
JSt
(
ΩSt
)
− V St
(
ΩSt
))1−ξ
. (3.30)
State Equilibrium Definition. Given a policy (b, et (·)) and an initial condition
ΩS0 an equilibrium is a sequence of Ω
S
t -measurable functions for wages wt, market
tightness θSt , employment L
S
t , and value functions
{
W St , U
S,E
t , U
S,I
t , J
S
t , V
S
t ,∆
S
t
}
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such that:
1. The value functions satisfy the worker and firm Bellman equations (3.23), (3.24),
(3.25), (3.26), (3.27),
2. Free entry: The value V St of a vacant firm is zero for all Ω
S
t ,
3. Nash bargaining: The wage satisfies equation (3.30),
4. Law of motion for employment: The employment process satisfies (5.2).
County Economy
The county is assumed to be small with respect to the state of which it is a member.
That is, the county unemployment rate is not assumed to affect the state unemploy-
ment rate and the county productivity process is orthogonal to the state one. The
benefit expiration policy for the county, however, depends on the state unemployment
rate. Thus, in addition to exogenous county productivity, zC , the state productivity
and the state unemployment rate will be state variables (since they are jointly suf-
ficient to forecast benefit policy). Thus, denote the vector of states for the county
ΩCt =
(
zCt ; z
S
t , u
S
t
)
. All of the equations governing workers and firms are the same
as in the state’s economy with the appropriately adjusted state variable. The defini-
tion of equilibrium is modified to add an additional condition, namely that the joint
process for
(
zSt , u
S
t
)
is consistent with the state equilibrium. The full equations and
definition of the county equilibrium can be found in Appendix C.3.
Calibration
The calibration strategy we employ is to require the state economy to be consistent
with key labor market statistics and to match the effect of unemployment benefit ex-
tensions on unemployment estimated in Section 3.3.1. The model period is taken to be
one week. We match the average labor market tightness, the average job finding rate,
and the regression coefficient of quasi-differenced unemployment on benefit duration.
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Table 3.6: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data Model
h Value of non-market activity 0.6246 Regression Coefficient 0.0602 0.0602
ξ Bargaining power 0.0662 Mean tightness 0.634 0.634
γ Matching function parameter 0.3995 Mean job finding rate 0.139 0.139
Note - The permanent effect is the average increase in unemployment from increasing
unemployment benefit duration by 13 weeks in all states of the world.
The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 5.1. In order to be consistent
with the existing EB program, in the calibration we set benefit expiration policy at
26 weeks when state unemployment is less than 6.5%, 39 weeks when unemployment
is between 6.5% and 8% and 46 weeks when greater than 8%. The remainder of the
parameters are calibrated externally, using the same values and parametric forms for
the matching function as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008a).
Quantitative Evaluation
The goal of the simulation exercise is to generate synthetic data at the county level
comparable to the actual data. We simulate two states and one county in each of
them. The two states and the two counties each have the same process for produc-
tivity. The counties, consistent with our border county assumption, have the same
realized sequence of shocks. The two states, however, have different realized sequences
of productivity shocks. Consequently, the realized exogenous sequences of state un-
employment will be different. Thus, the two counties will have a different time series
of unemployment benefits.
We simulate the two states and the two counties for 100 years and throw out
the first 15 years of data as ”burn-in.” We then estimate the same regression (with
quasi-differenced unemployment on the left-hand side) as we do on the data from the
Great Recession. Recall that our calibration strategy ensures that coefficient on the
difference in benefits in this regression is the same in the data and in the simulations
of the model. Then, we calculate the effect of a permanent 13-week increase in
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Table 3.7: Estimated Permanent Effect of a 13 Week Benefit Extension
from Regressions Coefficients in Model Generated Data
VARIABLES Unemp. Tightness Vacancies
(1) (2) (3)
Data 0.227 -0.378 -0.231
Model 0.226 -0.388 -0.225
benefits on unemployment, vacancies and tightness. We then compare these true
permanent effects from the model to the calculated permanent effects from the data.
The results and relevant comparisons are displayed in Table 3.7. The model generated
data confirms the empirical validity of our specification, as our model, calibrated
to generate the same regression coefficient on unemployment benefit duration from
the data delivers near identical permanent effects on unemployment, vacancies and
tightness.
Note that the model does not include endogenous search intensity decisions by
unemployed workers. Thus, the micro elasticity is zero, similar to the empirical
estimates discussed above. The total response of unemployment is instead driven by
the macro effect of benefit extensions on employers’ vacancy creation decisions.
3.5 Change in Location of Employment in Response to
Changes in Benefits
A potential concern arises from the observation that households may live in different
states than where they work. This would bias our estimates if the households sys-
tematically change their job search behavior in response to changes in unemployment
benefits. For example, if households search in states with less generous benefits to
take advantage of a higher job-finding rate, our estimate of the effect of benefit ex-
tensions on unemployment would be biased downwards, since those households would
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face a higher job-finding rate, which would translate into a lower unemployment rate
in that county. In this section, we use two different methods to show that our analysis
is not affected by such a bias. First, we develop an imputation procedure that allows
to estimate the effects of unemployment benefit extensions while fully accounting for
mobility. Second, we provide direct empirical evidence of job search behavior. Both
approaches confirm that search behavior does not vary systematically with changes
in benefits, validating our use of a simple and transparent specification that ignores
mobility decisions.
Because integrated labor markets generally contain multiple neighboring counties,
instead of focusing on the county pair as the unit of analysis for search behavior we
aggregate all counties on both sides of a border segment and perform the imputation
on that ”border segment” pair. To impute what fraction of workers search in the
state where they live, consider the following model. We consider the local economy
to consist of a pair of state border segments A, B. The segments are populated by
labor forces of size nAt and n
B
t (taken as the sum of all the county labor forces in each
state on the respective side of the border) and populations pAt and p
B
t .
In any given period, a worker can be either employed (matched with a firm),
unemployed or not in the labor force. In period t, firms in state A post vacancies
in state A, vAt . An unemployed worker in state A searches either in state A or in
state B. We assume that a fraction ζ of non-labor force participants (observed in the
LAUS data) enter the labor force and search for jobs. The number of new matches
in state A in period t equals
M
(
ũAt , v
A
t
)
,
where ũAt is the measure of individuals in period t searching in state A. The number
of matches is the same for state B mutatis mutandis. We assume a constant returns
to scale matching function M that is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both
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arguments. We define
θ̃At =
vAt
ũAt
to be the market tightness in state A in period t. We define the job-finding and
vacancy-filling probabilities as in Section 3.4.4.
The law of motion for the unemployed who live in states A and B is:
uAt+1 = δt
(
nA − uAt
)
+ uAt
(
1− xAt f
(
θAt
)
−
(
1− xAt
)
f
(
θBt
))
, (3.31)
uBt+1 = δt
(
nB − uBt
)
+ uBt
(
1− xBt f
(
θBt
)
−
(
1− xBt
)
f
(
θAt
))
, (3.32)
where uit is the number of unemployed who live in state i, x
i
t is the fraction of the
unemployed in state i that searches in state i, and δt is the separation probability
into unemployment, calculated from the Current Population Survey (CPS) following
Shimer (2007).
We can thus write for the number of unemployed searching in state A and B
respectively:
ũAt = (u
A
t + ζ(p
A
t − nAt ))xAt + (1− xBt )(uBt + ζ(pBt − nBt )), (3.33)
ũBt = (u
B
t + ζ(p
B
t − nBt ))xBt + (1− xAt )(uAt + ζ(pAt − nAt )), (3.34)
where we follow Hall (2013) and set ζ to 5/27 to match the ratio of the job-finding
rates of non-participants to the unemployed in the CPS.
We can measure the probabilities for an unemployed worker from states A and B
to find a job, φAt and φ
B
t , in the data:
φAt =
uAt − uAt+1 + δt
(
nAt − uAt
)
uAt
, (3.35)
φBt =
uBt − uBt+1 + δt
(
nBt − uBt
)
uBt
, (3.36)
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as all right-hand variables are measurable in the data. Using (3.31), we can then
relate the measurable φAt and φ
B
t to the unobservable variables x
A
t , x
B
t , f(θ
A
t ), f(θ
B
t ):
φAt = x
A
t f
(
θAt
)
−
(
1− xAt
)
f
(
θBt
)
, (3.37)
φBt = x
B
t f
(
θBt
)
−
(
1− xBt
)
f
(
θAt
)
. (3.38)
The four equations (3.33), (3.34), (3.37) and (3.38) have 4 unknowns, xAt , x
B
t , f(θ
A
t ),
f(θBt ).
29 These equations are not linearly independent and thus do not allow us to
recover these 4 unknowns. Instead they give us a set of solutions S.
In order to proceed to identify xAt , x
B
t we assume that the matching function is
Cobb-Douglas, µuγv1−γ. Note, however, that we do not necessarily see the true level
of vacancies. However, if we assume that we see the same fraction, ψ, of total vacancies
for both counties in a pair, we can still estimate the effective matching function given
our observed vacancies. If we observe ṽ = ψv, then the total number of matches is
µ̃uγ ṽ1−γ, where µ̃ = ψγ−1µ. Thus, we propose to identify µ̃ and γ in addition to the
x’s.
We allow µ̃ to change over time, to capture any possible time trends in the adoption
of online vacancies. The algorithm consists of selecting α, {µt, xAt , xBt }Tt=1 to minimize
the error in the equations (3.37), (3.38) and:
q(θAt )
q(θBt )
=
(
θBt
θAt
)α
, (3.39)
where we observe all left hand side variables for all t.30
We measure the effect of benefits on search behavior by examining the differ-
ence between the imputed fraction of workers searching away from their home states
(1−xAt )− (1−xBt ). Further, we construct imputed tightness by dividing county level
29We do not directly observe xAt , and thus we don’t observe ũ
A
t and θ
A
t , nor the matching function.
30The probability to fill a vacancy qt = 1 −
vt+1−vnewt+1
vt
, where vt is the stock of vacancies at t and v
new
t
are newly posted vacancies at t, so that vt+1− vnewt+1 are not filled vacancies from period t. Both vt and vnewt
are observable in the data.
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Table 3.8: Effect of UI Benefits on Imputed Labor Market Variables
VARIABLES Out of State Work Imputed Tightness Imputed Job-finding
Weeks of 0.0002 -0.1154 -0.0524
Benefits (0.510) (0.000) (0.000)
Factors 2 2 2
Observations 29,492 29,492 29,492
R-squared 0.066 0.2816 0.2996
Note - p-values (in parentheses) calculated via bootstrap.
Bold font indicates p < 0.01.
vacancies by the imputed measure of unemployed workers searching in that county
(vAt /ũAt ), corrected for the search behavior along that border segment (we impose the
same x’s for all counties within a state for each border segment). Then, the job find-
ing rate is constructed using the imputed tightness and the estimated parameters of
the matching function. Table 3.8 Column (1) shows, using the difference-in-difference
estimator, that there is only a very small and statistically insignificant response of
search behavior, to changes in benefits, so that mobility does not bias our estimates.
Further, the effect on imputed tightness, which now fully accounts for changes in
mobility in response to changes in benefits, is not statistically significantly different
from the baseline estimate. The effect of extending benefits to 82.5 weeks for approx-
imately 16 quarters (the average during the Great Recession) on the quarterly job
finding rate would predict a drop from 77.6% to 48.6%.
Next, we look for direct empirical evidence on where people work relative to where
they live. We use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2005-2011.
The ACS is an annual 1% survey of households in the United States conducted by
the Census Bureau. The survey contains information on the county of residence of
households and the state of employment. The survey is representative at the Public
Use Micro Area level - a statistical area that has roughly 100,000 residents (and
thus also for counties with more than 100,000 residents). We compute the share
147
Table 3.9: Regression Estimates of Out of State Employment
VARIABLES Out of state work
Quasi-Difference Diff-in-Diff
(1) (2)
Weeks of Benefits -0.3560 0.1737
(1.125) (1.267)
Pair Fixed Effects Yes No
Observations 76 76
R-squared 0.770 0.115
Note - Standard errors in parentheses.
Bold font indicates p < 0.1.
of households in border counties who work in the neighboring state. We can then
examine how this share of border state workers responds to changes in benefits across
states. We perform our analysis using the quasi-difference estimator derived in the
empirical methodology section and using a difference-in-difference estimator:
Quasi-difference: ∆ẽp,t = φp + αe∆bp,t + ∆νp,t
Diff-in-diff: ∆ep,t = φp + αe∆bp,t + ∆νp,t
where ep,t is the fraction of workers at time t that live in county i and work in the
state associated with county j (also in pair p). The results of the regressions are in
Table 3.9. Using both the quasi-difference and difference-in-difference specification
the coefficient on weeks of benefits available is statistically insignificant. This direct
evidence once again implies that worker search behavior does not respond significantly
to changes in unemployment benefits.
3.6 Implications for Macro Models
Throughout the paper our analysis was motivated by equilibrium search models,
such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). We found empirical support for the key
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mechanisms in the model. In particular, extending unemployment benefits puts an
upward pressure on equilibrium wages, which induces lower vacancy posting by firms
and consequently an increase in unemployment. Using a simple calibrated version of
the model we found that these effects are quantitatively consistent with the data.
In this section we briefly comment on the implications of our findings for the
business cycle analysis using this class of models. This analysis was carried out in
Mitman and Rabinovich (2013), who used a version of the model in Section 3.4.4,
calibrated to match the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment
documented in this paper. They carefully model the history of unemployment ben-
efit extensions in the US. In addition to changing unemployment benefit eligibility
over time, the dynamics are driven by fluctuations in aggregate productivity. The
endogenously determined dynamics of the unemployment rate in the model together
with its evolution in the data are plotted in Figure 3.1.
The results indicate that the effect of unemployment benefit extensions on un-
employment, vacancies, and wages documented in this paper is consistent with the
effect of business cycle movements in aggregate productivity on these variables. In-
terestingly, Mitman and Rabinovich (2013) find that the automatic and discretionary
benefit extensions in the recent recessions have substantially amplified the response of
unemployment and served as the root cause of the widely documented phenomenon of
the jobless recoveries (benefit extensions are triggered when unemployment reached
a sufficiently high level so that they effectively kick in after productivity is already
recovering, inducing a delayed recovery of employment). This is evident in Figure
3.1.
An important line of research, reviewed in Diamond (2013), that also aims to ex-
plain the persistently high unemployment following the great recession focused on the
behavior of the Beveridge curve. As the dotted green line in Figure 3.2 illustrates, the
curve appears to have shifted out following the Great Recession. This was interpreted
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Figure 3.1: The evolution of the U.S. unemployment rate: data and the prediction of the
search model with unemployment benefit extensions in Mitman and Rabinovich (2013).
as implying an increase in the “structural” or “mismatch” unemployment because of
the apparently high level of vacancies coexisting with high unemployment. As the
solid blue line in the same figure illustrates, this behavior of the Beveridge curve arises
naturally in the productivity-driven equilibrium search model with the extensions of
unemployment benefits as observed in the data during the Great Recession.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we employed a state-of-the-art empirical methodology to measure the
total effect of unemployment benefit extensions on unemployment. In particular, we
exploited the discontinuity of unemployment insurance policies at state borders to
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Figure 3.2: The Beveridge Curve in the Great Recession: data and the prediction of the
search model with unemployment benefit extensions in Mitman and Rabinovich (2013).
identify their impact. Our estimator controls for the effect of expectations of future
changes in benefits and has a simple economic interpretation. It is also robust to the
heterogeneous impacts of aggregate shocks on local labor markets.
We found that unemployment benefit extensions have a large effect on total unem-
ployment. In particular, our estimates imply that unemployment benefit extensions
can account for most of the persistently high unemployment after the Great Reces-
sion. Coupled with the robust finding in the recent literature that the ”micro” effect
of unemployment benefit extensions on worker search effort and job acceptance deci-
sions is small, this finding implies that the ”macro” elasticity is quantitatively large,
much larger than the micro elasticity. We found direct support for this conclusion
by documenting a large negative response of vacancy creation and employment to
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unemployment benefit extensions.
One motivation for increasing unemployment benefit durations during the Great
Recession, in addition to helping unemployed workers smooth their consumption, is
to increase employment through its stimulative effect on local demand. Although we
cannot do full justice to evaluating this effect given the methodology on which our
analysis relies, our results nevertheless offer some insights. To the extent that the
unemployed spend a significant fraction of their income in their home counties (in a
form of e.g., rent payments or service purchases), the corresponding part of the stim-
ulative effect is fully captured by our analysis. Indeed, we find that border counties
with longer benefit durations have much higher unemployment, despite the potential
beneficial effects of spending. If, on the other hand, spending by the unemployed was
spread uniformly on goods and services provided in all counties, this aggregate com-
ponent is not captured, as it is differenced out by our estimator. We find, however,
that an increase in unemployment due to benefit extensions is similar in magnitude
to the decline of employment. Thus, the total effect on spending is ambiguous as
extending benefits increase spending by the unemployed but at the same time de-
crease spending as fewer people are employed. The potential offsetting effect of lower
employment due to higher benefits was also recognized by policymakers but consid-
ered - based on the micro studies discussed above - to be quantitatively very small.
Our results of a sizeable macro effect leads us to expect that the stimulative effect of
higher spending by the unemployed is largely offset by the dramatic negative effect
on employment from the general equilibrium effect of benefit expansion on vacancy
creation. To evaluate this effect more explicitly, especially given the zero lower bound
constraints imposed on monetary policy following the Great Recession, it is desirable
to asses the effects of unemployment benefit extensions in a richer DSGE model with
frictional labor market, such as the one in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt
(2013). It’s interesting to note, however, that we find similar effects of increases in
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benefits during the Great Recession and during the 2001 recession, despite the fact
that the latter featured much higher nominal interest rates.
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Chapter 4
Unemployment Benefit Extensions Cause Jobless
Recoveries!?
A modified version of this chapter originally appeared as Mitman and Rabinovich
(2013) and is co-authored with Stanislav Rabinovich.
A central question in macroeconomic analysis of the labor market is understand-
ing the dynamics of unemployment. The emergence of jobless recoveries in the US
economy presents a challenge for this research agenda. Jobless recoveries, phenomena
in which aggregate labor productivity grows following a recession, but unemployment
remains high, are a prominent and striking feature of the recessions of 1990-1991,
2001 and 2007-2009. These observations have been interpreted as a puzzle from the
perspective of standard models of labor market dynamics, which attribute unem-
ployment fluctuations to fluctuations in labor productivity. In this paper, we argue
that jobless recoveries are a consequence of government policy, specifically of cyclical
changes in unemployment insurance.
The unemployment system in the United States features automatic triggers that
increase the duration of unemployment benefits during periods of high unemployment.
Moreover, in each of the last major recessions, the government has enacted discre-
tionary policies extending benefit duration further. The weeks of extended benefits
available have increased over the last 50 years, reaching an unprecendented 99 weeks
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of benefits available during the Great Recession. Crucially, because unemployment
benefit duration is generally tied to the unemployment rate, high benefit durations
persist long after labor productivity begins to recover following a recession.
To study the implications of this policy for the cyclical behavior of the labor mar-
ket, we use a variant of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium search model
with aggregate shocks to labor productivity. Workers and firms in the model match
pairwise to produce and bargain over wages. Unemployment benefits increase the un-
employment rate by raising the workers’ outside option in wage negotiations, thereby
discouraging firms from posting job vacancies. If unemployment benefits were con-
stant, a recovery in productivity in the model would imply a drop in unemployment.
However, the actual unemployment insurance system extends the duration of unem-
ployment benefits when unemployment is high. Because unemployment is high in the
aftermath of a productivity drop, a recovery in productivity is likely to coincide with
an extension of unemployment benefits, which can slow down or even prevent the
recovery of employment. We argue that this channel lowers the correlation between
productivity and unemployment and has the capacity to explain the emergence of
jobless recoveries that we observe.
We quantitatively evaluate the importance of this channel in our calibrated model
by simulating the series of productivity shocks observed in the 1960-2012 and sequen-
tially introducing the unemployment benefit extensions enacted during this period.
We find that the model accounts well for observed time series of unemployment, in
particular the observations that recoveries were not jobless prior to 1990 and be-
came jobless thereafter. We then conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify
the importance of the extensions: specifically, we examine how the cyclical behav-
ior of unemployment would have been different had the extensions not occurred.
We find that the model incorporating the observed countercyclical unemployment
benefit extensions accounts for the data substantially better than a model with a
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constant unemployment insurance policy. The model predicts a much faster recov-
ery of employment if the unemployment benefit extensions are not enacted. Key to
this quantitative result is the general equilibrium effect of unemployment benefits on
firms’ decisions to post vacancies, via their effect on the worker outside option in
wage negotiations. Our analysis shows that appropriately incorporating unemploy-
ment benefit extensions is important in quantitatively accounting for unemployment
dynamics.
In addition to matching the unemployment dynamics, we find that the model ac-
counts for the apparent shift in the Beveridge curve observed following the 2007-2009
recession. The Beveridge curve - the observed negative correlation between unem-
ployment and vacancies - is a robust feature of the post-war labor market. However,
this correlation became substantially weaker in the aftermath of the recession, as the
rise in job postings was not accompanied by a comparable fall in unemployment. We
show that our simulated model reproduces an unemployment-vacancy correlation very
similar to the one observed in the data - including the 2007-2012 period, during which
the model reproduces the perceived shift in the simulated Beveridge curve. In other
words, the large unemployment benefit extensions implemented during this period
acted as shocks that induced a substantial departure from the theoretical Beveridge
curve, making it appear as if the curve itself shifted, although all the parameters of
our model, including the matching function, have remained the same.
The analysis in our paper is distinct from the large body of research that tries to
explain the high volatility of unemployment, following the Shimer (2005) puzzle. Our
aim here is not to offer an explanation for the high unemployment volatility.1 Rather,
the quantitative success of our model is evidenced by the fact that it accounts well
for the entire time series of unemployment. In particular, it correctly predicts the
1Our calibration, described in detail in section 5.2, is different from the calibration strategy of Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008b) but delivers similar parameter values; in particular, it implies a high value of non-
market activity for unemployed workers. It is therefore not surprising that our model delivers a high volatility
of unemployment in line with the data.
156
timing, not just the volatility, of unemployment dynamics, specifically the sluggish
recovery of employment in the aftermath of a recession.
Our paper contributes to an already large and productive literature trying to
account for the phenomenon of jobless recoveries. Previous research attempts to sub-
stantially modify existing models to account for the sluggish recovery of employment.
Bernanke (2003) attributes jobless recoveries to sluggish aggregate demand. Groshen
and Potter (2003) propose structural change as an explanation, and Bachmann (2011)
studies the role of labor hoarding. Most recently, Berger (2011) has argued that coun-
tercyclical restructuring behavior of firms can generate jobless recoveries. This is by
no means an exhaustive list.2 Relative to this literature, our paper proposes a signifi-
cantly smaller departure from a workhorse Mortensen-Pissarides model. Rather than
modify the structural features of the model, we argue for incorporating a salient but
previously overlooked feature of US government policy - time-varying unemployment
insurance - into the standard framework. Our results imply not only that unemploy-
ment insurance is crucial for explaining the emergence of jobless recoveries, but also
that a standard equilibrium search model explains unemployment dynamics very well
once these time-varying policy changes are accounted for.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature attempting to quantify the impor-
tance of unemployment benefit extensions for unemployment in the 2007-2009 reces-
sion, including Nakajima (2011), Valletta and Kuang (2010), Fujita (2010), Rothstein
(2011b), and Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013). Our paper differs
substantially from this literature by using a calibrated general equilibrium model in
which the only exogenous inputs are productivity shocks and changes in unemploy-
ment benefit duration. Furthermore, while the above-mentioned literature focuses
only on the 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, we use time-varying unemploy-
ment benefits to explain the entire time series of unemployment over the last 50 years.
2Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004) discuss existing explanations that have been proposed for jobless
recoveries.
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To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to link the growing generosity of
extensions to the emergence of jobless recoveries, in particular to explain the unem-
ployment experience of the 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions as well as the most recent
one.
In section 5.1 we describe the model environment with time-varying unemployment
benefits. In section 5.2 we lay out the calibration procedure. In section 4.3 we discuss
the calibrated model’s predictions and compare them with empirical estimates from
the previous literature. In section 4.4, we describe the simulation and quantitative
analysis that we conduct. Section 5.3.2 reports the results, and section 5.5 concludes.
All tables and figures are collected in Appendix 4.7. Appendix D.1 provides an
overview of the unemployment benefit extensions in the post-war period.
4.1 Model Description
4.1.1 Economic Environment
We consider a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with aggregate productivity
shocks. Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. The economy is popu-
lated by a unit measure of workers and a larger continuum of firms.
Agents. In any given period, a worker can be either employed (matched with a
firm) or unemployed. Workers are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers and have
expected lifetime utility
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtxt,
where E0 is the period-0 expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and xt
denotes consumption in period t. An unemployed worker produces h, which stands
for the combined value of leisure and home production.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize profits. Workers and firms have the same
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discount factor β. A firm can be either matched to a worker or vacant. A firm posting
a vacancy incurs a flow cost k.
Matching. Unemployed workers and vacancies match in pairs to produce output.
The number of new matches in period t equals
M (ut, vt) ,
where ut is the unemployment level in period t, and vt is the measure of vacancies
posted in period t.
The matching function M exhibits constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in both arguments, and has the property that the number of new
matches cannot exceed the number of potential matches: M (u, v) ≤ min{u, v} ∀u, v.
We define
θt =
vt
ut
to be the market tightness in period t. We define the functions
f (θ) =
M (u, v)
u
= M (1, θ) and
q (θ) =
M (u, v)
v
= M
(
1
θ
, 1
)
where f (θ) is the job-finding probability for an unemployed worker and q (θ) is the
probability of filling a vacancy. By the assumptions on M made above, the function
f (θ) is increasing in θ and q (θ) is decreasing in θ.
Existing matches are exogenously destroyed with a constant job separation prob-
ability δ. Thus, any of the lt = 1− ut workers employed in period t has a probability
δ of becoming unemployed in period t+ 1.
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Production. All worker-firm matches are identical: the only shocks to labor produc-
tivity are aggregate shocks. Specifically, a matched worker-firm pair produces output
zt in period t, where zt is aggregate labor productivity. We assume that ln zt follows
an AR(1) process
ln zt = ρ ln zt−1 + σεεt, (4.1)
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1, σε > 0, and εt are independent and identically distributed standard
normal random variables. We will write zt = {z0, z1, ..., zt} to denote the history of
shocks up to period t.
4.1.2 Government Policy
The government levies a constant lump sum tax τ on firm profits and uses its tax
revenues to finance unemployment benefits b. Every worker, at each point in time,
can be either eligible or ineligible for unemployment insurance, and receives b only
if unemployed and eligible. We assume stochastic benefit expiration, similarly to
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and Faig and Zhang (2012). Eligible workers may
lose their eligibility if unemployed, and ineligible workers may regain eligibility when
employed. Specifically, the eligibility status of a worker evolves as follows:
• A worker who is eligible for unemployment insurance retains his eligibility the
following period with probability 1 if employed, and with probability 1 − et if
unemployed; with probability et he instead becomes ineligible.
• A worker who is ineligible for unemployment insurance remains ineligible the
following period if unemployed, and becomes re-entitled to unemployment in-
surance with probability rt if employed.
This assumption is made to mimic the actual system of benefit expiration and re-
entitlement in the US while ensuring the stationarity of the workers’ and firms’ deci-
sion problems. Finally, the government policy can potentially depend on the current
160
state of the economy, in particular on the unemployment rate.
4.1.3 Timing
1. The economy enters period t with some distribution of workers across employ-
ment and eligibility states:
• lEt = measure of eligible employed workers;
• lIt = measure of ineligible employed workers;
• uEt = measure of eligible unemployed workers;
• uIt = measure of eligible unemployed workers.
Note that lEt + l
I
t + u
E
t + u
I
t = 1.
2. The aggregate shock zt then realizes and is publicly observed. Production and
consumption then take place: employed workers get wage wEt if eligible for
unemployment insurance and wIt if ineligible (see below for how wages are de-
termined). Unemployed workers receive h + b if eligible for benefits and h if
ineligible.
3. Firms decide how many vacancies to post, at cost k per vacancy. This determines
the market tightness
θt =
vt
uEt + u
I
t
(4.2)
4. f (θ)
(
uEt + u
I
t
)
workers find jobs. At the same time, a fraction δ of the existing
lt = l
E
t + l
I
t matches are exogenously destroyed.
5. Eligible unemployed workers become ineligible with probability et and remain
eligible with probability 1 − et. At the same time, ineligible employed workers
become eligible with probability rt and remain ineligible with probability 1− rt.
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The laws of motion for the distribution of workers are then given by:
lEt+1 = (1− δ) lEt + f (θt)uEt + rt
[
(1− δ) lIt + f (θt)uIt
]
(4.3)
lIt+1 = (1− rt)
[
(1− δ) lIt + f (θt)uIt
]
(4.4)
uEt+1 = (1− et)
[
δlEt + (1− f (θt))uEt
]
(4.5)
uIt+1 = δl
I
t + (1− f (θt))uIt + et
[
δlEt + (1− f (θt))uEt
]
(4.6)
4.1.4 Worker Value Functions
We characterize the problem of the worker recursively. The aggregate state of the
economy in period t is denoted by Ωt ≡
(
zt, l
E
t , l
I
t , u
E
t , u
I
t
)
. The evolution of the
aggregate state is then determined by equations (4.1), (4.3)-(4.6).
A worker entering period t eligible employed receives a wage wEt . Then he retains
his job with probability 1 − δ and loses it with probability δ. If he loses his job, he
also loses his eligibility with probability et and retains it with probability 1− et.3
A worker entering period t as ineligible employed receives a wage wIt . Then he
retains his job with probability 1− δ and loses it with probability δ. If he retains his
job, he becomes eligible the following period with probability rt and remains ineligible
with probability 1− rt.
A worker entering period t as eligible unemployed receives h+b and finds a job with
probability f (θt). If he remains unemployed, he loses his eligibility with probability
et and retains it with probability 1− et.
A worker entering period t as ineligible unemployed receives only h and finds a
job with probability f (θt). If he remains unemployed, he also remains ineligible, and
if he finds a job, he becomes eligible with probability rt.
Denote the values of employed workers by WEt and W
I
t for eligible and ineligible
3We assume that a worker who has just become unemployed may lose his eligibility immediately. This
timing assumption does not affect any of the results and is made purely for analytical convenience; we could
have alternatively assumed that an eligible worker who just lost his job spends one period as eligible and
only then may lose his eligibility.
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workers, respectively. Similarly, denote the values of unemployed workers by UEt and
U It for eligible and ineligible workers, respectively. Then these values satisfy:
WEt (Ωt) = w
E
t + β (1− δ)EWEt+1 (Ωt+1)
+βδ (1− et)EUEt+1 (Ωt+1) + βδetEU It+1 (Ωt+1) (4.7)
W It (Ωt) = w
I
t + β (1− δ) rtEWEt+1 (Ωt+1)
+β (1− δ) (1− rt)EW It+1 (Ωt+1) + βδEU It+1 (Ωt+1) (4.8)
UEt (Ωt) = h+ b+ βf (θt)EWEt+1 (Ωt+1)
+β (1− f (θt)) (1− et)EUEt+1 (Ωt+1)
+β (1− f (θt)) etEU It+1 (Ωt+1) (4.9)
U It (Ωt) = h+ βf (θt) rtEWEt+1 (Ωt+1)
+βf (θt) (1− rt)EW It+1 (Ωt+1)
+β (1− f (θt))EU It+1 (Ωt+1) (4.10)
4.1.5 Firm Value Functions
A firm matched to an eligible worker receives profits zt − τ − wEt and retains the
worker for the next period with probability 1 − δ. A firm matched to an ineligible
worker receives profits zt − τ − wIt and retains the worker for the next period with
probability 1−δ. If it retains the worker, the worker becomes eligible the next period
with probability rt. Denote the value of a vacancy by Vt and denote by J
E
t , J
I
t the
values of a firm matched with an eligible and an ineligible worker, respectively. Then
the values of a matched firm satisfy:
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JEt (Ωt) = zt − wEt − τ + β (1− δ)EJEt+1 (Ωt+1) + βδmax {0, Vt (Ωt+1)} (4.11)
J It (Ωt) = zt − wIt − τ + β (1− δ) (1− rt)EJ It+1 (Ωt+1)
+β (1− δ) rtEJEt+1 (Ωt+1) + βδmax {0, Vt (Ωt+1)} (4.12)
A firm posting a vacancy in period t suffers a flow cost k and fills its vacancy with
probability q (θt). Let $t be the probability that, conditional on filling a vacancy, the
worker hired by the firm is eligible for benefits. Then the value of a vacancy satisfies:
Vt (Ωt) = −k + βq (θt)
{
$tEJEt+1 (Ωt+1) + (1−$t)EJ It+1 (Ωt+1)
}
(4.13)
The assumptions made above imply
$t =
uEt + rtu
I
t
uEt + u
I
t
(4.14)
Free entry of firms guarantees that the value of a vacancy is always zero in equilibrium,
so we will have:
k = βq (θt)
{
$tEJEt+1 (Ωt+1) + (1−$t)EJ It+1 (Ωt+1)
}
(4.15)
4.1.6 Wage Bargaining
We make the assumption, standard in the literature, that wages are determined ac-
cording to Nash bargaining: the wage is chosen to maximize a weighted product of
the worker’s surplus and the firm’s surplus. An eligible worker’s surplus from being
employed is defined by ∆Et = W
E
t −UEt , and an ineligible worker’s surplus from being
employed is ∆Et = W
E
t − UEt . Similarly, we define the surplus of a firm employing
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an eligible worker to be ΓEt = J
E
t − Vt, and for a firm employing an ineligible worker,
ΓIt = J
I
t − Vt. The wage wEt is chosen to maximize the product
(
∆Et
)ξ (
ΓEt
)1−ξ
(4.16)
and similarly, the wage wIt is chosen to maximize the product
(
∆It
)ξ (
ΓIt
)1−ξ
, (4.17)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s bargaining weight. Since the value of a vacancy is
always zero, we have Γit = J
i
t for i = E, I and so the first-order conditions for the
bargaining problems (4.16), (4.17) imply ∆Et = ξ
(
∆Et + J
E
t
)
and ∆It = ξ
(
∆It + J
I
t
)
.
4.1.7 Equilibrium
We now define the recursive equilibrium of the model.
Definition Given a policy (τ, b, e (·) , r (·)), an equilibrium is a set of functions for
wages wE (Ωt), w
I (Ωt), search effort S
E (Ωt), S
I (Ωt), market tightness θ (Ωt), and
value functions
{
WE (Ωt) ,W
I (Ωt) , U
E (Ωt) , U
I (Ωt) , J
E (Ωt) , J
I (Ωt) , V (Ωt)
}
such that:
1. The value functions satisfy the worker and firm Bellman equations (4.7)-(4.13)
2. Free entry: The value V (Ωt) of a vacant firm is zero for all Ωt
3. Nash bargaining: The wage wE (Ωt) maximizes equation (4.16), and w
I (Ωt)
maximizes equation (4.17)
165
4. Laws of motion: The aggregate state Ωt evolves according to equations (4.1),
(4.3)-(4.6).
4.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match US data over the 1960-2005 period to match several
salient features of the US labor market. The model period is taken to be 1 week.
We normalize mean weekly productivity to one. Following Hall & Milgrom (2008)
we set b = 0.25 to match the average replacement rate of unemployment insurance
after accounting for the fact that take-up rates of unemployment are less than 100%.
The tax rate is set so that the government balances its budget on average, resulting
in τ = 0.023 . The function e (·) mimics the variation in benefit duration in the US
economy.
Following den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we assume the functional form
of the matching function to be
M (N, v) =
Nv
[Nλ + vλ]1/λ
The choice of the matching technology is driven by the requirement that the job-
finding rate and the job-filling rate always be strictly less than 1. We obtain:
f (θ) =
θ
(1 + θλ)1/λ
q (θ) =
1
(1 + θλ)1/λ
Following Shimer (2005), labor productivity zt is taken to mean real output per
person in the non-farm business sector. This measure of productivity is taken from
the quarterly data constructed by the BLS. We also use the seasonally adjusted unem-
ployment series constructed by the BLS, and measure vacancies using the seasonally
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adjusted help-wanted index constructed by the Conference Board.
We set the discount factor β = 0.991/12, implying a yearly discount rate of 4%.
The parameters for the productivity shock process are estimated, at the weekly level,
to be ρ = 0.9895 and σε = 0.0034. The job separation parameter δ is set to 0.0081 to
match the average weekly job separation rate. We set k = 0.58 following Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008b), who estimate the combined capital and labor costs of vacancy
creation to be 58% of weekly labor productivity.
This leaves three parameters to be calibrated: (1) the value h of non-market ac-
tivity; (2) the worker’s bargaining weight ξ; and (3) the matching function parameter
λ. We calibrate these three parameters jointly to match three data targets, chosen to
capture relevant statistics from the US labor market. The first two of these statistics
are the average vacancy-unemployment ratio of 0.634 and the average job-finding rate
of 0.4. The third target is the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to
potential unemployment benefit duration. Classic research based on large benefit ex-
tensions during the recessions of the 1980’s, starting with e.g., Moffitt and Nicholson
(1982), Moffitt (1985b), and Katz and Meyer (1990b), reached consensus estimates
that a one week increase in benefit duration increases the average duration of unem-
ployment spells by 0.1 to 0.2 weeks. We target 0.1, the lower end of this range. In the
next section, we discuss the choice of this estimate. Table 5.1 reports the calibrated
parameters.
4.3 Discussion: The Effect of Benefit Extensions
As described above, our calibration procedure has used findings from the previous
literature estimating the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment dura-
tion. In what follows, we discuss the various available estimates in the literature and
compare them to our model’s predictions.
Our chosen target for the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to
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unemployment benefits lies at the lower end of the range of estimates obtained by
Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985b), and Katz and Meyer (1990b).4 Thus,
we can interpret our findings as being very conservative estimates of the overall effects
of unemployment benefit extensions. The estimate of 0.1 that we use implies that a
ten-week increase in benefit duration results in a one week increase in unemployment
duration. Although this elasticity might appear small, it is not innocuous in the con-
text we study, for two reasons. First, an apparently small increase in unemployment
duration can correspond to a large increase in the aggregate unemployment rate.
Second, the unemployment benefit extensions we consider are large, especially the
extensions in the most recent extensions, which increased potential benefit duration
to as much as 99 weeks.
One potential concern could be that the findings from the literature that we use
were based on the records of UI recipients and that non-recipients might react differ-
ently. But this was shown not to be the case by Rothstein (2011b). Indeed, he shows
that the job finding rate of ineligible workers responds as much as that of the eligible
ones to benefit extensions.
Another potential concern might be that these findings were obtained from the
recessions of the 1980’s, and that these recessions could, perhaps, be somehow fun-
damentally different from the subsequent ones. Card and Levine (2000) estimate the
effects of a temporary unemployment benefit extension that took place in New Jersey
in 1996. They found that a short-term extension of benefit duration by 13 weeks led
to a 16.6% decline in the exit rate from unemployment. In our model a permanent 13
week benefit extension leads to a 17.5% decrease in the exit rate from unemployment.
It is expected that our model should over-predict the numerical value from Card and
4Our model has deliberately abstracted from worker choice of search effort. The classic studies by Moffitt
and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985b), and Katz and Meyer (1990b), measuring the effect of unemployment
insurance on unemployment duration, do not disentangle the effect on worker search intensity from the effect
on firms’ vacancy creation, and thus we interpret their estimates as measuring the combination of these two
effects. On the other hand, recent innovative work by Rothstein (2011b) and Farber and Valletta (2013)
estimates the effect reflecting an individual worker’s search intensity response to unemployment benefits and
finds that this effect is small.
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Levine (2000), since they were measuring the effect of a temporary extension, whereas
in the model we measured the effect of a permanent extension.
Finally, Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013), estimate the effects
of unemployment benefit extensions during the Great Recession, as well as during the
2002 recession Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013) conclude that ex-
tending benefit duration significantly increases unemployment, decreases employment
and increases equilibrium wages. We find that our calibrated model is consistent with
the effects of unemployment benefits on employment and vacancy creation measured
by their study.
4.4 Simulation
In order to determine to what extent unemployment benefit extensions played a role
in the jobless recoveries from 1992 onwards, we simulate our model from 1960 for-
ward. Over that time period, as discussed in Appendix D.1, there were 19 changes
to unemployment benefit duration (excluding extensions and reauthorizations). In
order to deal with this large number of policy changes while still solving a stochastic
weekly model, we make the following simplifying assumptions: (1) We assume that
all policy changes are unanticipated, or equivalently zero probability events and (2)
We assume that all agents in the model believe that the policy changes are permanent
when enacted.
The only exogenous inputs to the model are labor productivity and the changes
in unemployment benefits. We construct the labor productivity series using output
per worker as reported by the BLS. We HP filter the quarter data with a smooth-
ing parameter of 1600, then compute the log deviation from the filtered series. We
then construct a smooth weekly series such that the quarterly average of the weekly
series matches the quarterly detrended series. We take the unemployment rate in
December 1960 as the initial condition and then simulate the model forward, feed-
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ing in the constructed series for productivity and policy changes. The equilibrium is
thus a rational expectations one, but not one with future foresight over productivity
realizations. At dates which correspond to policy changes, we implement the policy
change and simulate the model forward allowing the unemployment rate to evolve
endogenously.
4.5 Results
The simulated model is able to account for key features of the post-war labor market.
In figure 4.3, we plot the unemployment rate generated from the model and that ob-
served in the data. The model with the implemented US unemployment benefit policy
generates a time series of unemployment that closely matches what is seen in the data.
Next, we confirm the model’s ability to match key business cycle statistics. Tables 4.2
and 4.3 report the summary statistics from US data and from the model. Table 4.4
reports the same summary statistics from the simulated model with no benefit exten-
sions. In addition, we report in Table 4.5 the autocorrelation of unemployment and,
in Table 4.6, the correlation of unemployment with productivity lagged one quarter.
These results show that the calibrated model performs well in matching the cyclical
behavior of unemployment. Furthermore, shutting down time-varying unemployment
benefit extensions would substantially worsen the model’s ability to match the ob-
served dynamics, in particular the persistence of unemployment, the weak correlation
between unemployment and productivity, and the comparatively strong correlation
between unemployment and lagged productivity.
We next investigate whether the model is consistent with the emergence of jobless
recoveries. In figure 4.4, we plot the change in employment - actual and predicted
by the model - relative to the NBER peak before the 1973-1975, 1980 and 1981-1982
recessions. The model replicates the response of employment over those periods quite
well. Next, in figure 4.5, we similarly plot the change in employment for the 1990-1991,
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2001 and 2007-2009 recessions. The model is able to replicate the observation that,
unlike the previous three recessions, the recovery of productivity was not matched in
this case by a rapid rise in employment.
The model is also able to successfully replicate the counterclockwise movement in
the Beveridge curve in the Great Recession. The model and data Beveridge curves
are plotted in Figure 4.8. This suggests that the large unemployment benefit ex-
tensions implemented during this period acted as shocks that induced a substantial
departure from the theoretical Beveridge curve, making it appear as if the curve itself
shifted, although all the parameters of our model, including the matching function,
have remained the same. In order to elucidate the effect of benefit extensions on the
Beveridge curve, in Figure 4.9 we plot the simulated Beveridge curve when productiv-
ity is held constant during the Great Recession and subsequent recovery, but benefit
extensions are still enacted. The timing of the dynamics of unemployment signifi-
cantly lags the data (because the drop in productivity preceeded benefit extensions);
however, it shows that the change in benefits alone can generate counter-clockwise
movement in the Beveridge curve.
Finally, we examine the role of unemployment benefit extensions in generating
jobless recoveries. To do so, we perform a counterfactual experiment in which we
shut down all benefit extensions (i.e. fix the weeks of benefits at 26) and re-simulate
the model. The result is shown in Figure 4.7 for the 1990-1991, 2001 and 2007-2009
recessions. The figure illustrates that the model without the additional extensions
cannot generate jobless recoveries: employment recovers much faster in the model
than it does in the data. Unemployment benefit extensions are thus quantitatively
important for explaining the cyclical behavior of employment.
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4.6 Conclusion
The last three recessions in the US were characterized by the presence of jobless re-
coveries. The last three recessions also featured extensions of unemployment benefits
duration of unprecedented size. The thesis of this paper is that these two features of
the recent recessions are linked: unemployment benefit extensions in recessions slow
down the recovery of employment, by reducing firm incentives to post vacancies. Once
these time-varying extensions are incorporated into an equilibrium search model, we
argue that the model is able to reproduce observed unemployment dynamics.
172
4.7 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value
h Value of non-market activity 0.81
ξ Bargaining power 0.13
λ Matching parameter 0.40
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics, Quarterly US Data, 1960:I to 2013:II
u v v/u z
Standard Deviation 0.1201 0.1276 0.2758 0.0120
u 1 -0.8686 -0.8968 -0.2144
Correlation v 1 0.9775 0.2008
Matrix v/u 1 0.1434
z 1
Table 4.3: Results from the Calibrated Model
u v v/u z
Standard Deviation 0.0866 0.1077 0.2138 0.0120
u 1 -0.7729 -0.8745 -0.2829
Correlation v 1 0.9528 0.4000
Matrix v/u 1 0.2627
z 1
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Table 4.4: Results from the Model with No Benefit Extensions
u v v/u z
Standard Deviation 0.0794 0.0684 0.1431 0.0120
u 1 -0.7905 -0.8925 -0.7548
Correlation v 1 0.9116 0.8407
Matrix v/u 1 0.8193
z 1
Table 4.5: Autocorrelation of Unemployment
Quarter Lag Data Model Model
w/o Extensions
0 1 1 1
1 0.9154 0.8833 0.8576
2 0.7478 0.6602 0.5598
3 0.5375 0.4517 0.2408
4 0.3193 0.2753 -0.0336
5 0.1254 0.1173 -0.2302
6 -0.0428 -0.02 -0.3484
7 -0.188 -0.1248 -0.3919
Table 4.6: Correlation with lagged productivity, zt−1
Variable Data Model Model
w/o Extensions
ut -0.4321 -0.4420 -0.8929
vt 0.4680 0.5047 0.6927
vt/ut 0.4102 0.4589 0.8016
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Figure 4.1: Maximum possible benefit duration available during the Post-War period. The
extensions include a combination of discretionary federal extensions and the state-federal
extended benefits program.
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Figure 4.2: Maximum possible benefit duration available during the Post-War period and
productivity. Productivity is calculate as log deviation from HP filtered trend of output
per worker in the non-farm business sector reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In
the recessions follow the 1981-1982 recession, benefit extensions were more likely to occur
after productivity had already begun to recover.
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Figure 4.3: Simulated and actual unemployment from January 1960 through June 2013.
NBER dated recessions are shaded.
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Figure 4.4: Simulated and actual percentage change in employment from NBER peak
before the 1973-75, 1980 and 1981-82 recessions. The blue line is the model and dashed
green line is the data. Data and model are not filtered.
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Figure 4.5: Simulated and actual percentage change in employment from NBER peak
before the 1990-91, 2001 and 2007-09 recessions. The blue line is the model and dashed
green line is the data. Data and model are not filtered.
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Figure 4.6: Simulated and actual percentage change in employment from NBER peak
before the 1973-75, 1980 and 1981-82 recessions. The blue line is the model, the red dot-
dashed line is the model without extensions, and dashed green line is the data. Data and
model are not filtered.
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Figure 4.7: Simulated and actual percentage change in employment from NBER peak
before the 1990-91, 2001 and 2007-09 recessions. The blue line is the model, the red dot-
dashed line is the model without extensions, and green dashed line is the data. Data and
model are not filtered.
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Figure 4.8: Simulated and actual Beveridge curve from January 2005 through December
2011. The unemployment and vacancy rates come from the BLS JOLTS database. Both
series are plotted as quarterly averages of monthly (JOLTS) and weekly (model) data. Data
and model are not filtered.
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Figure 4.9: Actual and counterfactual Beveridge curve from 2007 Q:IV-2013 Q:II. The
unemployment and vacancy rates come from the BLS JOLTS database. Both series are
plotted as quarterly averages of monthly (JOLTS) and weekly (model) data. Labor produc-
tivity is held constant during the model simulation and only benefit extensions are enacted.
Data and model are not filtered.
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Chapter 5
Pro-cyclical Unemployment Benefits? Optimal
Policy in an Equilibrium Business Cycle Model
A modified version of this chapter originally appeared as Mitman and Rabinovich
(2012) and is co-authored with Stanislav Rabinovich.
How should unemployment insurance (UI) respond to fluctuations in labor produc-
tivity and unemployment? This question has gained importance in light of the high
and persistent unemployment rates following the 2007-2009 recession. In the United
States, existing legislation automatically extends unemployment benefit duration in
times of high unemployment. Nationwide benefit extensions have been enacted in
every major recession since 1958, including the most recent one, in which the max-
imum duration of unemployment benefits reached an unprecedented 99 weeks. The
desirability of such extensions is the subject of an active policy debate, which has
only recently begun to receive attention in economic research. In this paper, we use
an equilibrium search model to characterize the optimal cyclical behavior of unem-
ployment insurance.
Our approach integrates risk-averse workers and endogenous worker search effort
into the workhorse Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, with business cycles driven
by shocks to aggregate labor productivity. The key motivation for using the Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides model is to explore the consequences of general equilibrium ef-
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fects for the optimal design of UI policy over the business cycle. The equilibrium
search approach is ideal for studying these effects: it accounts for the possibility
that more generous unemployment benefits not only discourage unemployed workers
from searching, but also raise the worker outside option in wage bargaining, thereby
discouraging firms from posting vacancies. Although the framework we choose is a
classic one, commonly used to study labor market dynamics and policies, the nor-
mative implications of this framework - such as optimal UI - are still very much an
open question and need to be more fully understood. Our paper is a step within this
research agenda.
We characterize the optimal state-contingent UI policy by solving the Ramsey
problem of the government, taking the equilibrium conditions of the model as con-
straints. Specifically, we allow the government to choose the generosity of unem-
ployment benefits (level and expiration) optimally over the business cycle, and to
condition its policy choices on the past history of aggregate productivity shocks. Our
main result is that, contrary to the current US policy, the optimal benefit sched-
ule is pro-cyclical over long time horizons: when the model is simulated under the
optimal policy, optimal UI benefits are positively correlated with labor productivity
and negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. This overall pro-cyclicality
of benefits, however, masks richer dynamics of the optimal policy. In particular, the
optimal policy response to a one-time productivity drop is different in the short run
and in the long run: optimal benefit levels and duration initially rise in response to a
negative shock, but both subsequently fall below their pre-recession level. Thus, the
behavior of optimal benefits in response to productivity is non-monotonic, and the fall
in benefit generosity lags the fall in productivity. The intuition for these dynamics of
the optimal policy is that the initial fall in productivity lowers the gains from creating
additional jobs, hence the opportunity cost of raising the generosity of UI benefits
is low. On the other hand, the subsequent rise in unemployment raises the social
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gains from posting vacancies but does not raise the private incentives for doing so.
As a consequence, UI generosity optimally rises initially in response to a productivity
drop, but then quickly falls in response to the subsequent rise in unemployment.
Our paper contributes to the literature on optimal policy design within search
and matching models, which emphasize that policy affects firm vacancy creation de-
cisions. It is thus in the tradition of the general equilibrium approach to optimal
unemployment insurance, exemplified by Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), Fredriksson
and Holmlund (2001), Coles and Masters (2006), and Lehmann and van der Linden
(2007). The novelty of our analysis is to determine how unemployment insurance
should optimally respond to business cycle conditions, rather than analyzing optimal
policy in steady state.
Our paper also contributes to the emerging literature on optimal unemployment
insurance over the business cycle. Two recent papers in this literature are Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2010) and Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013). Kroft and Notowidigdo
(2010) examine optimal state-contingent UI in a principal-agent framework, extend-
ing the approach of Baily (1978), Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997), and Shimer and Werning (2008). This approach focuses on the tradeoff be-
tween insurance and incentive provision for an individual unemployed worker, but
abstracts from the effects of policy on firm hiring decisions. Landais, Michaillat, and
Saez (2013) incorporate firm hiring decisions into their model, but these decisions
do not respond to UI policy because wages do not depend on the workers’ outside
option.1 Our paper complements this literature by instead examining optimal UI
in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, where UI does affect vacancy creation.
Interestingly, our result that the optimal path of benefits is pro-cyclical is new to the
above literature. Our findings thus serve to illustrate that the choice of modeling
framework, in particular the presence or absence of general equilibrium effects, can
1In section 5.4.3 we compare our paper to Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013) in terms of testable
predictions and discuss a way to distinguish between the two empirically.
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have drastic implications for optimal policy.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 5.1. In section
5.2, we describe our calibration strategy. Section 5.3 defines the optimal policy and
contains our main optimal policy results. In section 5.4, we discuss our results and
conduct sensitivity analysis. Finally, we conclude in section 5.5. All tables and figures
are in section 5.6.
5.1 Model Description
5.1.1 Economic Environment
We consider a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with aggregate productivity
shocks. Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. The economy is popu-
lated by a unit measure of workers and a larger continuum of firms.
Agents. In any given period, a worker can be either employed (matched with a
firm) or unemployed. Workers are risk-averse expected utility maximizers and have
expected lifetime utility
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u (xt)− c (st)] ,
where E0 is the period-0 expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor,
xt denotes consumption in period t, and st denotes search effort exerted in period
t if unemployed. Only unemployed workers can supply search effort: there is no
on-the-job search. The within-period utility of consumption u : R+ → R is twice
differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies u′(0) = ∞. The cost
of search effort for unemployed workers c : [0, 1] → R is twice differentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly convex, and satisfies c′ (0) = 0, c′ (1) =∞. An unemployed worker
produces h, which stands for the combined value of leisure and home production.
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There do not exist private insurance markets and workers cannot save or borrow.2
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize profits. Workers and firms have the same
discount factor β. A firm can be either matched to a worker or vacant. A firm posting
a vacancy incurs a flow cost k.
Matching. Unemployed workers and vacancies match in pairs to produce output.
The number of new matches in period t equals
M (St (1− Lt−1) , vt) ,
where 1−Lt−1 is the unemployment level in period t−1, St is the average search effort
exerted by unemployed workers in period t, and vt is the measure of vacancies posted
in period t. The quantity Nt = St (1− Lt−1) represents the measure of efficiency units
of worker search.
The matching function M exhibits constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in both arguments, and has the property that the number of
new matches cannot exceed the number of potential matches: M (N, v) ≤ min{N, v}
∀N, v. We define
θt =
vt
Nt
to be the market tightness in period t. We define the functions
f (θ) =
M (N, v)
N
= M (1, θ) and
q (θ) =
M (N, v)
v
= M
(
1
θ
, 1
)
where f (θ) is the job-finding probability per efficiency unit of search and q (θ) is the
probability of filling a vacancy. By the assumptions on M made above, the function
f (θ) is increasing in θ and q (θ) is decreasing in θ. For an individual worker exerting
2In section 5.4.1 we discuss the possible consequences of relaxing this assumption.
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search effort s, the probability of finding a job is sf (θ). When workers choose the
amount of search effort s, they take as given the aggregate job-finding probability
f (θ).
Existing matches are exogenously destroyed with a constant job separation prob-
ability δ. Thus, any of the Lt−1 workers employed in period t− 1 has a probability δ
of becoming unemployed in period t.
Production. All worker-firm matches are identical: the only shocks to labor produc-
tivity are aggregate shocks. Specifically, a matched worker-firm pair produces output
zt in period t, where zt is aggregate labor productivity. We assume that ln zt follows
an AR(1) process
ln zt = ρ ln zt−1 + σεεt,
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1, σε > 0, and εt are independent and identically distributed standard
normal random variables. We will write zt = {z0, z1, ..., zt} to denote the history of
shocks up to period t.
5.1.2 Government Policy
The US UI system is financed by payroll taxes on firms and is administered at the
state level. However, under the provisions of the Social Security Act, each state can
borrow from a federal unemployment insurance trust fund, provided it meets certain
federal requirements. Motivated by these features of the UI system, we assume that
the government in the model economy can insure against aggregate shocks by buying
and selling claims contingent on the aggregate state and is required to balance its
budget only in expectation. Further, we assume that the price of a claim to one
unit of consumption in state zt+1 after a history z
t is equal to the probability of zt+1
conditional on zt; this would be the case, e.g., in the presence of a large number of
out-of state risk-neutral investors with the same discount factor.
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Government policies are restricted to take the following form. The government
levies a constant lump sum tax τ on firm profits and uses its tax revenues to finance
unemployment benefits. The government is allowed to choose both the level of ben-
efits and the rate at which they expire. We assume stochastic benefit expiration.
This assumption is likewise made in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), Albrecht and
Vroman (2005) and Faig and Zhang (2012) and will ensure the stationarity of the
worker’s optimization problem.3
A benefit policy at time t thus consists of a pair (bt, et), where bt ≥ 0 is the level of
benefits provided to those workers who are eligible for benefits at time t, and et ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability that an unemployed worker eligible for benefits becomes ineligible
the following period. The eligibility status of a worker evolves as follows. A worker
employed in period t is automatically eligible for benefits in case of job separation.
An unemployed worker eligible for benefits in period t becomes ineligible the following
period with probability et, and an ineligible worker does not regain eligibility until he
finds a job. All eligible workers receive the same benefits bt; ineligible workers receive
no unemployment benefits.
We allow the benefit policy to depend on the entire history of past aggregate
shocks; thus the policy bt = bt (z
t) , et = et (z
t) must be measurable with respect to
zt.4 Benefits are constrained to be non-negative: the government cannot tax h.
5.1.3 Timing
The government commits to a policy (τ, bt (·) , et (·)) once and for all before the period-
0 shock realizes. Within each period t, the timing is as follows.
1. The economy enters period t with a level of employment Lt−1. Of the 1− Lt−1
unemployed workers, a measure Dt−1 ≤ 1 − Lt−1 are eligible for benefits, i.e.
3We find that our main results are robust to the possibility of benefit expiration. See section 5.4.4 for a
further discussion of benefit expiration.
4Note, however, that bt is not allowed to depend on an individual worker’s history.
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will receive benefits in period t if they do not find a job.
2. The aggregate shock zt then realizes. Firms observe the aggregate shock and
decide how many vacancies to post, at cost k per vacancy. At the same time,
workers choose their search effort st at the cost of c (st). Letting S
E
t and S
I
t
be the search effort exerted by an eligible unemployed worker and an ineligible
unemployed worker, respectively, the aggregate search effort is then equal to
SEt Dt−1 + S
I
t (1− Lt−1 −Dt−1), and the market tightness is therefore equal to
θt =
vt
SEt Dt−1 + S
I
t (1− Lt−1 −Dt−1)
(5.1)
3. f (θ)
(
SEt Dt−1 + S
I
t (1− Lt−1 −Dt−1)
)
unemployed workers find jobs. At the
same time, a fraction δ of the existing Lt−1 matches are exogenously destroyed.
4. All the workers who are now employed produce zt and receive a bargained wage
wt (below we describe wage determination in detail). Workers who (i) were
employed and lost a job, or (ii) were eligible unemployed workers and did not
find a job, consume h plus unemployment benefits, h+bt and lose their eligibility
for the next period with probability et. Ineligible unemployed workers who have
not found a job consume h, and remain ineligible for the following period.
This determines the law of motion for employment
Lt
(
zt
)
= (1− δ)Lt−1
(
zt−1
)
+ f
(
θt
(
zt
)) [
SEt
(
zt
)
Dt−1
(
zt−1
)
+ SIt
(
zt
) (
1− Lt−1
(
zt−1
)
−Dt−1
(
zt−1
))]
(5.2)
and the law of motion for the measure of eligible unemployed workers:
Dt
(
zt
)
=
(
1− et
(
zt
)) [
δLt−1
(
zt−1
)
+
(
1− SEt
(
zt
)
f
(
θt
(
zt
)))
Dt−1
(
zt−1
)]
(5.3)
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Thus, the measure of workers receiving benefits in period t is
δLt−1 +
(
1− SEt f (θt)
)
Dt−1 =
Dt
1− et
Since we assume that the government has access to financial markets in which a
full set of state-contingent claims is traded, its budget constraint is a present-value
budget constraint
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
Lt
(
zt
)
τ −
(
Dt (z
t)
1− et (zt)
)
bt
(
zt
)}
≥ 0 (5.4)
5.1.4 Worker Value Functions
A worker entering period t employed retains his job with probability 1−δ and loses it
with probability δ. If he retains his job, he consumes his wage wt (z
t) and proceeds as
employed to period t+ 1. If he loses his job, he consumes h+ bt (z
t) and proceeds as
unemployed to period t+ 1. With probability 1− et (zt) he then retains his eligibility
for benefits in period t+ 1, and with probability et (z
t) he loses his eligibility. Denote
by Wt (z
t) the value after a history zt for a worker who enters period t employed.
A worker entering period t unemployed and eligible for benefits chooses search
effort sEt and suffers the disutility c
(
sEt
)
. He finds a job with probability sEt f (θt (z
t))
and remains unemployed with the complementary probability. If he finds a job, he
earns the wage wt (z
t) and proceeds as employed to period t + 1. If he remains
unemployed, he consumes h+ bt (z
t), and proceeds as unemployed to the next period.
With probability 1− et (zt) he retains his eligibility for benefits in period t + 1, and
with probability et (z
t) he loses his eligibility. Denote by UEt (z
t) the value after a
history zt for a worker who enters period t as eligible unemployed.
Finally, a worker entering period t unemployed and ineligible for benefits chooses
search effort sIt and suffers the disutility c
(
sIt
)
. He finds a job with probability
sIt f (θt (z
t)) and remains unemployed with the complementary probability. If he finds
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a job, he earns the wage wt (z
t) and proceeds as employed to period t + 1. If he
remains unemployed, he consumes h and proceeds as ineligible unemployed to the
next period. Denote by U It (z
t) the value after a history zt for a worker who enters
period t as ineligible unemployed.
The Bellman equations for the three types of workers are then:
Wt
(
zt
)
= (1− δ)
[
u
(
wt
(
zt
))
+ βEWt+1
(
zt+1
)]
+ δ
[
u
(
h+ bt
(
zt
))
+ β (1− et)EUEt+1
(
zt+1
)
+ βetEU It+1
(
zt+1
)]
(5.5)
UEt
(
zt
)
= max
sEt
−c
(
sEt
)
+ sEt f
(
θt
(
zt
)) [
u
(
wt
(
zt
))
+ βEWt+1
(
zt+1
)]
+
(
1− sEt f
(
θt
(
zt
)))
[u
(
h+ bt
(
zt
))
+ β
(
1− et
(
zt
))
EUEt+1
(
zt+1
)
+
βetEU It+1
(
zt+1
)
] (5.6)
U It
(
zt
)
= max
sIt
−c
(
sIt
)
+ sIt f
(
θt
(
zt
)) [
u
(
wt
(
zt
))
+ βEWt+1
(
zt+1
)]
+
(
1− sIt f
(
θt
(
zt
))) [
u (h) + βEU It+1
(
zt+1
)]
(5.7)
It will be useful to define the worker’s surplus from being employed. The surplus
utility from being employed, as compared to eligible unemployed, in period t is
∆t
(
zt
)
=
[
u
(
wt
(
zt
))
+ βEtWt+1
(
zt+1
)]
−[
u
(
h+ bt
(
zt
))
+ β (1− et)EUEt+1
(
zt+1
)
+ βetEU It+1
(
zt+1
)]
(5.8)
Similarly, we define the surplus utility from being employed as compared to being
unemployed and ineligible for benefits:
Ξt
(
zt
)
=
[
u
(
wt
(
zt
))
+ βEtWt+1
(
zt+1
)]
−
[
u (h) + βEU It+1
(
zt+1
)]
(5.9)
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5.1.5 Firm Value Functions
A matched firm retains its worker with probability 1−δ. In this case, the firm receives
the output net of wages and taxes, zt − wt (zt)− τ , and then proceeds into the next
period as a matched firm. If the firm loses its worker, it gains nothing in the current
period and proceeds into the next period unmatched. A firm that posts a vacancy
incurs a flow cost k and finds a worker with probability q (θt (z
t)). If the firm finds
a worker, it gets flow profits zt − wt (zt) − τ and proceeds into the next period as a
matched firm. Otherwise, it proceeds unmatched into the next period.
Denote by Jt (z
t) the value of a firm that enters period t matched to a worker,
and denote by Vt (z
t) the value of an unmatched firm posting a vacancy. These value
functions satisfy the following Bellman equations:
Jt
(
zt
)
= (1− δ)
[
zt − wt
(
zt
)
− τ + βEtJt+1
(
zt+1
)]
+ δβEtVt+1
(
zt+1
)
(5.10)
Vt
(
zt
)
= −k + q
(
θt
(
zt
)) [
zt − wt
(
zt
)
− τ + βEtJt+1
(
zt+1
)]
+(
1− q
(
θt
(
zt
)))
βEtVt+1
(
zt+1
)
(5.11)
The firm’s surplus from employing a worker in period t is denoted
Γt
(
zt
)
= zt − wt
(
zt
)
− τ + βEtJt+1
(
zt+1
)
− βEtVt+1
(
zt+1
)
(5.12)
5.1.6 Wage Bargaining
We make the assumption, standard in the literature, that wages are determined ac-
cording to Nash bargaining: the wage is chosen to maximize a weighted product of
the worker’s surplus and the firm’s surplus. Further, the worker’s outside option is
being unemployed and eligible for benefits, since he becomes eligible upon locating
an employer and retains eligibility if negotiations with the employer break down. The
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worker-firm pair therefore chooses the wage wt (z
t) to maximize
∆t
(
zt
)ξ
Γt
(
zt
)1−ξ
, (5.13)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s bargaining weight.
5.1.7 Equilibrium Given Policy
In this section, we define the equilibrium of the model, taking as given a government
policy (τ, bt (·) , et (·)) and characterize it.
Equilibrium Definition
Taking as given an initial condition (z−1, L−1), we define an equilibrium given policy:
Definition Given a policy (τ, bt (·) , et (·)) and an initial condition (z−1, L−1) an equi-
librium is a sequence of zt-measurable functions for wages wt (z
t), search effort SEt (z
t),
SIt (z
t), market tightness θt (z
t), employment Lt (z
t), measures of eligible workers
Dt (z
t), and value functions
{
Wt
(
zt
)
, UEt
(
zt
)
, U It
(
zt
)
, Jt
(
zt
)
, Vt
(
zt
)
,∆t
(
zt
)
,Ξt
(
zt
)
,Γt
(
zt
)}
such that:
1. The value functions satisfy the worker and firm Bellman equations (5.5), (5.6),
(5.7), (5.8), (5.9), (5.10), (5.11), (5.12)
2. Optimal search: The search effort SEt solves the maximization problem in (5.6)
for sEt , and the search effort S
I
t solves the maximization problem in (5.7) for s
I
t
3. Free entry: The value Vt (z
t) of a vacant firm is zero for all zt
4. Nash bargaining: The wage maximizes equation (5.13)
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5. Law of motion for employment and eligibility status: Employment and the mea-
sure of eligible unemployed workers satisfy (5.2) , (5.3)
6. Budget balance: Tax revenue and benefits satisfy (5.4)
Characterization of Equilibrium
We characterize the equilibrium given policy via a system of equations that involves
allocations only, and does not involve the value functions. This will be helpful in
computing the optimal policy.
Lemma 1. Fix an initial condition and a policy (τ, bt (·) , et (·)). Suppose that the
sequence
Υt
(
zt
)
= {wt
(
zt
)
, SEt
(
zt
)
, SIt
(
zt
)
, θt
(
zt
)
, Lt
(
zt
)
, Dt
(
zt
)
,
Wt
(
zt
)
, UEt
(
zt
)
, U It
(
zt
)
, Jt
(
zt
)
, Vt
(
zt
)
,∆t
(
zt
)
,Ξt
(
zt
)
,Γt
(
zt
)
}
is an equilibrium. Then the sequences {wt (zt) , SEt (zt) , SIt (zt) , θt (zt) , Lt (zt) , Dt (zt)}
satisfy:
1. The laws of motion (5.2) , (5.3)
2. The budget equation (5.4)
3. Modified worker Bellman equations (dependence on zt is understood throughout)
c′
(
SEt
)
f (θt)
= u (wt)− u (h+ bt) +
(1− et) βEt
(
c
(
SEt+1
)
+
(
1− δ − SEt+1f (θt+1)
) c′ (SEt+1)
f (θt+1)
)
+ etβEt
(
c
(
SIt+1
)
+
(
1− SIt+1f (θt+1)
) c′ (SIt+1)
f (θt+1)
− δ
c′
(
SEt+1
)
f (θt+1)
)
(5.14)
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c′
(
SIt
)
f (θt)
= u (wt)− u (h) +
βEt
(
c
(
SIt+1
)
+
(
1− SIt+1f (θt+1)
) c′ (SIt+1)
f (θt+1)
− δ
c′
(
SEt+1
)
f (θt+1)
)
(5.15)
4. Modified firm Bellman equation
k
q (θt)
= zt − wt − τ + β (1− δ)Et
k
q (θt+1)
(5.16)
5. Nash bargaining condition
ξu′ (wt) kθt = (1− ξ) c′
(
SEt
)
(5.17)
Conversely, if {wt (zt) , SEt (zt) , SIt (zt) , θt (zt) , Lt (zt) , Dt (zt)} satisfy (5.2)-(5.4) and
(5.14)-(5.17), then there exist value functions such that Υt (z
t) is an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix E.1.1.
The conditions (5.14)-(5.17) are straightforward to interpret. Equations (5.14) and
(5.15) state that the marginal cost of increasing the job finding probability for the
eligible and ineligible workers, respectively, equals the marginal benefit. The marginal
cost (left-hand side of each equation) of increasing the job finding probability is the
marginal disutility of search for that worker weighted by the aggregate job finding
rate. The marginal benefit (right-hand side of each equation) equals the current
consumption gain from becoming employed plus the benefit of economizing on search
costs in the future. Equation (5.16) gives a similar optimality condition for firms: it
equates the marginal cost of creating a vacancy, weighted by the probability of filling
that vacancy, to the benefit of employing a worker. Finally, (5.17) is a restatement
of the first-order condition of the bargaining problem. It will be clear in section
5.3 that the conditions (5.14)-(5.17) will play the role of incentive constraints in the
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optimal policy problem, analogous to incentive constraints in principal-agent models
of unemployment insurance, e.g. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
5.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match salient features of the US labor market. The model
period is taken to be 1 week. We normalize mean weekly productivity to one. We
assume a benefit scheme that mimics the benefit extension provisions currently in
place within the US policy. We set the benefit level b = 0.4 to match the average
replacement rate of unemployment insurance. The standard benefit duration is 26
weeks; local and federal employment conditions trigger automatic 20-week and 33-
week extensions. In the model we assume that et = 1/59 when productivity is more
than 3% below the mean, et = 1/46 when productivity is between 1.5% and 3%
below the mean, and et = 1/26 otherwise. We pick the tax rate τ = 0.023 so that the
government balances its budget if the unemployment rate is 5.5%.
We assume log utility: u (x) = lnx. For the cost of search, we assume the func-
tional form
c (s) =
A
1 + ψ
[
(1− s)−(1+ψ) − 1
]
− As (5.18)
This functional form is chosen to ensure that the optimal search effort will always be
strictly between 0 and 1. In particular, the functional form above guarantees that,
for any A > 0, we have c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, as well as c(0) = c′(0) = 0, c(1) = c′(1) =∞.
For the matching function, we follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and
pick
M (N, v) =
Nv
[Nχ + vχ]1/χ
The choice of the matching technology is likewise driven by the requirement that the
job-finding rate and the job-filling rate always be strictly less than 1.5 We obtain:
5The frequently used alternative is the Cobb-Douglas specification. However, commonly used local solu-
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f (θ) =
θ
(1 + θχ)1/χ
q (θ) =
1
(1 + θχ)1/χ
Following Shimer (2005), labor productivity zt is taken to mean real output per
person in the non-farm business sector. This measure of productivity is taken from
the quarterly data constructed by the BLS for the time period 1951-2004. We also
use the 1951-2004 seasonally adjusted unemployment series constructed by the BLS,
and measure vacancies using the seasonally adjusted help-wanted index constructed
by the Conference Board.
We set the discount factor β = 0.991/12, implying a yearly discount rate of 4%.
The parameters for the productivity shock process are estimated, at the weekly level,
to be ρ = 0.9895 and σε = 0.0034. The job separation parameter δ is set to 0.0081 to
match the average weekly job separation rate.6 We set k = 0.58 following Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008b), who estimate the combined capital and labor costs of vacancy
creation to be 58% of weekly labor productivity.
This leaves five parameters to be calibrated: (1) the value h of non-market activ-
ity; (2) the worker bargaining weight ξ; (3) the matching function parameter χ; (4)
the level coefficient of the search cost function A; and (5) the curvature parameter
of the search cost function ψ. We jointly calibrate these five parameters to simul-
taneously match five data targets: (1) the average vacancy-unemployment ratio; (2)
the standard deviation of vacancy-unemployment ratio; (3) the average weekly job-
finding rate; (4) the average duration of unemployment; and (5) the elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to benefits. The first four of these targets are
directly measured in the data. For the elasticity of unemployment duration with
tion methods for the model do not guarantee that the job-finding rate is less than one under this specification.
6We use the same procedure of adjusting for time aggregation as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008b) to
obtain the weekly estimates for the job finding rate and the job separation rate from monthly data.
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respect to benefits, Ed,b, we use micro estimates reported by Meyer (1990b) and tar-
get an elasticity of 0.97. Note that the model counterpart of the measured elasticity
is taken to be the micro (partial-equilibrium) elasticity: the percentage change of
unemployment duration due to decreased search effort alone, in response to a 1%
increase in the benefit level, but keeping fixed the value of f (θ).8 Intuitively, given
the first three parameters, the average unemployment duration and its elasticity with
respect to benefits identify the parameters A and ψ, since these parameters govern
the distortions in search behavior induced by benefits.
Table 5.1 reports the calibrated parameters and the matching of the calibration
targets. Note that our calibration procedure implies a large value of h. In fact,
the combined value of h and unemployment benefits is h + b = 0.981, while the
mean equilibrium wage is w = 0.955. This might seem surprising, considering that
empirical studies (e.g. Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001), Aguiar and
Hurst (2005)) report a consumption drop for workers upon becoming unemployed.
However, this is, in fact, consistent with the best available evidence on consumption
of the unemployed. First, Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) do not
distinguish between consumption of the unemployed and consumption expenditures
of the unemployed; in other words, their measures of consumption exclude items such
as home production and searching for cheaper products. On the other hand, Aguiar
and Hurst (2005), who properly distinguish between consumption and expenditure,
show that the consumption drop for the unemployed is only 5%, illustrating that most
earlier estimates of the consumption drop are biased upward. Second, studies such
as Browning and Crossley (2001) include, in their sample of unemployed workers,
a significant fraction who are ineligible for benefits. The model counterpart of the
consumption of the unemployed would thus be some weighted average of h + b and
7There exist a range of estimates (e.g. Krueger and Meyer (2002b)) in the literature for the elasticity
of unemployment duration with respect to benefit level. However, we find that qualitatively our results are
robust to calibrating to higher or lower values of the elasticity.
8This is distinct from the macro elasticity, which would comprise the total effect of a 1% increase in UI
benefits, and thus include the general equilibrium effect on θ. See section 5.4.3 for a discussion.
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h. Third, h includes the consumption value of leisure, which would not appear as
consumption in the data. Fourth, and most importantly, we show in section 5.4.6
that our optimal policy results are robust to the calibrated value of h: they hold even
if we assume a substantially lower value for h.
5.3 Optimal Policy
5.3.1 Optimal Policy Definition
We assume that the government is utilitarian: it chooses a policy to maximize the
period-0 expected value of worker utility, taking the equilibrium conditions as con-
straints.
Definition A policy τ, bt (z
t) , et (z
t) is feasible if there exists a sequence of zt-measurable
functions {wt (zt) , SEt (zt) , SIt (zt) , θt (zt) , Lt (zt) , Dt (zt)} such that (5.2), (5.3), (5.14)-
(5.17) hold for all zt, and the government budget constraint (5.4) is satisfied.
Definition The optimal policy is a policy τ, bt (z
t) , et (z
t) that maximizes
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

Lt (z
t)u (wt (z
t)) +
(
Dt(zt)
1−et(zt)
)
u (h+ bt (z
t)) +(
1− Lt (zt)−
Dt(zt)
1−et(zt)
)
u (h)−Dt−1 (zt−1) c
(
SEt (z
t)
)
−
(1− Lt−1 (zt−1)−Dt−1 (zt−1)) c
(
SIt (z
t)
)

(5.19)
over the set of all feasible policies.
The government’s problem can be written as one of choosing a policy τ, bt (z
t) , et (z
t)
together with functions {wt (zt) , SEt (zt) , SIt (zt) , θt (zt) , Lt (zt) , Dt (zt)} to maximize
(5.19) subject to (5.2), (5.3), (5.14)-(5.17) holding for all zt, and subject to the gov-
ernment budget constraint (5.4). We find the optimal policy by solving the system
of necessary first-order conditions for this problem. The period-t solution will nat-
urally be state-dependent: in particular, it will depend on the current productiv-
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ity zt, as well as the current unemployment level 1 − Lt−1, and current measure of
benefit-eligible workers Dt−1 with which the economy has entered period t. How-
ever, in general the triple (zt, 1− Lt−1, Dt−1) is not a sufficient state variable for
pinning down the optimal policy, which may depend on the entire past history of
aggregate shocks. In the appendix, we show that the optimal period t solution is
a function of (zt, 1− Lt−1, Dt−1) as well as (et−1, µt−1, νt−1, γt−1), where et−1 is the
previous period’s benefit expiration rate and µt−1, νt−1, γt−1 are Lagrange multipli-
ers on the constraints (5.14),(5.15),(5.16), respectively, in the maximization problem
(5.19). The tuple (zt, 1− Lt−1, Dt−1, et−1, µt−1, νt−1, γt−1) captures the dependence of
the optimal bt, et on the history z
t. The fact that the zt, 1 − Lt−1 and Dt−1 are not
sufficient reflects the fact that the optimal policy is time-inconsistent: for example,
the optimal benefits after two different histories of shocks may differ even though the
two histories result in the same current productivity and the same current unemploy-
ment level. Intuitively, the government might want to induce firms to post vacancies
- and workers to search - by promising low unemployment benefits, but has an ex
post incentive to provide higher benefits, so as to smooth worker consumption, after
employment outcomes have realized. Including the variables et−1, µt−1, νt−1, γt−1 as
state variables in the optimal policy captures exactly this trade-off. Note that we
assume throughout the paper that the government can fully commit to its policy. In
Appendix E.1.2 we explain the method used to solve for the optimal policy.
5.3.2 Optimal Policy Results
We now investigate how the economy behaves over time under the optimal policy. To
this end, we simulated the model both under the current benefit policy and under the
optimal policy. Table 5.4 reports the summary statistics, under the optimal policy,
for the behavior of unemployment benefit levels b and potential benefit duration 1/e.
Benefits are higher and expire faster under the optimal policy than under the current
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policy. The optimal tax rate under the optimal policy is τ = 0.018, lower than under
the current policy.
The key observation is that, over a long period of time, the correlation of optimal
benefits with productivity is positive: both benefit levels and potential benfit duration
are pro-cyclical in the long run and, in particular, negatively correlated with the
unemployment rate. Moreover, this result is not driven by any balanced budget
requirement, since we allow the government to run deficits in recessions.
In order to understand the mechanism behind this behavior of the optimal policy,
in Figure 5.1 we plot the optimal benefit policy function bt(zt, 1−Lt−1, Dt−1, et−1, µt−1,
νt−1, γt−1) as a function of current z and last period’s 1− L only, keeping Dt−1, et−1,
µt−1, νt−1 and γt−1 fixed at their average values. The optimal benefit level is decreasing
in current productivity z and decreasing in unemployment 1 − L. The intuition for
this result is that the optimal benefit is lower in states of the world when the marginal
social benefit of job creation is higher, because lower benefits are used to encourage
search effort by workers and vacancy creation by firms. The marginal social benefit
of job creation is higher when z is higher, since the output of an additional worker-
firm pair is then higher. The marginal social benefit is also higher when current
employment is lower, because the expected output gain of increasing θ is proportional
to the number of unemployed workers. Note, however, that although the social gains
from creating jobs are high when unemployment is high, the private gains to firms
of posting vacancies do not directly depend on unemployment. As a consequence,
optimal benefits are lower, all else equal, when current unemployment is high. Figure
5.2 illustrates the same result for the optimal duration of benefits: optimal benefit
duration is lowest at times of high productivity and high unemployment. This shape of
the policy function also implies that during a recession, there are two opposing forces
at work - low productivity and high unemployment - which give opposite prescriptions
for the response of optimal benefits. This gives an ambiguous prediction
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for the overall cyclicality of benefit levels and benefit duration.
In Figures 5.3 and 5.4 we analyze the dynamic response of the economy to a nega-
tive productivity shock under the optimal policy and compare it to the response under
the current policy. In Figure 5.3 we plot the impulse response of the optimal policy
to a productivity drop of 1.5% below its mean. Note that under the current policy,
benefit duration does not change in response to the shock, since automatic extensions
are only activated when productivity is more than 1.5% below the mean. The optimal
benefit level initially jumps up, but then falls for about two quarters following the
shock, and slowly reverts to its pre-shock level. The same is true of optimal benefit
duration. Unemployment rises in response to the drop in productivity and continues
rising for about one quarter before it starts to return to its pre-shock level. Note
that the rise in unemployment is significantly lower than under the current benefit
policy. The intuition for this optimal policy response is that the government would
like to provide immediate insurance against the negative shock and, expecting future
productivity to rise, would like to induce a recovery in vacancy creation and search
effort. Thus, benefit generosity responds positively to the initial drop in productiv-
ity but negatively to the subsequent rise in unemployment, precisely as implied by
Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
In Figure 5.4 we plot the response of other key labor market variables. As com-
pared to the current benefit policy, the optimal policy results in a faster recovery of
the vacancy-unemployment ratio, the search intensity of unemployed workers eligible
for benefits, and the job finding rate. Wages also fall less, in percent deviation terms,
under the optimal policy than they do under the current policy. This is due to the
fact that the initial rise in benefits smooths the fall in wages through an increase in
the worker outside option. The fact that wages fall less in percentage terms indicates
that firm profits fall more. Despite the fall in contemporaneous profits, there is not a
large fall in market tightness. The reason for this is that firms expect future benefits
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to fall. The figure thus illustrates that the labor market response depends not only
on the contemporaneous benefit policy but also on agents’ expectations about future
policy dynamics.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the moments of key labor market variables when the
model is simulated under the current policy and the optimal policy, respectively. As
compared to the optimal policy, the optimal policy results in lower average unem-
ployment and lower unemployment volatility. These results show that the optimal
benefit policy stabilizes cyclical fluctuations in unemployment.
Finally, we compute the expected welfare gain from switching from the current
policy to the optimal policy. We find that implementing the optimal policy results
in a significant welfare gain: 0.67% as measured in consumption equivalent variation
terms.
5.4 Discussion of the Results
5.4.1 The assumption of no savings
An important assumption made for transparency in this paper is that workers cannot
save or borrow. We now briefly discuss how relaxing this assumption could affect our
results. On one hand, if workers are allowed to hold wealth, cyclical variations in this
wealth will affect how government-provided insurance should vary over the business
cycle. Periods in which unemployed workers’ wealth is lower would warrant higher
unemployment benefits. Intuitively, this effect is similar to the effect that would
arise if h varied over the business cycle. In particular, if workers are more liquidity-
constrained in recessions than in booms, this would provide a motive for raising
unemployment benefits in recessions (or raising their duration), with the potential to
reverse our optimal policy results.
On the other hand, the presence of savings reduces the responsiveness of the worker
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outside option to unemployment benefits. As a result, both worker search effort and
firm vacancy posting will respond less to policy than they would in the absence of
savings. Therefore, in the presence of savings, inducing any given behavioral response
requires a larger change in benefits than it would have required otherwise. This effect
would amplify the cyclical behavior of optimal benefits in our model, potentially
making optimal benefits even more strongly pro-cyclical.
The overall effect of introducing savings in the model on the pro-cyclicality of
optimal benefits is thus ambiguous. We believe that it is an important extension
to investigate whether our results are robust to relaxing the no-savings assumption.
Assessing this robustness is research in progress.
5.4.2 The Hosios condition and its relationship to our model
A concern in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with Nash bargaining is that
the laissez-faire equilibrium is not constrained efficient. Even with risk-neutral work-
ers, the Hosios (1990) condition requires that the worker bargaining weight be equal
to the elasticity of the matching function in order to attain efficiency. If the Hosios
condition is violated, there is a role for government intervention - such as unemploy-
ment benefits - even in the absence of insurance considerations. The reason for this
is that when an individual firm posts a vacancy, it reduces the matching probability
of other firms and increases the matching probability for workers, thereby imposing
an externality.
The Hosios condition is not applicable to our model: since workers are risk-averse
in our model, output maximization is not equivalent to welfare maximization. Nev-
ertheless, the question can still be posed to what extent our optimal policy results
are driven by corrections for the externality that an individual firm imposes when
entering. To answer this question, we first find the value of the worker bargaining
power ξ such that the optimal government intervention (UI benefit and tax) is zero
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in the steady state, keeping all the other parameters fixed at their calibrated values.
This serves as the intuitive analogue of the Hosios condition in our model. We obtain
a value of ξ = 0.72. Next, we solve for the optimal policy for this value of ξ, keeping
all other parameters fixed at the benchmark calibration values. A comparison of the
impulse responses shown in figures 5.3 and 5.9 shows that the shape of the optimal
policy is robust to raising ξ to 0.72. The same holds for the overall pro-cyclicality
of optimal benefits. These qualitative results are also unchanged if we use a value
of ξ higher than 0.72. This indicates that our results are not driven by a search
externality.
5.4.3 Comparison to Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2010)
In closely related work, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013) also examine optimal
UI policy over the business cycle but use a model very different from ours. Unlike our
paper, they find that optimal UI benefits should be countercyclical. In this section,
we discuss the difference in the testable implications of the two models.
In Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013), wages are assumed to be an exogenous
function of labor productivity. Since wages are exogenously fixed, the labor market
does not adjust to equate labor supply and labor demand, and jobs are therefore
rationed. A fall in unemployment benefits triggers an increase in search intensity
by unemployed workers, but, because the number of jobs does not respond to this
policy change, this increase in search intensity has a crowding-out effect that partially
offsets the effect on unemployment. A key implication of that model is that general
equilibrium effects dampen the responsiveness of unemployment to UI policy. Thus,
Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013) predict that the sensitivity of unemployment to
economy-wide changes in benefit policy should be smaller, in percentage terms, than
its sensitivity to policy changes for a small group of workers: the macro elasticity of
unemployment with respect to UI benefits is smaller than the micro elasticity.
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In contrast, in our model, wages are determined by bargaining and are therefore
an increasing function of the workers’ outside option. Unemployment benefits raise
this outside option, thereby discouraging firms from posting vacancies. General equi-
librium effects thus amplify the responsiveness of unemployment to UI policy. As a
result, our model implies that the sensitivity of unemployment to large-scale policy
changes should be greater than what would be measured in small-scale experiments:
the macro elasticity of unemployment with respect to UI benefits is larger than the
micro elasticity. As stated above in section 5.2, we calibrated our model parameters
to match the empirical finding that the micro elasticity is about 0.9. Consistent with
the above intuition, our model predicts a macro elasticity of 2.4, substantially larger
than the micro elasticity.
Both our model and that of Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013) thus generate
clear testable predictions regarding the micro and macro elasticity of unemployment
with respect to UI benefits. The relative size of these elasticities in the data is still
an open empirical question. A large literature has estimated the micro effect of UI:
for example, the classic studies by Moffitt (1985b) and Meyer (1990b) estimate that
the micro elasticities of unemployment duration with respect to benefit duration and
benefit level, respectively, are about 0.16 and 0.9. Measuring the macro elasticity,
however, requires obtaining reliable estimates of general equilibrium effects of UI.
These general equilibrium effects are difficult to measure, because large scale policy
changes are typically endogenous to changing macroeconomic conditions. Several
recent studies have attempted this, with mixed results. Using French data on young
long-term unemployed people, Crepon, Duflo, Gurgand, Rathelot, and Zamora (2012)
evaluate the effect of a job placement counseling program, both on the workers who
participated in the program and on those who did not. When they consider the
entire sample of workers, they find no evidence that an increase in search by some
workers crowds out the job finding probability of other job seekers. However, when
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they restrict their estimates to a select group of males, they do find evidence of
crowding out, suggesting - indirectly - that the macro elasticity of unemployment with
respect to benefits may be smaller than the micro elasticity for certain segments of the
labor market. Note, however, that the policy evaluated in Crepon, Duflo, Gurgand,
Rathelot, and Zamora (2012) is neither an unemployment benefit extension nor a
change in the benefit level, and may therefore not have the same effect as UI on the
workers’ outside option; as such, it might not have delivered an amplifying general
equilibrium effect through vacancy posting even if such an effect existed. On the other
hand, for the US, Hagedorn, Karahan, Mitman, and Manovskii (2013) use exogenous
variation in benefit extensions across states and estimate an aggregate elasticity of
unemployment with respect to benefit duration of about 0.9, significantly larger than
the micro estimate of 0.16 in Moffitt (1985b).9 Their result implies that the macro
elasticity is larger than the micro elasticity. In a study of Sweden, Fredriksson and
Soderstrom (2008) exploit cross-regional variation in unemployment benefit generosity
and likewise find a very large macro elasticity. Our conclusion from these very recent
studies is that empirical work on measuring the macro elasticity is a promising but
nascent research agenda, and that the current evidence on this subject seems to
suggest that the macro elasticity is larger than the micro. Our model’s prediction
provides a way of testing between the two models if further reliable estimates of the
macro elasticity do become available in the future.
5.4.4 Benefit level and duration
To jointly characterize the optimal behavior of benefit levels and duration, we have
assumed stochastic benefit expiration. This assumption is made for tractability, since
it renders the dynamic problem of the worker stationary. We find that the opti-
mal cyclical behavior of benefit levels and expected benefit duration is qualitatively
9Note that the measure of 0.9 from Meyer (1990b) is the micro elasticity with respect to level and not
duration.
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similar: both are pro-cyclical and both exhibit the same dynamic response to a pro-
ductivity shock. However, the presence of stochastic benefit expiration in the model
is not important for our results. To illustrate this, we examine the optimal policy
when the government is restricted to change only one of these two policy dimensions.
We conduct three alternative policy experiments. In the first, we fix the benefit level
at its current level: b = 0.4, and allow only the duration to change over the business
cycle. The results, reported in Figure 5.5, show that the optimal policy response is
similar qualitatively to our benchmark: in response to a negative productivity shock,
potential duration of benefits should initially rise, and then fall considerably below
its initial level. However, both the initial rise in the potential duration and its subse-
quent decline are greater than in the benchmark optimal policy result. In the second
experiment, we fix the benefit expiration rate at its current level of e = 1/26 and
compute the optimal benefit policy. Finally, in the third experiment, we ask how the
benefit level should vary if benefits are not allowed to expire at all, i.e. if we fix e = 0.
The results are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. We find that the shape of the policy
response is once again similar to the benchmark: benefits initially rise and then fall.
Thus, our main result is quite robust and, in particular, holds when expiration is shut
down altogether and the only policy variable is the benefit level.
5.4.5 The replacement ratio of unemployment benefits
The actual UI system in the US indexes an individual’s unemployment benefits to
his wage in the previous job. Because of this, the policy variable of interest in policy
discussions is often not the benefit level, but the replacement ratio - the ratio of an
unemployed worker’s benefits to his previous wage. In our model, however, we delib-
erately use the benefit level, rather than the replacement ratio, as the government’s
choice variable. In order to realistically mimic the administration of the replacement
ratio in the US, the model would need to assume that the replacement ratio is a
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function of wages received during the worker’s previous employment spell - not the
current aggregate wage. At any point in time, unemployed workers differ in the past
wages they received while employed, and would thus differ in their benefit levels if
the replacement ratio were used. This would also imply that workers would differ in
their outside option during wage negotiations, leading to a distribution of wages at
any point in time. Computing welfare would require the government to keep track of
the distribution of past employment histories, making the model intractable.
On the other hand, assuming that the government’s choice variable is b/w, where
b is the current unemployment benefit and w is the current aggregate wage, could
lead to misleading results. For example, consider a worker who had been employed
in a boom and gets fired at the beginning of a recession. The US unemployment
insurance system would assign this worker an unemployment benefit based on his
previous wages, which are likely to have been high. A system that conditions b on
the current aggregate w would assign this worker a considerably lower unemployment
benefit level. Furthermore, unlike the US system, a policy that varies b based on the
aggregate w, rather than the worker’s own history, would result in an unemployment
benefit level that fluctuates throughout the worker’s unemployment spell, whereas it
is constant in the data. These two features make this alternative problematic. Thus,
our assumption that the government chooses b rather than b/w, while imperfect,
appears to be a good compromise.
5.4.6 Sensitivity analysis
We examine the robustness of our results to the parameterization of the model. We
have calibrated the model parameters - in particular, the value of non-market activity
and the worker bargaining power - to make the model’s behavior consistent with US
labor market volatility data. However, since several alternative calibrations exist in
the literature (see e.g. Shimer (2005)), we conduct sensitivity analysis to determine
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whether our optimal policy results remain valid under alternative parameterizations.
Below, we report the results of sensitivity experiments in which we change the values
of selected parameters (e.g. h) while keeping the remaining parameters unchanged at
their benchmark calibrated values. Similar robustness results hold if we recalibrate
the other parameters.
Figure 5.8 displays the optimal policy results when h is set to 0. Because the value
of unemployment is now considerably lower, the optimal policy prescribes for benefits
not to expire at all (et = 0), but the optimal response of the benefit level is similar
to our benchmark. Figure 5.9 displays the results when worker bargaining power is
increased to 0.72. As already discussed in section 5.4.2, the business cycle response
of the benefit level is the same qualitatively as in the benchmark. Next, we adopt a
calibration similar to Shimer (2005), in which we set h to 0 and the bargaining power
of the workers to 0.72. The result is displayed in Figure 5.10; once again, optimal
benefits do not expire, but the optimal response of the benefit level is the same as
in our benchmark. The main qualitative features of our results, including the result
that the optimal benefit scheme is pro-cyclical, do not depend on which calibration
is used.
In addition, we have computed the optimal policy for different values of worker risk
aversion: specifically, we have computed it for constant relative risk aversion utility,
for values of relative risk aversion equal to 1/2 and 2. The results are displayed in
Figures 5.13 and 5.14. Once again, the qualitative features of our results remain
intact.
5.5 Conclusion
We analyzed the design of an optimal UI system in the presence of aggregate shocks in
an equilibrium search and matching model. Optimal benefits respond non-monotonically
to productivity shocks: while raising benefit generosity may be optimal at the on-
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set of a recession, it becomes suboptimal as the recession progresses and inducing a
recovery is desirable. We find that optimal benefits are pro-cyclical overall, counter
to previous results in the literature and to the way UI policy is currently conducted.
Our findings thus demonstrate that conventional wisdom guiding policymakers may
be overturned in a quite standard equilibrium search model of the labor market.
Our paper has focused on the optimal cyclical behavior of UI benefits and thus
serves to inform the ongoing policy debate on the desirability of benefit extensions
in recessions. UI benefits are a worker-side intervention, as they affect the economy
by changing the workers’ value of being unemployed. An interesting extension would
be to consider the optimal behavior of UI benefits in conjunction with firm-side in-
terventions, such as hiring subsidies. Increasing hiring subsidies in recessions may be
desirable as another instrument for stimulating an employment recovery. A potential
concern with hiring subsidies, frequently articulated in policy debates, is the firm-side
moral hazard they generate: firms could, for example, fire existing employees only to
hire them again in order to receive hiring subsidies. A thorough investigation of the
tradeoffs involved with such policies seems a fruitful extension for future work.
Finally, an important direction for future research is investigating the role of
government commitment. The ability of the government to commit matters because
the behavior of agents in our model depends not only on the current policy, but also on
their expectations about future policy. Throughout the paper, we have assumed that
the government can fully commit to its policy. A government without commitment
power might be tempted not to lower benefits when there are a lot of unemployed
workers. It will therefore be interesting to characterize the time-consistent policy and
compare it to the optimal policy in the presence of aggregate shocks.
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5.6 Tables and Figures
Table 5.1: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data Model
h Value of non-market activity 0.581 Mean v/(1− L) 0.634 0.634
ξ Bargaining power 0.141 St. dev of ln(v/(1− L)) 0.259 0.259
χ Matching parameter 0.492 Mean job finding rate 0.139 0.139
A Disutility of search 0.0063 Unemployment duration 13.2 13.2
ψ Search cost curvature 2.224 Ed,b 0.9 0.9
Note: Ed,b is the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits.
Table 5.2: Summary statistics - quarterly US data, 1951:1-2004:4
z 1− L v v/ (1− L)
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.125 0.139 0.259
z 1 -0.302 0.460 0.393
Correlation 1− L - 1 -0.919 -0.977
Matrix v - - 1 0.982
v/ (1− L) - - - 1
Note: Standard deviations and correlations are reported
in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-filtered trend
with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 5.3: Summary statistics - calibrated model
z 1− L v v/ (1− L)
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.128 0.151 0.259
z 1 -0.855 0.867 0.914
Correlation 1− L - 1 -0.758 -0.913
Matrix v - - 1 0.945
v/ (1− L) - - - 1
Note: Standard deviations and correlations are reported
in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-filtered trend
with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
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Table 5.4: Optimal benefit behavior
Benefit level Potential duration
b 1/e
Mean 0.478 11.7
Standard deviation 0.010 0.059
Correlation with z 0.694 0.476
Correlation with 1− L -0.331 -0.08
Correlation with b 1 0.962
Table 5.5: Model statistics simulated under the current US policy
z 1− L v/ (1− L) f̂ w SE SI
Mean 1 0.058 0.634 0.139 0.954 0.503 0.667
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.128 0.259 0.152 0.010 0.045 0.002
z 1 -0.855 0.914 0.895 0.926 0.888 0.954
1− L - 1 -0.913 -0.918 -0.679 -0.923 -0.894
v/ (1− L) - - 1 0.997 0.729 0.992 0.963
Correlation f̂ - - - 1 0.697 0.998 0.960
Matrix w - - - - 1 0.686 0.828
SE - - - - - 1 0.960
SI - - - - - - 1
Note: Means are reported in levels, standard deviations and correlations
are reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-filtered trend with a
smoothing parameter of 1600. f̂ denotes the weekly job finding rate.
Table 5.6: Model statistics simulated under the optimal US policy
z 1− L v/ (1− L) f̂ w SE SI
Mean 1 0.048 0.772 0.161 0.956 0.523 0.668
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.027 0.061 0.032 0.011 0.009 0.003
z 1 -0.875 0.815 0.774 0.918 0.744 0.995
1− L - 1 -0.937 -0.923 -0.653 -0.907 -0.842
v/ (1− L) - - 1 0.998 0.519 0.993 0.766
Correlation f̂ - - - 1 0.459 0.999 0.722
Matrix w - - - - 1 0.419 0.945
SE - - - - - 1 0.690
SI - - - - - - 1
Note: Means are reported in levels, standard deviations and correlations
are reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-filtered trend with a
smoothing parameter of 1600. f̂ denotes the weekly job finding rate.
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Figure 5.1: Optimal policy: benefit level
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Figure 5.2: Optimal policy: benefit duration
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Figure 5.3: Responses to 1.5% drop in productivity
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Figure 5.4: Responses to 1.5% drop in productivity
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Figure 5.5: Response of duration to a 1.5% shock, fixing benefit level at b = 0.4
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Figure 5.6: Response of benefit level to a 1.5% shock, fixing expected duration at 26 weeks
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Figure 5.7: Response of benefit level to a 1.5% shock with no benefit expiration
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Figure 5.8: Response to a 1.5% shock with h = 0. Note: The optimal policy under this
parameterization prescribes that benefits do not expire, which is why the behavior of 1/e is
omitted.
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Figure 5.9: Response to a 1.5% shock with ξ = 0.72. Note: The optimal policy under this
parameterization prescribes that benefits do not expire, which is why the behavior of 1/e is
omitted.
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Figure 5.10: Response to a 1.5% shock with ξ = 0.72, h = 0. Note: The optimal policy
under this parameterization prescribes that benefits do not expire, which is why the behavior
of 1/e is omitted.
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Figure 5.11: Response of benefit replacement ratio to a 1.5% shock
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Figure 5.12: Response of benefit replacement ratio to a 1.5% shock with no benefit
expiration
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Figure 5.13: Response to a 1.5% shock under risk aversion of σ = 1/2
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Figure 5.14: Response to a 1.5% shock under risk aversion of σ = 2. Note: The optimal
policy under this parameterization prescribes that benefits do not expire, which is why the
behavior of 1/e is omitted.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 1
In this appendix I present the proofs for Propositions 3-5. All remaining proofs can
be found in the Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 3.
(a) Suppose y ∈ B∗(bF , η, ξ1, z). Take ξ2 < ξ1. Since WBF is increasing in the first
argument WBF (η−ξ1, y, z) ≤ WBF (η−ξ2, y, z). However, since y ∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ1, z)
this implies that WNBF (bF + η + y, z) ≤ WBF (η − ξ′1, y, z), which implies that
y ∈ B∗(bF , η, ξ2, z).
(b) Suppose y ∈ B∗(bF , η, ξ, z). Take x > 0. Since WBF is increasing in its first argu-
ment, WBF (η + x− ξ, y, z) ≥ WBF (η − ξ, y, z). However, since y ∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z)
this implies that WNBF (η+y+bF , z) ≤ WBF (η−ξ, y, z), and WNBF (η+y+bF , z) =
WNBF ((η + x) + y + (bF − x), z), therefore y ∈ B
∗
(bF − x, η + x, ξ, z).
(c) Suppose y /∈ B∗(bF , η, ξ, z), where ξ > 0. Take x > 0. Since WNBF is increasing
in the first argument, WNBF (bF + η+ x+ y, z) ≥ WNBF (bF + η+ y, z). Note that
since ξ > 0, the additional home equity is forefeited in bankruptcy, WBF ((η +
x)− (ξ + x), y, z) = WBF (η − ξ, y, z). Thus, since y /∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z) this implies
that WNBF (bF + η + x + y, z) ≥ WNBF (bF + η + y, z) ≥ WBF (η − ξ′1, y, z), which
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implies that y /∈ B∗(bF , η + x, ξ + x, z).
(d) When there is no homestead exemption the value of defaulting only depends on
the endowment y and state z. Today’s budget set only depends on the net asset
position, therefore the bankruptcy set only depends on η + bF and z.
(e) This comes directly from Proposition 1 and that WNBF (a, i) ≥ WBCF (a, i). Let
ε = bF + η − χs > 0. Suppose not, i.e. ∃y ∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z). This implies that
u(y; ps)+βEV BC ≥ u(c∗(η+bF +y); ps)+βEV G. However, consuming y+ε and
saving χ was a feasible choice, which implies that: u(c∗(η+bF +y); ps)+βEV G ≥
u(y + ε; ps) + βEV BC > u(y; ps) + βEV BC from the strict monotonicity of u,
which arrives at the desired contraction.
Proof of Proposition 4. When γ < 1 and h(1− δ) > m implies h(1− δ)−m > γh(1−
δ)−m (the deficiency judgment value) and h(1− δ)−m > max {γh(1− δ)−m, 0}
(the no deficiency judgment value). Thus, the household can guarantee itself strictly
more resources tomorrow if it does not declare bankruptcy (if it has a good credit
history), then from since the value functions are increasing in their first argument,
we are done. In case of bankruptcy and χ > 0 the same argument holds. If χ = 0
the assumption that when a household has positive home equity and is indifferent
between foreclosing and not it chooses to repay completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is immediate from Proposition 4 and the definition
of foreclosure when ψ = 0. When δ ≥ 1− κ⇒ h(1− δ) ≤ m, thus the household will
always have more resources if it chooses foreclosure.
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A.1 Supplementary Tables
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Table A.1: Legal Environments Considered
States
Homestead
Recourse
Median HH
Weight
Exemption Income
Washington, N. Carolina 0.64 No 42334 0.053
California, Alaska, N. Dakota 1.58 No 47211 0.112
Minnesota, Arizona, Montana 3.33 No 42154 0.050
Maryland, Ohio, Georgia, Illinois, 0.23 Yes 42146 0.248
Tennessee, Indiana, Virginia
Kentucky, S. Carolia, Alabama
Michigan, Missouri, Louisiana, 0.677 Yes 42650 0.305
New York, Wyoming, New Jersey,
Nebraska, Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Hawaii, Oregon, West Virginia,
Utah, Wisconsin, Arkansas,
Delaware, Colorado, Idaho
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Maine, 3.65 Yes 44872 0.075
New Hampshire, Mississippi, Nevada,
Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode Island
Florida, Texas, Kansas ∞ Yes 38944 0.158
Oklahoma, S. Dakota, D.C.
Table A.2: State Results - Recourse
Maryland Michigan Massachusetts Florida
χs = 0.23 χs = 0.68 χs = 3.7 χs =∞
Unsecured debt, B− -0.59 -0.48 -0.04 -0.01
Mortgages M 3.34 3.39 3.81 3.83
Bankruptcy rate 1.24% 1.22% 0.91% 0.88%
Foreclosure rate 0.49% 0.54% 0.61% 0.62%
Joint 42% 36% 21% 21%
In debt 5.5% 5.4% 4.9% 4.9%
Fraction of households 60% 45% 24% 22%
with Unsecured Debt
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Table A.3: State Results - No Recourse
Washington California Minnesota
χs = 0.64 χs = 1.57 χs = 3.32
Unsecured debt, B− -0.38 -0.20 -0.04
Mortgages M 3.54 3.64 3.78
Bankruptcy rate 1.15% 1.00% 0.62%
Foreclosure rate 0.53% 0.58% 0.63%
Joint 23% 10% 2%
In debt 5.3% 5.2% 5.0%
Fraction of households 35% 16% 3%
with Unsecured Debt
Table A.4: State Level Implications of BAPCPA
State
Foreclosure Rates Bankruptcy Rates
Baseline BAPCPA Baseline BAPCPA
Maryland 0.49% 1.28% 1.24% 2.27%
Michigan 0.54% 1.29% 1.22% 2.32%
Massachusetts 0.61% 1.30% 0.91% 2.57%
Florida 0.62% 1.31% 0.88% 2.58%
Washington 0.53% 0.61% 1.14% 2.44%
California 0.58% 0.69% 1.00% 2.77%
Minnesota 0.63% 0.71% 0.62% 2.86%
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A.2 Supplementary Figures
Notes: as a function of leverage, κ = m
h
, for a household in Michigan, a recourse state, and in all no
recourse states. The Michigan line represents the price schedule given its optimal choice of housing and
unsecured debt: $210K house and $6K of unsecured debt. The No-Recourse line is independent of house
size and unsecured debt position.
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Figure A.1: Model mortgage interest rates
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Figure A.2: Transitional dynamics after the implementation of BAPCPA at time 0.
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A.3 Proofs Related to the Household Problem
I can simplify the household problem because of the static intra-temporal substitution
between consumption and housing services. Thus, in the household problem define:
u(c; ps) = max
c̃,s≥0
U(c̃, s)
s.t.
c̃+ pss = c
Assumption 1. U(c, s) : R2+ → R is strictly increasing, concave and differentiable.
Further, it is bounded above by U , and given ps > 0,
u(yi/λ; ps)− u(0; ps) >
β
1− β
(Ū − u(yi/λ; ps)) ∀ i
In addition, to rule out Ponzi schemes, I assume that there exist maximum levels
of borrowing, both secured and unsecured:
Assumption 2. There exists a maximum level of unsecured borrowing, bmin, and a
maximum mortgage size, mmax.
Lemma 2. u(c; ps) is continuous, strictly concave, strictly increasing.
Proof. Take c1, c2 > 0 and cθ = θc1 + (1 − θ)c2 for θ ∈ (0, 1). u(ci; ps) ≡ U(c̃i, si)
where c̃i and si are from the maximizers. From the strict concavity of U , we know
that
θU(c̃1, s1) + (1− θ)U(c̃2, s2) < U(θc̃1 + (1− θ)c̃2, θs1 + (1− θ)s2)
≤ U(c̃θ, sθ)
where the first inequality comes from the strict concavity of U and the second from
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the fact that θc̃1 + (1 − θ)c̃2 + ps(θs1 + (1 − θ)s2) = θc1 + (1 − θ)c2 = cθ, thus it
is a feasible choice for the maximization for u(cθ; ps), and by definition of a max.
Continuity and strict monotonicity follow from the properties of U .
Let M ⊂ R+ be the mortgage choice set, B ⊂ R be the bond/unsecured choice
set, H ⊂ R+ be the housing choice set, C ⊂ R+ be the consumption expenditure
choice set. The continuous state variable, cash-at-hand, a ∈ A ⊂ R+. Let Z and Y
be the set of possible realizations for the persistent shock and income. The possible
credit histories are H = {G,B,BC}. For the household problem, I take the pricing
functions qb : B ×H ×M × Z → R+ and qm : B ×H ×M × I ×H → R+ as given.
To economize on notation, I will typically not make explicit the dependence of the
prices on the choice parameters.
I define the budget correspondence for households with a good credit history and
foreclosure choice F who didn’t go bankrupt, ΓNBF : A× Z → C ×B ×H ×M as:
ΓNBF (aF , z) = {(c, b, h,m) ∈ C ×B ×H ×M : c+ bqb + h[1− ps]−mqm ≤ aF}
(A.1)
and households who did go bankrupt, I define the budget correspondence ΓB : A ×
Z → ×H ×M as:
ΓBF(aF , z) = {(h,m) ∈ G×M : h[1− ps]−mqm ≤ aF} (A.2)
Households with bad credit histories face the budget correspondence ΓBCF : A×Z →
C ×B ×H ×M as:
ΓBCF (aF , z) = {(c, b, h,m) ∈ C ×B ×H ×M : λc+ bqb + h[1− ps]−mqm ≤ aF , b ≥ 0}
(A.3)
Now, I can define the value functions of households that begin the period with
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good and bad credit histories:
V G(b, g,m, δ, y, z) = max
F∈{0,1}
EJ max
{
WBF (ηF , y, z),W
NB
F (aF , z)
}
ηF = (1−F)[(1− δ)h−m]
aF = y + (1−F)[(1− δ)h−m+ b] + FbF
V BC(b, g,m, δ, y, z) = max
F∈{0,1}
EJ
{
WBCF (aF , z)
}
aF = y + (1−F)[(1− δ)h−m+ b] + FbF
where
WNBF (aF , z) = max
x∈ΓNBF (aF ,z)
{
u(c; ps) + βE(δ′,y′,z′)|zV G(b′, h′,m′, δ′, y′, z′)
}
(A.4)
WBF (ηF , y, z) = u(y; ps) + max
x∈ΓBF
{
βE(δ′,y′,z′)|zV BC(b′, h′,m′, δ′, y′, z′)
}
(A.5)
WBCF (aF , z) = max
x∈ΓBCI (aI ,z)
{
u(c; ps) + βE(δ′,y′,z′)|z
 αV G(X ′)+
(1− α)V BC(X ′)
} (A.6)
Denote the cardinality of the number of credit states by NH. Let V be the set of all
continuous (in b, h,m, δ, y, z), vector-valued functions V : B×H×M ×∆×Y ×Z →
RNH that are increasing in b, h, y and decreasing in m, δ that satisfy the following:
V H(b, h,m, δ, y, z) ∈
[
u(0; ps)
1− β
,
ū
1− β
]
(A.7)
V G(b, h,m, δ, y, z) ≥ V BC(b, h,m, δ, y, z) (A.8)
Lemma 3. V is nonempty. With ‖V ‖ = maxH{sup |V H |} as the norm, (V , ‖ · ‖) is
a complete metric space.
Proof. Any constant vector-valued function that satisfies (A.7) is clearly continuous
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and satisfies the monotonicity requirements. The set of all continuous vector-valued
functions coupled with the same norm (C, ‖ · ‖) is a complete metric space, thus to
prove that (V , ‖ · ‖) is a complete metric space I need to show that V ⊂ C is closed
under the defined norm. Take an arbitrary sequence of functions from V , {Vn} that
is converging to a function V ∗. If V ∗ violates any of the conditions (A.7)-(A.8) or the
monotonicity properties, then there must exist some N , such that VN also violates
those conditions or properties, but that contradicts the assertion that Vn ∈ V ∀n.
Therefore, V ∗ must satisfy conditions (A.7)-(A.8) and the monotonicity properties.
To prove the continuity of V ∗, one can apply Theorem 3.1 in Stokey, Lucas and
Prescott 1989, adapted to a vector-valued function.
Lemma 4. ΓBF is nonempty, monotone, compact-valued and continuous.
Lemma 5. Given V ∈ V, WBF (ηF , y, z;V ) defined by (A.5) exists, is continuous in
aF and y, increasing in aF and strictly increasing in y.
Proof. The existence and continuity of WBF (ηF , y, z;V ) are a direct consequence of
the Theorem of the Maximum, since V is continuous and ΓBF is compact valued
and continuous. The strict monotonicity in y comes from the strict monotonicity of
u(·; ps). The monotonicity in ηF comes from the fact that ΓBF is monotone in ηF and
the monotonicity of V .
In order to show the existence ofWNBF (aF , z) andW
BC
F (aF , z) I first need to extend
their definitions, because for some values of a the budget correspondence may be
empty. First, I will denote by cH(a, z, x
′) the consumption of a household with a, z,H
who makes the portfolio choice x′. Thus, cG(a, z, x
′) ≡ a− b′qb−h′[1−ps]+m′qm and
cB(a, z, x
′) ≡ (a− b′qb − h′[1− Ps] +m′qm) /λ. Note that these consumptions can be
negative. Using this notation, I can define lifetime utility from choosing portfolio x′
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as follows:
ωBCF (a, z, x
′;W ) ≡u (max {cBC(a, z, x′), 0}) + βE(δ′,y′,z′)|z
 αV G(X ′)+
(1− α)V BC(X ′)

(A.9)
ωNBF (a, z, x
′;V ) ≡u (max {cG(a, z, x′), 0}) + βE(δ′,y′,z′)|zV G(x′, δ′, y′, z′) (A.10)
where X ′ = (x′, δ′, y′, z′)
Lemma 6. ωHF (a, z, x
′;V ) is continuous in a and x′. Further, for any i, x′, ωs is
increasing in a, and strictly increasing if cH(a, z, x
′) > 0.
Proof. Note that cs(a, z, x
′) are continuous functions of a and x′ and u(·; ps) is contin-
uous in its first argument. Further, since V ∈ V it is continuous in x′ and integration
preserves continuity. The monotonicity comes because of the strict monotonicity in
u(·; ps) and the fact that cH(a, z, x′) is increasing in a and strictly increasing in a
when cH(a, z, x
′) > 0
Thus, I redefine the extended value functions as:
WHF (aF , z;V ) = max
x′∈X̄s(aF ,z)
ωHF (aF , z, x
′;V ) (A.11)
where X̄HF (aF , i) = {(b, g,m) ∈ B ×H ×M : bqb + h[1− ps]−mqm ≤ a}∪0 is taken
to be the budget correspondence (without c).
Lemma 7. WHF (aF , z;V ) exists, is continuous in its first argument and is increasing
in its first argument.
Proof. Immediate from the Theorem of the Maximum and the monotonicity of ωHF .
Lemma 8. A bad credit history lowers lifetime utility WBCF ≤ WNBF
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Proof. Since V ∈ V , αV BC + (1 − α)V G ≤ V G. From the definition of cH(a, z, x′),
max {cB(a, z, x′), 0} ≤ max {cG(a, z, x′), 0}. Thus, from the strict monotonicity of
u(·; ps), ωBF (a, z, x′;V ) ≤ ωBCF (a, z, x′;V ). Hence, since X̄BCF ⊂ X̄NBF , WBCF ≤ WNBF .
I define the operator vector valued operator TV (b, h,m, y, δ) ={
TV H(b, h,m, δ, y, z) : H ∈ H
}
by:
TV G(b, h,m, δ, y, z) = max
F∈{0,1}
EJ max
{
WBF (ηF , y, z;V ),W
NB
F (aF , z;V )
}
ηF = (1−F)[(1− δ)h−m]
aF = y + (1−F)[(1− δ)h−m+ b] + FbF
TV BC(b, h,m, δ, y, z) = max
F∈{0,1}
EJ
{
WBCF (aF , z;V )
}
aF = y + (1−F)[(1− δ)h−m+ b] + FbF
Lemma 9. T is a contraction mapping with modulus β.
Proof. In order to prove that T is a contract mapping I appeal to Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions:
1. Self-map: TV ⊂ V . In order to show this first note that WHF are all continuous
in their first argument, the convex combination of two continuous functions is
continuous and the maximum of two continuous functions is continuous. The
boundedness property (A.7) is satisfied by the boundedness of WHF . That TV
is increasing in b′, h′ and y′ comes from the fact that all the WHF are increasing
in their first argument and that WBF is strictly increasing in y. By the same
argument, TV is decreasing in both δ′ and m′. The monotonicity property
(A.8) is satisfied by virtue of WNBF ≥ WBCF since the payoff in V B can always
be achieved in V G.
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2. Monotonicity: V̂ ≥ V → T V̂ ≥ TV . For each H ∈ H, WHF (·;V ) is increasing
in V . Therefore, because the convex combination of two increasing functions is
increasing and the maximum of two increasing functions is increasing T V̂ ≥ TV .
3. Discounting: T (V + k) = TV + βk. Notice that for each H ∈ H WHF (·;V ),
WHF (·;V +k) = WHF (·;V )+βk, thus for eachH ∈ H, T (V H+k) = TV H+βk.
Since I have extended the domain of WBCF and W
NB
F , I must now verify that an
agent will never make a choice such that he will have no feasible choices (i.e. for WNBF
he would choose to go bankrupt rather than repay, and for WBCF that he would never
pick a portfolio choice that could result in a negative asset position at the beginning
of the next period). First I prove that an agent will choose to go bankrupt rather
than not go bankrupt and have zero consumption.
Lemma 10. Under Assumption 1, an agent with a good credit history will always
choose to go bankrupt rather than not go bankrupt and have zero consumption. Fur-
thermore, an agent that chooses not to go bankrupt always consumes a strictly positive
amount.
Proof. The utility from choosing not to go bankrupt when the budget set is empty is
bounded by u(0; ps) + βū/(1− β). By choosing bankruptcy the agent can guarantee
lifetime utility of at least u(ymin/λ)/(1−β), which by Assumption 1 is strictly greater.
To ensure that conditional on not going bankrupt agents consume a strictly positive
amount, note that from the continuity of u(·; ps), there exists some c̃ > 0 such that
u(c̃; ps)+βū/(1−β) < u(ymin/λ)/(1−β), which implies that conditional on not going
bankrupt an agent will consume at least c̃.
When an agent is in the bankruptcy or bad credit state, he does not have the
option to declare bankruptcy, only foreclosure. Therefore, I must show that an agent
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will never make a portfolio or foreclosure choice that would result in zero consumption
in the subsequent period.
First consider the case where there is no recourse after foreclosure, i.e. ψ = 0.
From Lemma 5, when ψ = 0 an agent will choose foreclosure whenever (1−δ′)h′ < m′.
Hence, an agent will always begin the subsequent period with a positive a since ymin
is bounded away from zero.
When there is a positive probability of recourse, i.e. ψ > 0, even if an agent
chooses foreclosure, he may still be responsible for the entire balance of the mortgage.
Further, since the support of F (δ′) includes 1, there is a positive probability that the
depreciated value of the house (1− δ′)h′ is arbitrarily close to zero. Thus, I need to
rule out any portfolio choices (b′, h′,m′), that could result in cash-at-hand positions
for which the budget set is empty in the subsequent period. However, since my choice
of u(0; ps) is unrestricted, I can set it arbitrarily low, such that a household would
always find it optimal to never choose a portfolio that resulted in 0 consumption with
positive probability.
Proof of Proposition 1. The existence and uniqueness of the value functions is an
immediate consequence of Lemma 9 and the Contraction Mapping Theorem. The
monotonicity properties of the value functions and the effect of a bad credit score
follow immediately from Lemmas 7 & 8.
The proof of Proposition 2 is an extension of Chatterjee et al. 2007. I first prove
two lemmas.
Lemma 11. Let ŷ ∈ Y \B∗(bF , η, ξ, z), y > ŷ. If y ∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z), then the optimal
consumption with ŷ, c∗(η + bF + ŷ) > ŷ.
Proof. Since ŷ ∈ Y \B∗(bF , η, ξ, z), the agent strictly prefers not declaring bankruptcy,
i.e.:
u(c∗(η + bF + ŷ); ps) + βEV G(X ′∗) > u(ŷ; ps) + βEV BC(X ′) (A.12)
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Let ε = y − ŷ. The choices: č = c∗(η + bF + ŷ) + ε, b̌′ = b′∗, ȟ′ = h′∗, m̌′ = m′∗ were
feasible choices with resources y+η+ bF , but were not chosen since y ∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z)
(where the starred variables are the optimal choices under endowment ŷ), therefore:
u(č; ps) + βEV G(X ′∗) ≤ u(y; ps) + βEV BC(X ′) (A.13)
Subtracting equations (A.12) and (A.13) I obtain:
u(ŷ + ε; ps)− u(ŷ; ps) > u(c∗(η + bF + ŷ) + ε; ps)− u(c∗(η + bF + ŷ); ps) (A.14)
which from the strict concavity of u(·; ps) implies that c∗(η+bF +ŷ) > ŷ. The portfolio
choice is unchanged for the household conditional on bankruptcy, thus X ′ is the same
across (A.13) and (A.14).
Lemma 12. Let ŷ ∈ Y \B∗(bF , η, ξ, z), y < ŷ. If y ∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z), then the optimal
consumption with ŷ, c∗(η + bF + ŷ) < ŷ.
Proof. Omitted. The proof is essentially identical to the previous.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(a) If B∗(bF , η, ξ, z) is non-empty let yB = inf B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z) and ȳ
B = supB∗(bF , η, ξ, z).
These both exist from the Completeness Property of R since B∗(bF , η, ξ, z) ⊆
Y ⊂ R. If they’re equal, I’m done, therefore suppose yB < ȳB. Take ŷ ∈
(yB, ȳB). Suppose by way of contradiction that ŷ /∈ B∗(bF , η, ξ, z). Now, there
exists a y ∈ B∗(bF , η, ξ, z) such that y > ŷ (if not ȳB = ŷ, contradicting that
ŷ ∈ (yB, ȳB)). Thus, from Lemma 1, c∗(η+ bF + ŷ) > ŷ. By the same argument
there exists a y ∈ B∗(bF , η, ξ, z) such that y < ŷ, but from Lemma 2 this implies
c∗(η + bF + ŷ) < ŷ, a contradiction. The closedness comes from the continuity
of WNBF and u(·; ps).
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(b) Suppose y ∈ B∗(b̂F , η, ξ, z). Take bF < b̂F . Since WNBF is increasing in the
first argument, WNBF (bF + η + y, z) ≤ WNBF (b̂F + η + y, z). However, since
y ∈ B∗(b̂F , η, ξ, z) this implies that WNBF (b̂F + η + y, z) ≤ WBF (η − ξ, y, z) ⇒
WNBF (bF + η + y, z) ≤ WBF (η − ξ, y, z) ⇒ y ∈ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z), which implies
B∗(b̂F , η, ξ, z) ⊆ B
∗
(bF , η, ξ, z).
Lemma 13. Conditional on the foreclosure choice and deficiency judgment realiza-
tion, the bankruptcy decision B∗ depends only on unsecured debt bF , positive home
equity η, non-exempt equity ξ, endowment y, and persistent state z.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of the foreclosure value functions and bF .
A.4 Proofs Related to the Intermediaries Problem
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is a direct consequence of Proposition 5. The char-
acterization is obtained by dividing 1.2 by m′.
Proof of Propositio 8. The proof is a direct consequence of Propositions 2-3 and 5.
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A.5 Computational Details
In order to calibrate the model I employ a nested fixed point algorithm to match
relevant moments from the model with the data. I discretize the state space and the
choice parameters.
The outline of the algorithm is as follows:
1. Loop 1 - Guess a vector of the structural parameters Θ0
(a) Loop 2 - Make an initial guess for the price of housing services p0s
i. Loop 3 - Make an initial guess for the price schedules q0b and q
0
m
ii. Compute the policy choice (b̆′, h̆′, m̆′) that yields the maximal resources
in the current period, and denote it by ă.
A. Loop 4 - Make an initial guess for W 0 on the domain [ă−c, ā], and
define v0 for a < ă − c as u(c) + βū/(1 − β), where c is a minimal
consumption level.
B. Compute Eδ′,y′,z′V H(b′, h′,m′, y′, δ′, z′) for each choice of b′, h′,m′,
and the implied default decisions B∗ and f ∗.
C. Compute the new value functions, W 1, by maximization given
Eδ′,y′,z′V (b′, h′,m′, y′, δ′, y′)
D. Compute the foreclosure, bankruptcy and portfolio policy functions
E. If ‖W 1 −W 0‖ < εW end Loop 4, otherwise set W 0 = W 1 and go
to B.
iii. Given the default decisionsB∗(b′, h′,m′, y′, δ′, z′) and f ∗(b′, h′,m′, y′, δ′, z′),
use Equations 1.4 & 1.2 to compute the new implied price schedules q0b
and q0m.
iv. If ‖q1 − q0‖ < εq end Loop 3, otherwise set q0 = νq0 + (1 − ν)q1 and
go to (ii).
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(b) Compute the invariant distribution µ over A× Z ××Y S.
(c) Compute the housing services supplied SS and demanded SD from the
policy functions and invariant distribution.
(d) If ‖SD − SS‖ < εS end Loop 2.
(e) If SD < SS, pick p1s < p
0
s and repeat Loop 3
(f) Repeat until SD > SS, then use a bisection until ‖SD−SS‖ < εS end Loop
2.
2. Compute model moments MMODEL.
3. If
∑
wi(MMODELi −MDATAi )2 < εM end Loop 1. Otherwise, return to 1.
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A.6 Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Information by State
Table A.5: Foreclosure Deficiency and Homestead Bankruptcy Exemption by State
State Foreclosure Max Homestead Federal
Deficiency Exemption Allowed
Alabama Yes 5,000∗ No
Alaska No 54,000 No
Arizona No 150,000 No
Arkansas Yes 17,425∗ Yes
California No 50,000† No
Colorado Yes 45,000 No
Connecticut Yes 75,000 Yes
Delaware Yes 50,000 No
D.C. Yes 17,425∗ Yes
Florida Yes ∞ No
Georgia Yes 10,000∗ No
Hawaii Yes 17,425∗ Yes
Idaho Yes 104,471 No
Illinois Yes 7,500∗ No
Indiana Yes 7,500 No
Iowa No ∞ No
Kansas Yes ∞ No
Kentucky Yes 5,000 No
Louisiana Yes 25,000 No
Maine Yes 35,000 No
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table A.5 – Continued
State Foreclosure Max Homestead Federal
Deficiency Exemption Allowed
Maryland Yes 0 No
Massachusetts Yes 100,000 Yes
Michigan Yes 17,425∗ Yes
Minnesota No 200,000 Yes
Mississippi Yes 75,000 No
Missouri Yes 15,000 No
Montana No 100,000 No
Nebraska Yes 12,500 No
Nevada Yes 550,000 No
New Hampshire Yes 100,000 No
New Jersey Yes 17,425∗ Yes
New Mexico Yes 30,000∗ Yes
New York Yes 50,000 No
North Carolina No 18,500 No
North Dakota No 80,000 No
Ohio Yes 5,000 No
Oklahoma Yes ∞ No
Oregon Yes 25,000‡ No
Pennsylvania Yes 17,425∗ Yes
Rhode Island Yes 200,000 Yes
South Carolina Yes 17,425∗ Yes
South Dakota Yes 30,000 No
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table A.5 – Continued
State Foreclosure Max Homestead Federal
Deficiency Exemption Allowed
Tennessee Yes 5,000† No
Texas Yes ∞ Yes
Utah Yes 20,000∗ No
Vermont Yes 75,000 Yes
Virginia Yes 5,000∗ No
Washington No 40,000 Yes
West Virginia Yes 25,000 No
Wisconsin Yes 40,000∗ Yes
Wyoming Yes 10,000∗ No
∗Can be doubled for couples
†Can be multiplied by 1.5 for couples
‡33,000 for couples
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1 Theoretical Appendix
B.1.1 Characterization of Equilibrium Mortgage Interest Rates
In this section we will construct a proof of Proposition 9 in the main text.
Proof. In equilibrium equation (2.6) becomes (by dividing both sides by mortgage
size m′ > 0):
Pm (g
′,m′) =
1
m′
[
m′F (δ∗(m′, g′)) + γg′
∫∞
δ∗(m′,g′)
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
]
=
(
1
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
){
F (δ∗(κ′)) +
γ
κ′
∫ ∞
δ∗(κ′)
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)
}
= Pm(κ
′)
which proves the mortgages are priced exclusively on leverage. The second point
follows from the definition of the CDF of δ′ and the optimal default choice δ∗(κ′). To
prove the final point, note that for all δ′ > δ∗(κ′) we have γ
κ′
(1− δ′) < 1 and thus the
term in {}-brackets is strictly less than 1.
B.1.2 Endogenous Upper Bound on Leverage
In this section we will construct a proof of Proposition 10 in the main text.
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Proof. In order to prove the statement, we will first show that there exists a leverage
κ∗ that maximizes the contemporaneous resources available to the household. Then
we will argue that in equilibrium households will only chose values of leverage less
than κ∗ and that the value κ∗ is strictly less than the leverage which leads to certain
default.
First, consider the period budget constraint:
c+ bPb + hPl + g −mPm (g,m) = a+ gPl (B.1)
This equation can be rewritten as:
g[1− Pl − κPm (g,m)] = a− c− hPl − bPb (B.2)
For a fixed amount of housing g > 0, we can calculate the value of mortgages m that
will generate the maximal amount of resources available today:
m∗ ∈ arg min
0≤m≤g(1−δ)
[g[1− Pl − κPm (g,m)] (B.3)
⇔ m∗ ∈ arg min
0≤m≤g(1−δ)
−mPm (g,m) (B.4)
Note that g(1− δ), the upper bound on m, corresponds to a leverage that will result
in default for sure in the second period. Borrowing above this level does not increase
resources available today since an extra dollar borrowed beyond this limit will be
defaulted on for sure, and thus no additional resources will be advanced today by the
financial intermediary against the promise to pay nothing back tomorrow. Further-
more, this upper bound compactifies the choice space and guarantees that the pricing
function is differentiable on the interior of that space. The first order conditions for
this program is:
− Pm(κ)−m
∂Pm(κ)
∂κ
∂κ
∂m
+ λ = 0 (B.5)
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where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the upper constraint (the lower bound
trivially is not binding as long as E[δ] < 1 and thus Pm > 0). The second order
condition (which is well-defined due to the differentiability of f(δ)) is:
− 1
g
[
2
∂Pm(κ)
∂κ
+ κ
∂2Pm(κ)
∂κ2
]
(B.6)
In order to simplify these conditions, consider the mortgage pricing function
Pm(
m
g
) given by:
Pm(κ) =
1
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
F (1− κ) + γκ
δ̄∫
1−κ
(1− δ)dF (δ)
 (B.7)
As long as δ has a continuous pdf (guaranteed because F ∈ C2), we can apply Leib-
nitz’s rule to obtain:
∂Pm(κ)
∂κ
=
1
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
×−f(1− κ)− γκ2
δ̄∫
1−κ
(1− δ)dF (δ) + γ
κ
(−1)(−1) (1− (1− κ)) f (1− κ)

=
1
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
(γ − 1)f (1− κ)− γκ2
δ̄∫
1−κ
(1− δ)dF (δ)

We can simplify the first order conditions by substituting in our prior calculations
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to obtain:
λ = Pm(κ
∗) +
κ∗
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
(γ − 1)f (1− κ∗)− γκ∗2
δ̄∫
1−κ∗
(1− δ)dF (δ)

= F (1− κ∗) + γ
κ∗
δ̄∫
1−κ∗
(1− δ)dF (δ) + (γ − 1)κ∗f (1− κ∗)− γ
κ∗
δ̄∫
1−κ∗
(1− δ)dF (δ)
= F (1− κ∗) + (γ − 1)κ∗f (1− κ∗)
We want to show that κ∗ is an interior choice and thus that λ = 0. Consider
otherwise, that is κ∗ = 1− δ and λ ≥ 0:
F (1− κ∗) + (γ − 1)κ∗f (1− κ∗)− λ = F (δ)︸︷︷︸
=0
+ (γ − 1)(1− δ)f(δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
− λ︸︷︷︸
≥0
Since f(δ) > 0 (from the definition of the support of F ), if foreclosure is inefficient
γ < 1, then the above equation will be strictly less than 0, implying that κ∗ = 1− δ
cannot satisfy the first order conditions, thus guaranteeing an interior optimal choice.
Note that when foreclosure is efficient (γ = 1) choosing κ∗ = 1 − δ maximizes the
resources received today (by the same argument in the text, since this is the point
at which the household defaults for sure). The multiplier λ is still zero in this case,
since κ∗ = 1− δ is the global maximizer of the mortgage receipts.
Thus, we can characterize interior value of leverage which satisfies the first order
conditions by the implicit equation:
κ∗ =
F (1− κ∗)
(1− γ)f (1− κ∗)
(B.8)
A solution to this implicit equation exists and is unique on (0, κ̄). To see this rewrite
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the implicit equation as:
1
1− x
= (1− γ) f(x)
F (x)
(B.9)
for x ∈ (δ, 1). The right hand side is strictly increasing in x, and takes values from
[1/(1 − δ),∞). The left hand side is decreasing and also unbounded above (both
coming from log-concavity of F ). Thus, from a standard fixed-point theorem in R,
there exists an x in that interval which satisfies the equation and it is unique.
Now that we have found an interior solution to the first order conditions, we must
check the second order condition, which simplifies to:
− 1
g(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
{(γ − 2)f (1− κ) + (1− γ)κf ′ (1− κ)} (B.10)
If the second order conditions is strictly positive at κ∗, the first order condition
will be necessary and sufficient for a minimum, and thus will characterize the leverage
which yields the maximal amount of contemporaneous resources. Log-concavity of
F (δ) is sufficient for the SOC to be strictly positive. To see this, first note that
log-concavity implies f ′2 < 0. Using this fact we can show:
f ′ <
f
F
f
⇒ f ′ (1− κ∗) < f (1− κ
∗)
F (1− κ∗)
f (1− κ∗)
⇒ (1− γ)κ∗f ′ (1− κ∗) < f (1− κ∗)
where the last inequality comes from equation (B.8). Now, this last inequality, along
with the fact that γ < 1 and f ≥ 0 implies that the second order condition at κ∗ will
be strictly positive. Thus, we have shown that our interior κ∗ is indeed a maximum.
Now that we have shown the existence of κ∗ to prove the first statement, sup-
pose by way of contradiction that a household has chosen an affordable and conjec-
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tured optimal allocation {c, h, b, g,m} such that κ > κ∗. Consider another alloca-
tion {c′, h′, b′, g′,m′}, where h′ = h, b′ = b, g′ = g and m′ is such that m′
g′
= κ∗
and c′ = c + m′Pm(κ
∗) − mPm(κ). Note that this new allocation is affordable,
and that m′Pm(κ
∗) > mPm(κ) implies that c
′ > c (from above). Furthermore
cash-at-hand in the next period will be weakly greater in all possible states un-
der the primed allocation than the original (since b = b′, g = g′ and m′ < m,
b+ max((1− δ)g −m, 0) ≤ b′ + max((1− δ)g′ −m′, 0)). Thus, from the strict mono-
tonicity of the utility function, the primed allocation yields strictly higher period
utility and weakly higher continuation value, and thus is strictly preferred to the
original hypothesized optimum.
B.1.3 Existence, Uniqueness and Characterization of the Value Function
Definitions
First we need some definitions. Let the M ⊂ R+ mortgage choice set, B ⊂ R+ be
the bond choice set, G ⊂ R+ be the housing choice set, C ⊂ R+ the consumption
expenditure choice set. The state variable, cash-at-hand lies in a ∈ A ⊂ R+. Income
resides in y ∈ Y , where Y is a finite set. We define the budget correspondence
Γ : A→ C ×B ×G×M as:
Γ(a) = {(c, b, g,m) ∈ C×B×G×M : c+bPb+g[1−Pl]−mPm (g,m) ≤ a, m ≤ gκ∗}
(B.11)
where κ∗ is the endogenous maximal leverage characterized above.
We can write down our Bellman equation as:∗
v(a, y) = max
x∈Γ(a)
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)
∫
v(φ(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′), y′)dF (δ′) (B.12)
∗We will show in the next section that Γ is compact valued, so that the maximum of the program will
be obtained, justifying our use of the max-operator as opposed to the sup-operator.
259
where x = (c, b′, g′,m′) and a(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′) = b′+ max((1− δ′)g′−m′, 0) + (1− τ)y′
is cash at hand tomorrow. We can now define our operator, T : A× Y → A× Y as:
Tv(a, y) = max
x∈Γ(a)
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)
∫
v(φ(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′), y′)dF (δ′) (B.13)
With our definitions in hand, we proceed to discuss the properties of the budget
correspondence Γ and the operator T .
Properties of Γ and T
We begin by establishing properties of Γ. First, it is non-empty (since 0 ∈ Γ(a))
and monotone. Given prices that satisfy† 1 − Pl − κPm(κ) > 0 ∀κ ∈ [0, κ∗], we
can show that Γ is also continuous and compact valued. To prove this we want to
apply Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 from Stokey and Lucas (1989). We will show that the
conditions for these two theorems are met by proving two lemmas.
Lemma 14. The graph of Γ, G = {(a, c, b, g,m) ∈ A×C×B×G×M : (c, b, g,m) ∈
Γ(a)} is closed, and for any bounded set Â ⊂ A, Γ(Â) is bounded.
Proof. To show that the graph is closed, take a sequence {(an, cn, bn, gn,mn)}∞n=0 such
that (cn, bn, gn,mn) ∈ Γ(an) for all n that converges to (a, c, b, g,m). Suppose that
(c, b, g,m) /∈ Γ(a∗). This implies either c+bPb+g[1−Pl]−mPm (g,m) > a or m > gκ∗.
However, since all functions involved are continuous, there exists some N > 0 such
that ones of the inequalities is also violated for (aN , cN , bN , gN ,mN), which implies
that (cN , bN , gN ,mN) /∈ Γ(aN), a contradiction.
To show that Γ(Â) is bounded, let â = sup Â. Since Γ is monotone, if Γ(â) is
bounded, Γ(Â) will be bounded. Now, observe that 0 ≤ c ≤ a, 0 ≤ b ≤ a/Pb. To
†This is a no-arbitrage condition on the relation between the interest rate and rental rate, and thus will
be true in any equilibrium. If this condition is violated the household can buy one unit of housing with
leverage κ at a positive cash flow today (and due to the default option the cash flow tomorrow from this
transaction is nonnegative, and strictly positive as long as the household does not default with probability
1).
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prove that g is bounded above is equivalent to showing ∀a ∈ R+ ∃ḡ ≥ 0 s.t. ∀g >
ḡ, (c, b, g,m) /∈ Γ(a). We will construct such a candidate ḡ. We propose ḡ(a) such
that ḡ(a) = a/[1 − Pl − κ∗Pm(κ∗)], where κ∗ is the endogenous leverage limit. Now,
suppose by way of contradiction that there was an allocation (c, b, g,m) ∈ Γ(a) with
g > ḡ(a). This implies that:
c+ bPb + g[1− Pl − κPm (g,m)] ≤ a (B.14)
⇒ c+ bPb + g[1− Pl − κ∗Pm (g,m∗)] ≤ a (B.15)
⇒ g ≤ ḡ − c+ bPb
1− Pl − κ∗Pm (g,m∗)
(B.16)
⇒ g ≤ ḡ, (B.17)
a contradiction. Thus, for any a, Γ(a) is bounded, thus Γ(â) is bounded and therefore
Γ(Â) is bounded.
Lemma 15. The graph of Γ, G, is convex, and for any bounded set Â ⊂ A, there
exists a bounded set X̂ ⊂ C ×B ×G×M such that Γ(a) ∩ X̂ 6= ∅ for all a ∈ Â.
Proof. The second part of the lemma is trivially satisfied by letting X̂ = {(0, 0, 0, 0)}.
In order to show convexity we need to establish that −mPm(m, g) is convex, which
will make c+ bPb + g[1− Pl]−mPm (g,m) convex in c, b, g,m, guaranteeing that the
inequality constraint will hold for convex combinations. Consider the Hessian for
−mPm(m, g):
D2(−mPm(m, g)) =
 −1g (2P ′m + κP ′′m) κg (2P ′m + κP ′′m)
κ
g
(2P ′m + κP
′′
m) −κ
2
g
(2P ′m + κP
′′
m)
 (B.18)
Since the Hessian is singular, in order to show that the matrix is positive semi-definite,
and hence that −mPm(m, g) is convex, we only need to show that the two diagonal
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elements are positive. Thus, we need to show that 2P ′m + κP
′′
m ≤ 0. From before we
know that:
2P ′m + κP
′′
m =
1
(1 + rb)(1 + rw + θ − φ)
{(γ − 2)f (1− κ) + (1− γ)κf ′ (1− κ)}
(B.19)
Focusing on:
(γ − 2)f (1− κ) + (1− γ)κf ′ (1− κ) (B.20)
We again employ the maintained assumption of log-concavity of F (δ) to show:
f (1− κ∗)
F (1− κ∗)
≥ f (1− κ)
F (1− κ)
∀κ ∈ [0, κ∗] (B.21)
⇒ f ′ (1− κ) < f (1− κ
∗)
F (1− κ∗)
f (1− κ) ∀κ ∈ [0, κ∗] (B.22)
⇒ f ′ (1− κ) < 1
(1− γ)κ∗
f (1− κ) ∀κ ∈ [0, κ∗] (B.23)
⇒ f ′ (1− κ) < 1
(1− γ)κ
f (1− κ) ∀κ ∈ [0, κ∗] since f > 0 (B.24)
(1− γ)κf ′ (1− κ) < f (1− κ) ∀κ ∈ [0, κ∗] (B.25)
(B.26)
which guarantees that (B.19) is negative. This implies that the diagonal elements are
non-negative, combined with the fact that the determinant is zero, yields that the
Hessian is positive semi-definite on κ ∈ [0, κ∗] (this follows from Debreu 1952). Now,
recall our definition of ḡ(a) = a/[1−Pl−κ∗Pm(κ∗)] which is the maximum size house
that could be purchased by a household with cash-at-hand a. Take any g ∈ [0, ḡ(a)],
then for any m ∈ [0, gκ∗], the function −mPm(m, g) will be convex, since κ ∈ [0, κ∗].
Thus, we have established the convexity of G.
These two lemmas, combined with theorems 3.4 and 3.5 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989), guarantee that Γ is compact valued, u.h.c. and l.h.c. Since we are analyzing
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the simplified recursive household problem (with the solution of the static expenditure
allocation problem substituted in), we need to show some properties of the indirect
utility function over consumption expenditures, u(c, Pl).
Lemma 16. u(c;Pl) is continuous, strictly concave and strictly increasing in c, for
all Pl > 0.
Proof. Take c1, c2 > 0 and cθ=θc1 + (1 − θ)c2 for θ ∈ (0, 1). Let u(ci;Pl) ≡ U(c̃i, hi)
where c̃i and hi are the maximizers of the static problem. From the strict concavity
of U , we know that
θU(c̃1, h1) + (1− θ)U(c̃2, h2) < U(θc̃1 + (1− θ)c̃2, θh1 + (1− θ)h2)
≤ U(c̃θ, hθ)
where the first inequality comes from the strict concavity of U . The second inequality
follows from the fact that θc̃1 + (1− θ)c̃2 +Pl(θh1 + (1− θ)h2) = θc1 + (1− θ)c2 = cθ,
thus it is a feasible choice for the maximization for u(cθ;Pl), and by definition of a
maximum. Continuity and strict monotonicity follow from the properties of U .
Since we have assumed that the utility function is unbounded from below, we use a
similar argument to Chatterjee et al. (2007) to establish the existence and uniqueness
of the value function. Let V be the set of all continuous functions v : A × Y → R,
such that:
v(a, y) ∈
[
u((1− τ)ymin;Pl)
1− β
,
ū
1− β
]
(B.27)
u((1− τ)ymin;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)v((1− τ)y′, y′) > u(0;Pl) +
βū
1− β
(B.28)
Lemma 17. V is non-empty and (V , ‖ · ‖) is a complete metric space, where ‖ · ‖ is
the sup-norm.
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Proof. Take any constant function v0 satisfying (B.27). v0 is continuous and satisfies
(B.28) by the assumption that u is unbounded below. In order to show that (V , ‖ · ‖)
is complete, first note that (C, ‖ · ‖) is complete, where C is the set of continuous
functions from A× Y → R. First note that V ⊂ C, and thus it is sufficient to show‡
that V is a closed subset of C. So take any sequence of functions {vn}∞n=0 ∈ V such
that vn → v∗. We need to show that v∗ ∈ V . Suppose not, i.e. v∗ /∈ V . Then either v∗
is not continuous, or (B.27) or (B.28) was violated. Continuity is preserved because
vn converges to v
∗ uniformly given the sup-norm. If (B.27) is violated, then there
must exist some N such that it is also violated for vN , contradicting that vN ∈ V .
Finally, given (B.27), (B.28) is satisfied by the assumption of unboundedness of u
from below.
Now we need to show that for all v ∈ V , Tv ∈ V . Thus, we need to establish that T
preserves continuity, and that (B.27) and (B.28) hold. To show that T preserves con-
tinuity, first note that a(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′) is a continuous function. Thus v(a(), y) is also
continuous, because the composition of continuous functions is continuous. Further,
continuity is preserved by integration, and thus
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)
∫
v(a(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′), y′)
dF (δ′) is also continuous. This implies that:
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)
∫
v(a(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′), y′)dF (δ′) (B.29)
is a continuous function in c, b′, g′,m′ on C × B × G × M . That, combined with
the previously established fact that Γ is compact valued and continuous allows us to
assert the continuity of Tv from the Theorem of the Maximum. To show that (B.27)
is preserved, note that u(c;Pl) is bounded above by ū, thus Tv ≤ ū + βū/(1− β) =
ū/(1−β). Further, choosing a consumption expenditure of c = (1− τ)ymin is feasible
in all periods, thus Tv ≥ u((1 − τ)ymin;Pl) + βu((1 − τ)ymin;Pl)/(1 − β) = u((1 −
‡Corollary 1 on p. 52 of Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989, establishes that any closed subspace of a
complete metric space is also complete
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τ)ymin;Pl)/(1 − β). This result, combined with the assumption that u(0;Pl) = −∞
guarantees that Tv satisfies (B.28). Thus TV ⊂ V .
The final lemma necessary to prove our main result is:
Lemma 18. The operator T is a contraction with modulus β.
Proof. To prove this we will show that T satisfies monotonicity and discounting and
then apply Blackwell’s sufficient conditions (see Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem
3.3§).
a) Monotonicity: Take v, w ∈ V such that v(a, y) ≤ w(a, y) for all (a, y) ∈ A ×
Y . We want to show that Tv ≤ Tw. By the definition of T and the fact that∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)
∫
v(a′, y′)dF (δ′) ≤
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)
∫
w(a′, y′)dF (δ′), Tv ≤ Tw.
b) Discounting: Take any γ ∈ R+, T (v + γ) = Tv + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)
∫
γdF (δ′) =
Tv + βγ.
Thus, from Blackwell’s theorem it follows that T is a contraction mapping with
modulus β.
Proposition 13. Under the maintained assumptions on u and the assumption that
F (δ) is C2 and log-concave, there exists a unique v∗ ∈ V such that Tv∗ = v∗. Fur-
thermore, v∗ is strictly increasing in a.
Proof. From Lemmas 17, 18 above and the contraction mapping theorem it follows
that there exists a unique v∗ ∈ V such that Tv∗ = v∗. In order to show that v∗ is
increasing in a we appeal to the monotonicity of Γ and the strict monotonicity of
§Note that all functions in V are bounded.
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u(c;PL). Take a, a
′ ∈ A such that a < a′. We want to show v∗(a, y) < v∗(a′, y).
v∗(a, y) = max
x∈Γ(a)
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)v∗(a(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′), y′)dF (δ′) (B.30)
= u(c∗;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)v∗(a(b′∗, g′∗,m′∗, δ′, y′), y′)dF (δ′) (B.31)
< u(c∗ + a′ − a;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)v∗(a(b′∗, g′∗,m′∗, δ′, y′), y′)dF (δ′) (B.32)
≤ max
x∈Γ(a′)
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)v∗(a(b′, g′,m′, δ′, y′), y′)dF (δ′) (B.33)
= v∗(a′, y) (B.34)
where the third line comes from the strict monotonicity of u. The fourth line comes
from the fact that a′ − a > 0 and the fact that if (c∗, b′∗, g′∗,m′∗) ∈ Γ(a), then
(c∗ + a′ − a, b′∗, g′∗,m′∗) ∈ Γ(a′).
Characterization
In this section we prove Proposition 12. It is a direct consequence of Theorem 3 in
Clausen and Strub (2012).
Proof. We seek to apply theorem 3 of Clausen and Strub (2012). Consider re-writing
the value function as follows:
V (b, g,m, δ, d, y) = max
x∈Γ(a),d′∈{0,1}
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′∈Y
π(y′|y)V (b′, g′,m′, δ′, d′, y′)dF (δ′)
(B.35)
where x and Γ are defined as before, but now
a = b+ y + (1− d′) [(1− δ)g −m] (B.36)
where we explicitly model the foreclosure decision with d′. Note, that there is a
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slight abuse of timing here, the d′ denotes the choice to default in the current period,
whereas d denotes the foreclosure choice in the previous period. As a result, V does
not depend on d since the default decision in the previous period is not relevant for
the current period’s optimization.
In order to apply Theorem 3 of Clausen and Strub, we need to show that the
choices satisfy what they call ”one-period interior choice.” The fact that the utility
function is unbounded below guarantees that consumption will always be strictly inte-
rior. By assuming, as we did in proposition 12 that g′, b′,m′, g′′, b′′,m′′ > 0 guarantees
that the choice of c, h, g′, b′,m′ satisfies the ”one-period interior choice” condition.
Therefore, since, as we showed above, the value function is finite and as long as
the utility function is differentiable, then it will also be differentiable with respect to
b, g,m, holding g′, b′,m′, d, d′ constant, and is differentiable with respect to g′, b′,m′,
holding b, g,m, d, d′ constant (based on how it is defined above). Then, we can con-
clude that if (g′, b′,m′, d′) is an optimal choice at b, g,m, d, δ and g′, b′,m′ > 0, then
V will be differentiable in g′, b′,m′ for all δ′. Taking first order conditions and rear-
ranging them yields the characterization in Proposition 12.
B.1.4 A Lower Bound for the Equilibrium Rental Price of Housing Pl
In the main text we established a lower bound for the equilibrium rental rate,
Pl ≤
rb + rw + rbrw + γE(δ
′) + 1− γ
(1 + rb)(1 + rw)
.
We now discuss a lower bound for the rental rate; whose existence we can be sure
of, but for which we have no closed-form characterization. Due to the presence
of idiosyncratic house price shocks, the housing asset is an inherently risky asset.
Households, however, can effectively choose the risky returns to housing by taking on
different levels of leverage. Since households are risk averse, for them to purchase the
housing asset, at some leverage the expected return to housing (which includes the
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“dividend” Pl), weighted by the stochastic discount factor of the household, must be
greater than the return of the risk-free bond. This in turn implies a lower bound on
the rental price Pl.
Although we do not have an analytical characterization of that lower bound, we
found in our quantitative analysis that the equilibrium rental price Pl was such that
the expected return of housing at zero leverage was always at least as high as the risk
free interest rate. This implies that in our numerical analysis the following relationship
holds: (
1
1 + rb
)∫ 1
δ
(1− δ′)dF (δ′) ≥ 1− Pl
which can be rewritten as
(
1
1 + rb
)
(1− E(δ′)) ≥ 1− Pl or
Pl ≥
rb + E(δ
′)
1 + rb
.
This result states that the rental price of housing was not smaller than the (expected)
user cost of housing in equilibrium.
Combining these results, with γ = 1 and rw = 0 we would immediately obtain that
the rental price of housing Pl equals its user cost
rb+E(δ
′)
1+rb
. In fact, what happens in an
equilibrium under this parameterization (γ = 1, rw = 0) is that households purchase
houses, lever up such that they default for sure tomorrow and the houses end up in the
hand of the banks. Since these are risk-neutral, and since default is fully priced into
the mortgage and banks receive the full (but depreciated) value of the house, banks
rather than households (which are risk averse) should (from a normative perspective)
and will effectively end up owning the real estate. This equilibrium in effect replicates
the equilibrium, described in section 2.5.2 of the paper, in the version of the model
in which a housing mutual fund can diversify all idiosyncratic house price risk.
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B.2 Computational Appendix
B.2.1 Simplification of the Household Problem
For the computation of the household problem it will be convenient to split the house-
hold maximization problem into a portfolio choice problem in which the household
chooses how much to invest in bonds and houses and how much of the house to
finance, and into a standard intertemporal consumption-saving problem. Define
x′ = b′Pb + g
′ [1− Pl]−m′Pm(κ′).
Then the consumption-savings problem reads as
v(a, y) = max
0≤x′≤a
{u (a− x′;Pl) + βw (x′, y)}
where the value of saving x′ units is given by
w(x′, y) = max
b′,g′,m′≥0
∑
y′
π(y′|y)
∫ ∞
δ
v(a′, y′)dF (δ′)
s.t.
x′ = b′Pb + g
′ [1− Pl]−m′Pm(κ′)
a′ = b′ + max{0, (1− δ′)g′ −m′)}+ (1− τ)y′
This last problem can be conveniently expressed as a choice problem of just bond b′
and leverage κ′ = m′/g′. Note that if g′ = 0 the household cannot borrow and thus
κ′ = 0. First, we can write the last two equations in terms of κ′ instead of m′:
x′ = b′Pb + g
′ {1− Pl − κ′Pm(κ′)}
a′ = b′ + g′max{0, (1− δ′)− κ′)}+ (1− τ)y′
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Now we solve the first equation for g′ to obtain
g′ =
x′ − b′Pb
1− Pl − κ′Pm(κ′)
a′ = b′ +
x′ − b′Pb
1− Pl − κ′Pm(κ′)
max{0, (1− δ′)− κ′)}+ (1− τ)y′
and thus the portfolio choice problem boils down to a choice of b′ and κ′:
w(x′, y) = max
0≤b′≤x′/Pb
0≤κ′
∑
y′
π(y′|y)
∫ ∞
δ
v
{
b′ +
x′ − b′Pb
1− Pl − κ′Pm(κ′)
max{0, (1− δ′)− κ′)}+ (1− τ)y′, y′
}
dF (δ′)
B.2.2 Labor Income Process
From the Tauchen procedure we obtain (after de-logging) the five labor productiv-
ity shock realizations y ∈ {0.3586, 0.5626, 0.8449, 1.2689, 1.9909} and the following
transition matrix:
π =

0.7629 0.2249 0.0121 0.0001 0.0000
0.2074 0.5566 0.2207 0.0152 0.0001
0.0113 0.2221 0.5333 0.2221 0.0113
0.0001 0.0152 0.2207 0.5566 0.2074
0.0000 0.0001 0.0121 0.2249 0.7629

which in turn implies the stationary distribution Π = (0.1907, 0.2066, 0.2053, 0.2066, 0.1907)
and an average labor productivity of one.
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B.3 Sensitivity Analysis Appendix
B.3.1 The Economy with Capital
Details of the Model
The economy with capital is identical to the Aiyagari (1994) economy, augmented
by risky housing assets and housing services, as in the benchmark economy. Instead
of labor income, households now receive idiosyncratic labor endowments y ∈ Y in
each period. These endowments follow a finite state Markov chain with transition
probabilities π(y′|y) and unique invariant distribution Π(y), as does labor income in
the benchmark model. A household’s labor income in a given period is then given by
wy, where w is the economy-wide wage. We denote by ȳ =
∑
y∈Y yΠ(y) the average
labor endowment and normalize it to 1. We will use the terms labor endowment
and labor income interchangeably throughout the remainder of this appendix, and
as before assume that a law of large number applies, so that π and Π also denote
deterministic fractions of households receiving a particular labor income shock y.
In addition to consumption and housing services the household spends income to
purchase three types of assets, one-period pure discount bonds b′, perfectly divisible
houses g′ (as before) and physical capital k̃′. Capital pays a net return r − δk where
r is the rental rate on capital and δk its depreciation rate. The recursive problem of
the households now reads as
v(a, y) = max
c,h,b′,m′,g′,k̃′≥0
{
U(c, h) + β
∑
y′
π(y′|y)
∫ 1
δ
v(a′, y′)dF (δ′)
}
(B.37)
subject to
c+ b′Pb + hPl + g
′Ph + k̃
′ −m′Pm (g′,m′) = a+ g′Pl (B.38)
a′(δ′, y′,m′, g′) = (1 + r− δk)k̃′+ b′+ max{0, Ph(1− δ′)g′−m′)}+ (1− τ)wy′ (B.39)
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On the production side, a representative firm rents labor and capital and produces
the final good which can be used for consumption and physical capital investment
purposes. The production technology is given by
Y = AKαL1−α
where K is the physical capital stock, L is the labor input used by the representative
firm and Y is aggregate output. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1) measures the capital share.
Note that α = 0 corresponds to our endowment economy. The real estate construction
sector and the financial intermediary sector works as before. The same is true for
the government who levies income taxes at a flat rate τ on households to finance the
mortgage interest rate subsidy. The tax revenues of the government are now given
by τw, recalling that aggregate labor supply is normalized to 1. For a loan of type
(m′, g′) the subsidy by the government is given by
sub(m′, g′) = θm′Pm(g
′,m′;φ = θ)
and the total economy-wide subsidy is
G =
∫
sub(m′, g′)dµ (B.40)
The income tax rate then has to satisfy
τ =
G
w
. (B.41)
Definition of Competitive Equilibrium
We are now ready to define a stationary recursive Competitive Equilibrium for the
benchmark economy. Let S = R+ × Y denote the individual state space.
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Definition Given a government subsidy policy φ a Stationary Recursive Com-
petitive Equilibrium are value and policy functions for the households, v, c, h, b′,m′,
g′ : S → R, policies for the production sector K,L, for the real estate construction
sector I, Ch, prices Pl, Pb, wages and rental rates w, r, a mortgage pricing function
Pm : R+ ×R+ → R, a government tax rate τ and government spending G, as well as
a stationary measure µ such that
1. (Household Maximization) Given prices Pl, Pb, Pm and government policies the
value function solves (B.37) and c, h, b′,m′, g′ are the associated policy functions.
2. Production Firm Maximization
w = (1− α)A
(
K
L
)α
r = αA
(
K
L
)α−1
3. (Real Estate Construction Company Maximization) Policies I, Ch solve (2.4).
4. (Loan-by-Loan Competition) Given Pb and Pm, (2.6) holds with equality for all
m′, g′.
5. (Government Budget Balance) The tax rate function τ satisfies (B.41) and gov-
ernment spending G satisfies (B.40), given the functions m′, Pm.
6. (Market Clearing in Rental Market)
∫
g′(s)dµ =
∫
h(s)dµ
7. (Market Clearing in the Bond Market)
Pb
∫
b′(s)dµ = (1 + rw + θ − φ)
∫
Pm(g
′,m′;φ)m′(s)dµ
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8. (Market Clearing in the Capital Market)
∫
k̃′(s)dµ = K
9. (Market Clearing in the Labor Market)
∫
ydµ = L
10. (Market Clearing in the Goods Market)
∫
c(s)dµ+ Ch + δkK + (rw + θ − φ)
∫
Pm(g
′,m′;φ)m′dµ+G = AKαL1−α
where
Ch = I =
∫
g′(s)
[
1−
∫ δ∗(κ′(s))
δ
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)− γ
∫ 1
δ∗(κ′(s))
(1− δ′)dF (δ′)
]
dµ
is gross investment in the housing stock.
11. (Invariance of Distribution µ). The measure µ is invariant with respect to the
Markov process induced by the exogenous Markov process π and the policy
functions m′, g′, b′.
When we derive the welfare consequences of removing the mortgage interest sub-
sidy, as before we measure aggregate economy-wide welfare via a Utilitarian social
welfare function in the steady state, defined as
WEL =
∫
v(s)µ(ds)
where µ is the invariant measure over the state space for cash at hand and income,
s = (a, y).
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Theoretical Results
Simplification of the Household Problem First, we note that bonds and capital
are both risk-free assets, and for either to be demanded in positive but finite amounts,
it needs to be the case that both assets command the same returns. Thus in any
equilibrium where both assets are traded
Pb =
1
1 + r − δk
.
Define a new variable k′ = k̃′ + Pbb
′. Then the household problem can be written as
v(a, y) = max
c,h,m′,g′,k′≥0
{
U(c, h) + β
∑
y′
π(y′|y)
∫ 1
δ
v(a′, y′)dF (δ′)
}
subject to
c+ k′ + hPl + g
′Ph −m′Pm (g′,m′) = a+ g′Pl (B.42)
a′(δ′, y′,m′, g′) = (1 + r − δk)k′ + max{0, Ph(1− δ′)g′ −m′)}+ (1− τ)wy′ (B.43)
As before the household problem can be separated into a static and dynamic
problem, with end result:
v(s) = max
c,b′,m′,g′≥0
{
u(c;Pl) + β
∑
y′
π(y′|y)
∫ 1
δ
v(s′)dF (δ′)
}
a = c+ k′ + g′ [1− Pl]−m′Pm(κ′)
a′(δ′, h′,m′, g′) = (1 + r − δk)k′ + max{0, (1− δ′)g′ −m′)}+ (1− τ)wy′
and the same properties of the household problem go through as before go through.
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Simplification of the Recursive Competitive Equilibrium Trivially L = 1 from
the labor market clearing condition, and thus
w = (1− α)AKα
r = αAKα−1
Adding the bond and capital market clearing conditions yields
Pb
∫
b′(s)dµ+
∫
k̃′(s)dµ = K + (1 + rw + θ − φ)
∫
Pm(g
′,m′;φ)m′(s)dµ
and thus ∫
k′(s)dµ = K + (1 + rw + θ − φ)
∫
Pm(g
′,m′;φ)m′(s)dµ
Consequently the only changes the shift from the endowment to the production econ-
omy entails is that now the risk-free interest rate in the economy is tied to the marginal
product of labor, and that the market clearing conditions for risk-free assets now
equates household demand for these assets to the sum of real assets (the physical
capital stock) and financial assets (mortgages), rather than just financial assets, as
in the endowment economy.
Calibration
Our objective is to calibrate the steady state equilibrium of the production economy
with a 30bp subsidy to the same targets as we did for the endowment economy. We
retain the same parameters for the idiosyncratic income process (since the common
wage w just adds an aggregate constant to the log-income equation) as well as for the
idiosyncratic house price depreciation process. Parameters governing the foreclosure
technology and the government subsidy remain the same as well.
The production side of the economy is characterized by the three parameters
A,α, δk. We normalize A = 0.9232 such that w = 1 in the benchmark equilibrium
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which facilitates comparisons with the endowment economy and choose a capital
share of α = 0.3 and a depreciation rate of δk = 9%. With these choices and a target
capital-to-output ratio of K/Y = 3 (achieved by judicious choice of the preference
parameters below) the model delivers the same risk-free interest rate of 1% as in the
benchmark endowment economy.
The time discount parameter β and the CRRA parameter σ are endogenously
calibrated to match an equilibrium risk free rate of 1% (equivalently, given the other
parameters discussed above, a capital-output ration of 3) and a median household
leverage of 61% in the benchmark economy. In order to simultaneously match these
targets we find that we need a much higher coefficient of relative risk aversion and a
much lower time discount rate. The calibrated parameters are (β, σ) = (0.893, 7.512).
In order to understand the intuition, increasing the value of σ has a two-fold effect
- first, it increases precautionary saving demand, helping to match a capital-output
of 3 (rather than zero, as in the endowment economy). However, the higher con-
temporaneous risk-aversion also makes households more willing to ”borrow-to-save”
because they value the increased insurance. Lowering the time discount factor then
allows us to then match the risk-free interest rate. For comparison we also report
results obtained for the production economy under the original, endowment economy,
preference specification with (β, σ) = (0.919, 3.912).
Quantitative Results with Physical Capital
The results of our experiment in the model with physical capital are presented in
Table ??. The main text contains a shortened version of this table in which only
results from the re-calibrated economy with capital are presented.
From the table we observe that the introduction of physical capital leaves the
results of the policy analysis qualitatively, and to a large extent quantitatively un-
changed if we re-calibrate the model to be consistent with the same targets as was
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Variable Baseline With Capital With Capital
(Recalibrated)
σ 3.912 3.912 7.512
β 0.919 0.919 0.893
% Sub 30bp 0bp 30bp 0bp 30bp 0bp
Median Leverage 61.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 61.5% 0.0%
rb 1.0% 0.518% 2.841% 2.840% 1.0% 0.676%
Sub/ȳ 0.97% 0% 0.006% 0% 0.96% 0%
Pl 0.0281 0.0278 0.0450 0.0450 0.0296 0.0294
GDP 1.150 1.151 1.430 1.430 1.585 1.587
H/GDP 4.633 4.737 2.491 2.491 3.332 3.404
M/GDP 2.810 0.269 0.012 0.0001 2.018 0.003
K/GDP 0.0 0.0 2.353 2.355 2.702 2.830
w 1 1 0.93 0.93 1 1.014
Default share 0.51% 0.41% 0.28% 0.15% 0.49% 0.30%
Mean Net Worth/GDP 4.633 4.737 4.844 4.846 6.034 6.234
Median Bond Share 60.7% 7.2% 48.8% 48.6% 72.2% 47.8%
µ (g′ > 0) 96.79% 96.66% 97.6% 97.6% 100% 100%
µ (g′ > h) 43.00% 39.77% 47.6% 48.2% 45.7% 45.9%
CEV ? 0 0.81% 0% 0.04% 0% 2.17%
the model without capital. Under the old calibration, but in the model with capital,
households save predominantly in riskless capital, the demand for riskless assets and
mortgages collapses and the equilibrium interest rate rises significantly (from 1% in
the model without capital to 2.8% in the model with capital). Median leverage, one
of the calibration targets falls from 61% in the benchmark model to zero in the model
with capital (both in the presence of the subsidy). Since the mortgage market almost
completely collapses the removal of the subsidy has essentially no effect on allocations
and welfare. We don’t think that the economy with capital, under the no-capital cal-
ibration, is a useful laboratory to analysis the hypothetical policy reform since it
results in the counterfactual absence of any meaningful mortgage market. And of
course, if there are no mortgages traded in equilibrium, a policy that subsidizes these
mortgages has no effect.
Therefore we would argue that, in order to assess the sensitivity of our benchmark
results to the inclusion of capital, one should re-calibrate the capital economy to be
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consistent with the same targets as the no-capital economy, and especially a risk-free
interest rate of 1% as well as a median leverage of 61%. As discussed above, in order
to induce households to borrow more (and saving households to save more) in the
model we have to make the precautionary savings motive more potent by increasing
the risk aversion and prudence parameter σ from 3.9 to 7.5. In addition, the required
discount factor β falls from 0.92 to 0.89. The changes in these parameters resurrect the
quantitative importance of the borrow to save motive and results in median leverage
equal to the empirical target of 61% as well as a risk free rate of 1%, as in the economy
without capital.
With this parameterization, both in terms of aggregate allocations, and specif-
ically the equilibrium allocation of mortgages, houses and financial assets, the tax
rate to finance the subsidy, and the rental price, as well as in terms of the welfare
consequences, the endowment economy and the re-calibrated economy with capital
display qualitatively, and to a large part quantitatively, the same consequences of a
removal of subsidy. The one quantitative exception are the welfare gains from the
removal of the subsidy, which are significantly larger in the economy with capital,
thus reinforcing the normative point we wish to make. The key difference to the
economy without capital is a larger value of the risk aversion (prudence) parameter
σ, which induces larger curvature in the utility and thus value function of households.
Thus a policy reform (such as the removal of the subsidy) that redistributes from
rich (high income and cash at hand) to poor households constitutes larger aggregate
welfare gains, under our utilitarian social welfare function.
B.3.2 The Economy with Housing Mutual Fund
Now, instead of introducing physical, suppose there exists a housing mutual fund that
can purchase an entire portfolio (with positive measure) of housing assets and thus
exploit the law of large numbers to perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic house price
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risk. Since the mutual fund is a risk-free asset it has to earn the same return rb as
risk-free bonds.
For each dollar invested, the mutual fund buys one unit of housing (recall that
the price of housing was normalized to 1), rents it out immediately at price Pl and
tomorrow sell the non-depreciated part (1 − E(δ)), again at price 1. Note the fact
that the mutual fund can perfectly diversify idiosyncratic depreciation risk explains
why a deterministic fraction 1−E(δ) of the fund’s housing stock depreciates. Implicit
in this discussion is that the mutual fund cannot default on part of its portfolio.
Equilibrium Rental Price
Thus the gross return of the fund’s investment strategy tomorrow is
(1 + rb)Pl + 1− E(δ)
which has to be equal to the return on bonds and capital, or
(1 + rb)Pl + 1− E(δ) = 1 + rb
and thus in the mutual fund economy the rental price is given by the user cost of
housing:
Pl =
rb + E(δ)
1 + rb
(B.44)
At this rental price the housing mutual fund is a perfect substitute for the risk-free
bond and thus the mutual fund is a redundant asset from the perspective of the house-
hold. Thus the existence of the mutual fund does not alter the household decision
problem¶, relative to the benchmark economy, but it pins down the equilibrium rental
price Pl in equation (B.44).
¶The risk-free asset position is now a composit of risk-free bonds and risk-free housing mutual funds,
both earning the same return.
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Asset Market Clearing Condition
The housing position of the housing mutual fund is then given by
M =
∫
h(s)dµ−
∫
g′(s)dµ
and the asset market clearing condition that determines the still endogenous risk-free
interest rate rb now reads as
Pb
∫
b′(s)dµ = M + (1 + rw + θ − φ)
∫
Pm(g
′,m′;φ)m′(s)dµ.
Note that in this economy households can still buy individual houses carrying
idiosyncratic risk using mortgages, and might opt to do so given the option-like mort-
gage cum foreclosure contract. But if in fact
∫
g′(s)dµ ≡ 0, this economy collapses
to one in which the entire housing stock is owned by the housing mutual fund, and
individual households have neither houses nor mortgages in their asset portfolio. Ta-
ble 2.4 shows that this is indeed what happens in the benchmark economy to a good
first approximation. As a consequence this economy cannot reproduce the empirically
observed median level or distribution of mortgage leverage in the economy, and the
removal of the mortgage subsidy is inconsequential for allocations and welfare.
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 3
C.1 Implementation of Iterative Two-Stage Estimator
The following is a brief description of the algorithm implementing our iterative two-
stage estimator.
1. Start with a guess for α, say α1.
2. At each iteration ξ, do the following:
(a) given αξ, for each p, construct υp,t = ∆xp,t − β (1− st) ∆xp,t+1 − αj∆bp,t.
Then, υp,t = λ
′
pFt is a pure factor model and can be estimated consistently
using principal components.∗
(b) Given the estimates for λp and Ft, estimate equation (3.14) via OLS and
update the guess to obtain αξ+1.
3. Repeat 2 until αξ converges.
†
∗The exposition of the estimator assumes that there are no missing observations. We use the generalized
procedure described in Bai (2009) and allow for missing observations.
†We have conducted a number of Monte Carlo simulations with sample sizes similar to our sample. The
estimator described here is found to converge to the true parameter. Results are available upon request.
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C.2 Inadmissibility of State Unemployment Differences in
Testing for Endogeneity
In this section we elucidate why controlling for the difference in state unemployment
does not constitute a valid exogeneity test. To illustrate our point, we simulate
data from our calibrated model where we impose exogeneity - i.e. we assume the
productivity processes at the county and state level are independent. In Figure C.1
we plot the time series for state unemployment, county unemployment and weeks of
benefits available. Notice that both state and county level unemployment are smooth
moving variables, whereas the weeks of benefits jumps when a benefit extension is
triggered on. The correlation between state and county unemployment is significantly
higher than between county unemployment and benefits, and controlling for state
unemployment completely takes out the effect of benefits. However, it is important
to note that the only channel through which the state economy affects the county
economy is through the benefit policy (because in this example the productivity
processes are orthogonal). Thus, controlling for state unemployment is not a valid
test for exogeneity.
C.3 County Economy, Detailed Specification
The law of motion for county employment is:
LCt+1(Ω
C
t ) = (1− δ)LCt + f(θCt )
(
1− LCt
)
. (C.1)
and uCt = 1− LCt .
Value Functions. The flow value for a firm employing a worker is
JCt (Ω
C
t ) = z
C
t − wCt + β (1− δ)EJt+1(ΩCt+1), (C.2)
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Figure C.1: County and State Unemployment: Model.
and the flow value of a vacant firm is:
V Ct (Ω
C
t ) = −k + βq
(
θCt
)
EJCt+1(ΩCt+1). (C.3)
The surplus for a firm employing a worker is thus JCt − V Ct .
The value functions for workers can be written as:
WCt (Ω
C
t ) = w
C
t + β (1− δ)EWCt+1 + βδ
(
1− et(ΩCt )
)
EUC,Et+1 (ΩCt+1)
+βδet(Ω
C
t )EU
C,I
t+1(Ω
C
t+1), (C.4)
UC,Et (Ω
C
t ) = h+ b+ βf
(
θCt
)
EWCt+1(ΩCt+1) + β
(
1− f
(
θCt
)) (
1− et(ΩCt )
)
EUC,Et+1 (ΩCt+1)
+β
(
1− f
(
θCt
))
et(Ω
C
t )EU
C,I
t+1(Ω
C
t+1), (C.5)
UC,It (Ω
C
t ) = h+ βf
(
θCt
)
EWt+1(ΩCt+1) + β
(
1− f
(
θCt
))
EUC,It+1(ΩCt+1). (C.6)
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Define the surplus of being employed as ∆C,Et = W
C
t − U
C,E
t . Also define the surplus
for an unemployed worker of being eligible: ΦCt = U
C,E
t − U
C,I
t . The laws of motion
for these quantities are:
∆C,Et (Ω
C
t ) = w
C
t − h− b+ β
(
1− δ − f
(
θCt
))
E∆C,Et+1 (ΩCt+1)
+β
(
1− δ − f
(
θCt
))
et(Ω
C
t )EΦCt+1(ΩCt+1), (C.7)
ΦCt (Ω
C
t ) = b+ β
(
1− f
(
θCt
)) (
1− et(ΩCt )
)
ΦCt+1(Ω
C
t+1). (C.8)
The wage is chosen to maximize:
(
∆C,Et
(
ΩSt
))ξ (
JCt
(
ΩSt
)
− V Ct
(
ΩSt
))1−ξ
. (C.9)
County Equilibrium Definition. Taking as given an initial condition ΩC0 , benefit
expiration policy, and the joint stochastic process for state productivity and unem-
ployment, we define an equilibrium given policy:
Definition Given a policy (b, et (·)) and an initial condition ΩC0 an equilibrium is a
sequence of ΩCt -measurable functions for wages wt, market tightness θ
C
t , employment
LCt , and value functions
{
WCt , U
C,E
t , U
C,I
t , J
C
t , V
C
t ,∆
C
t
}
such that:
1. The value functions satisfy the worker and firm Bellman equations (C.2), (C.3),
(C.4), (C.5), (C.6);
2. Free entry: The value V Ct of a vacant firm is zero for all Ω
C
t ;
3. Nash bargaining: The wage satisfies equation (C.9);
4. Law of motion for employment: The employment process satisfies (C.1);
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5. The joint process for
(
zSt , u
S
t
)
is consistent with the state equilibrium.
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C.4 Appendix Figures
Figure C.2: Map of U.S.A. with state and county outlines.
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Figure C.3: Unemployment benefit duration across U.S. states during the Great Recession.
Selected months.
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Appendix D
Appendices to Chapter 4
D.1 The Post-War US Unemployment Insurance System: An
Overview
By the late 1950s, most unemployment insurance systems in U.S. states offered 26
weeks of benefits to newly displaced workers. The deep recession of 1957-58, however,
prompted the federal government to lengthen the duration of benefits available. Under
the Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act (TUC), the federal government
offered interest free loans to states in order to provide up to 13 additional weeks of
benefits. Seventeen states opted to participate in the program, which lasted from
June of 1958 until June of 1959.
The first federally financed extension of unemployment benefits occurred during
the 1960-1961 recession. The federal government passed the Temporary Extended Un-
employment Compensation Act (TEUC). Whereas TUC was a voluntary program,
TEUC was mandatory for all states and provided up to 13 weeks of additional ben-
efits to unemployed workers from April 1961 until June 1962. The extra weeks of
benefits were entirely financed by the federal government (which raised the Federal
Unemployment Tax to offset the extensions).
Guided by TUC and TEUC, the federal government sought to develop an au-
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tomatic system of extending unemployment benefits during recessions. In 1970 the
Employment Security Amendments developed the Extended Benefits (EB) program,
which would provide additional weeks of benefits to states experiencing high un-
employment. The EB program is a state-federal partnership, with the costs of the
extended benefits shared equally between the state and federal government. The EB
program provided up to 13 weeks of additional benefits. The extended benefits can
be ”triggered” nationally when the unemployment rate crosses certain thresholds, or
triggered within individual states when the state-level unemployment crosses certain
thresholds.
Following the recession of 1969-1970, in addition to additional benefits provided
by the EB program, the federal government passed the Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1971 (EUCA) which provided for an additional 13 weeks of
benefits to states with high unemployment financed fully by the federal government.
Thus, unemployed workers could receive up to 52 weeks of benefits under the regular,
EB and EUCA programs∗. The EUCA provided benefits from January 1972 through
March 1973.
During the 1973-1975 recession, the federal government passed the Federal Sup-
plemental Benefits (FSB) program, which was in effect from January 1975 through
October 1977. The program initially provided for 13 weeks of additional benefits
financed from the federal government, but was amended to provide 26 weeks of ben-
efits in March 1975. The EB program triggered on nationwide from February 1975
through December 1977. Thus, from March 1975 through October 1977 displaced
workers could receive a total of 65 weeks of benefits (26 state + 13 EB + 26 FSB).
In 1980 and 1981, through the Omnibus Reconciliation Acts of those years, the
federal government altered the EB program. It eliminated the national trigger for
EB and raised the thresholds for the state level triggers. In addition, it imposed
∗The triggers under EUCA were different than under the EB program. Thus some states only qualified
for EB, others only for EUCA, and others for both EB and EUCA.
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stricter eligibility requirements for unemployed workers to receive benefits under the
EB program.
During the 1981-1982 recession, the federal government established the Federal
Supplemental Compensation (FSC) program in September of 1982. The tightening
of the EB program under the OBRA legislation made roughly half of states ineligible
to additional benefits under that program. FSC was amended several times from 1982
through early 1985. For the majority of the program duration, it provided up to 14
additional weeks of benefits financed by the federal government. Thus, the maximum
weeks of benefits that could be received were 53 (26 state + 13 EB + 14 FSC).
After the 1990-1991 recession, the federal government passed the Emergency Un-
employment Compensation (EUC) Act of 1991. The extension was amended several
times from 1991 through 1994 providing at various times an additional 20, 26, 33 or
15 additional weeks of benefits. The benefits were financed entirely by the federal
government. The maximum weeks of benefits that an individual could have received
was 72 (26 state + 13 EB + 33 EUC). In addition, the EB program was amended
to increase the maximum number of weeks payable. States with unemployment rates
above 8% would now receive 20 weeks of benefits instead of 13.
In March 2002, after the 2001 recession, the federal government passed the Tem-
porary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) act. The act provided up
to 26 additional weeks of federally financed unemployment benefits through March
of 2004. The maximum weeks of benefits that an individual could have received was
72 (26 state + 13 EB + 26 EUC).
During the 2007-2009, the federal government passed the Emergency Unemploy-
ment Compensation (EUC08) Act of 2008. The program initially provided up to 13
weeks of additional benefits financed by the federal government. The EUC08 has
been amended 8 times to day, gradually raising the maximum additional benefits
provided by the federal government to 53 weeks, making to total compensation that
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an unemployed worker could receive 99 weeks (26 state + 20 EB + 53 EUC08). The
program is currently set to expire at the end of 2013.
Beginning in the 1950s, federal unemployment benefit extensions in recessions
have become increasingly generous. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1, where we plot
the time path of maximum benefit duration from 1950 to 2011. In Figure 4.2 we
plot the time path of maximum benefit duration together with the time series for
aggregate labor productivity. This figure illustrates that, in the recessions following
the 1981-982 recession, benefit extensions were more likely to occur after productivity
had already begun to recover.
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Appendix E
Appendices to Chapter 5
E.1
E.1.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 1. First, observe that the necessary first-order conditions for optimal
search effort are
∆t =
c′
(
SEt
)
f (θt)
(E.1)
Ξt =
c′
(
SIt
)
f (θt)
(E.2)
Next, taking the differences of the workers’ value functions from equations (5.5), (5.6),
(5.7), we have
Wt − UEt = c
(
SEt
)
+
(
1− δ − SEt f (θt)
)
∆t
= c
(
SEt
)
+
(
1− δ − SEt f (θt)
) c′ (SEt )
f (θt)
(E.3)
Wt − U It = c
(
SIt
)
+
(
1− SIt f (θt)
)
Ξt
(
zt
)
− δ∆t
= c
(
SIt
)
+
(
1− SIt
(
zt
)
f (θt)
) c′ (SIt )
f (θt)
− δ
c′
(
SEt
)
f (θt (zt))
(E.4)
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Next, we rearrange the expressions for worker surpluses (5.8), (5.9) to get
∆t =u (wt)− u (h+ bt)
+ β (1− et)Et
(
Wt+1 − UEt+1
)
+ βetEt
(
Wt+1 − U It+1
)
(E.5)
Ξt =u (wt)− u (h) + βEt
(
Wt+1 − U It+1
)
(E.6)
Now, substituting (E.1) and (E.3) into the left and right hand sides of (E.5) gives
(5.14); similarly, substituting (E.2) and (E.4) into the left and right hand sides of
(E.6) gives (5.15).
Next, we derive the law of motion for the firm’s surplus from hiring. By the free-entry
condition, the value Vt (z
t) of a firm posting a vacancy must be zero. Equations (5.10)
and (5.11) then simplify to:
Jt = (1− δ) [zt − wt − τ + βEtJt+1] (E.7)
0 = −k + q (θt) [zt − wt − τ + βEtJt+1] (E.8)
which together imply
Jt = (1− δ)
k
q (θt)
(E.9)
Γt =
k
q (θt)
(E.10)
Equations (E.7) and (E.9) imply that Γt follows the law of motion Γt = zt−wt− τ +
β (1− δ)EtΓt+1, which, by (E.10), is precisely (5.16).
Finally, the first-order condition with respect to wt for the Nash bargaining problem
(5.13) is
ξu′ (wt) Γt = (1− ξ) ∆t (E.11)
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Substituting (E.10) and (E.1) into (E.11) and using the fact that f (θ) = θq (θ) yields
(5.17).
The converse of the result holds since the value functions can be recovered via the
corresponding Bellman equations.
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E.1.2 Solving for the Optimal Policy
The government is maximizing
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

Lt (z
t)u (wt (z
t)) +
(
Dt(zt)
1−et(zt)
)
u (h+ bt (z
t)) +
(
1− Lt (zt)−
Dt(zt)
1−et(zt)
)
u (h)
−Dt−1
(
zt−1
)
c
(
SEt (z
t)
)
−
(
1− Lt−1
(
zt−1
)
−Dt−1 (zt−1)
)
c
(
SIt (z
t)
)

(E.12)
subject to the conditions (5.2), (5.3), (5.14). (5.15),(5.16),(5.17) holding for all zt,
and subject to the government budget constraint (5.4).
Let π (zt) be the probability of history zt = {z0, z1, ..., zt} given the initial condition
z−1. Denote by η the Lagrange multiplier on (5.4), and denote the Lagrange mul-
tipliers on (5.2), (5.3), (5.14). (5.15),(5.16),(5.17) by βtπ (zt)λt (z
t) , βtπ (zt)αt (z
t) ,
βtπ (zt)µt (z
t) , βtπ (zt) νt (z
t) , βtπ (zt) γt (z
t) , βtπ (zt)φt (z
t) , respectively. In what
follows, we suppress the dependence on zt for notational simplicity. The first order
necessary conditions with respect to bt, et, wt, S
E
t , S
I
t , Lt, Dt, θt, respectively, are:
(Dt − (1− et)µt)u′ (h+ bt) = ηDt (E.13)
Dt [u (h+ bt)− u (h)− ηbt − αt] = µt (1− et)
[
u (h+ bt)− u (h)−
c′
(
SIt
)
− c′
(
SEt
)
f (θt)
]
(E.14)
γt = (Lt + µt + νt)u
′ (wt)− φtξu′′ (wt) kθt (E.15)
φt (ξ − 1) c′′
(
SEt
)
=Dt−1
[
(λt − αt) f (θt)− c′
(
SEt
)]
+
c′′
(
SEt
)
f (θt)
[
µt−1
(
(1− et−1)
(
1− SIt f (θt)
)
− δ
)
− µt − δνt−1
]
(E.16)
(1− Lt−1 −Dt−1)
[
c′
(
SIt
)
− λtf (θt)
]
=
c′′
(
SIt
)
f (θt)
[
(µt−1et−1 + νt−1)
(
1− SIt f (θt)
)
− νt
]
(E.17)
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λt = u (wt)− u (h) + ητ+
βEt
{
c
(
SIt+1
)
+ λt+1
(
1− δ − SIt+1f (θt+1)
)
+ αt+1δ
}
(E.18)
αt = u (h+ bt)− u (h)− ηbt
+ β (1− et)Et{c
(
SIt+1
)
− c
(
SEt+1
)
+ λt+1f (θt+1)
(
SEt+1 − SIt+1
)
+
αt+1
(
1− SEt+1f (θt+1)
)
} (E.19)
φtξu
′ (wt) k − f ′ (θt)
{
λt
[
SEt Dt−1 + S
I
t (1− Lt−1 −Dt−1)
]
− αtSEt Dt−1
}
−
[γt − (1− δ) γt−1]
kq′ (θt)
(q (θt))
2 = [µt − µt−1 (1− et−1 − δ) + νt−1δ]
c′
(
SEt
)
f ′ (θt)
(f (θt))
2 +
[νt − νt−1 − µt−1et−1]
c′
(
SIt
)
f ′ (θt)
(f (θt))
2 (E.20)
The first-order necessary condition for the optimal tax rate τ is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{ηLt
(
zt
)
− γt
(
zt
)
} = 0 (E.21)
To find the optimal policy given η and τ , we solve the above system of difference
equations (E.13)-(E.20) and (5.2), (5.3), (5.14). (5.15),(5.16),(5.17) for the optimal
policy vector
Ω
(
zt
)
= {bt
(
zt
)
, et
(
zt
)
, wt
(
zt
)
, SEt
(
zt
)
, SIt
(
zt
)
, θt
(
zt
)
, Lt
(
zt
)
, Dt
(
zt
)
,
λt
(
zt
)
, αt
(
zt
)
, µt
(
zt
)
, νt
(
zt
)
, γt
(
zt
)
, φt
(
zt
)
}
We then pick η and τ so that (5.4) and (E.21) are satisfied.
Observe that the only period-t− 1 variables that enter the period-t first-order condi-
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tions are
Lt−1, Dt−1, et−1, µt−1, νt−1, γt−1,
and no variables from periods prior to t− 1 enter the period-t first-order conditions.
This implies that (zt, Lt−1, Dt−1, et−1, µt−1, νt−1, γt−1) is a sufficient state variable for
the history of shocks zt up to and including period t. Specifically, fix η, τ , and let
(−) and (+) denote the previous period’s variable and the next period’s variable,
respectively. Let
Ψ : (z, L−, D−, e−, µ−, ν−γ−) 7→
(
b, e, w, SE, SI , L,D, θ, λ, α, µ, ν, γ, φ
)
be a function that satisfies
(D − (1− e)µ)u′ (h+ b) = ηD (E.22)
D [u (h+ b)− u (h)− ηb− α] = µ (1− e)
[
u (h+ b)− u (h)−
c′
(
SI
)
− c′
(
SE
)
f (θ)
]
(E.23)
γ = (L+ µ+ ν)u′ (w)− φξu′′ (w) kθ (E.24)
φ (ξ − 1) c′′
(
SE
)
=D−
[
(λ− α) f (θ)− c′
(
SE
)]
+
c′′
(
SE
)
f (θ)
[
µ−
(
(1− e−)
(
1− SIf (θ)
)
− δ
)
− µ− δν−
]
(E.25)
(1− L− −D−)
[
c′
(
SI
)
− λf (θ)
]
=
c′′
(
SI
)
f (θ)
[
(µ−e− + ν−)
(
1− SIf (θ)
)
− ν
]
(E.26)
λ = u (w)− u (h) + ητ + βE
{
c
(
SI+
)
+ λ+
(
1− δ − SI+f (θ+)
)
+ α+δ
}
(E.27)
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α = u (h+ b)− u (h)− ηb
+ β (1− e)E
{
c
(
SI+
)
− c
(
SE+
)
+ λ+f (θ+)
(
SE+ − SI+
)
+ α+
(
1− SE+f (θ+)
)}
(E.28)
φξu′ (w) k − f ′ (θ)
{
λ
[
SED− + S
I (1− L− −D−)
]
− αSED−
}
− [γ − (1− δ) γ−]
kq′ (θ)
(q (θ))2
= [µ− µ− (1− e− − δ) + ν−δ]
c′
(
SE
)
f ′ (θ)
(f (θ))2
+ [ν − ν− − µ−e−]
c′
(
SI
)
f ′ (θ)
(f (θ))2
(E.29)
as well as
L = (1− δ)L− + f (θ)
[
SED− + S
I (1− L− −D−)
]
D = (1− e) [δL− + (1− sf (θ))D−] (E.30)
c′
(
SE
)
f (θ)
=u (w)− u (h+ b) + (1− e) βE
(
c
(
SE+
)
+
(
1− δ − SE+f (θ+)
) c′ (SE+)
f (θ+)
)
+ eβE
(
c
(
SI+
)
+
(
1− SI+f (θ+)
) c′ (SI+)
f (θ+)
− δ
c′
(
SI+
)
f (θ+)
)
(E.31)
c′
(
SI
)
f (θ)
=u (w)− u (h) + βE
(
c
(
SI+
)
+
(
1− SI+f (θ+)
) c′ (SI+)
f (θ)
− δ
c′
(
SE+
)
f (θ+)
)
(E.32)
k
q (θ)
= z − w − τ + β (1− δ)E k
q (θ+)
(E.33)
ξu′ (w) kθ = (1− ξ) c′
(
SE
)
(E.34)
Then the sequence defined by
Ω
(
zt
)
= Ψ
(
zt, Lt−1
(
zt−1
)
, Dt−1
(
zt−1
)
, et−1
(
zt−1
)
, µt−1
(
zt−1
)
, νt−1
(
zt−1
)
, γt−1
(
zt−1
))
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satisfies the system (E.13)-(E.20) and (5.2), (5.3), (5.14). (5.15),(5.16),(5.17).
To find the optimal policy given η, we therefore solve the system of functional equa-
tions (E.22)-(E.34).
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E.2 Supplementary Appendix
E.2.1 The Steady State Equations for the Optimal Policy
The steady-state versions of the equations characterizing the optimal policy are as
follows:
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for b:
(D − (1− e)µ)u′ (h+ b) = ηD (E.35)
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for e:
D [u (h+ b)− u (h)− ηb− α] = µ (1− e)
[
u (h+ b)− u (h)−
c′
(
SI
)
− c′
(
SE
)
f (θ)
]
(E.36)
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for w:
γ = (L+ µ+ ν)u′ (w)− φξu′′ (w) kθ (E.37)
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for SE:
φ (ξ − 1) c′′
(
SE
)
=D
[
(λ− α) f (θ)− c′
(
SE
)]
+
c′′
(
SE
)
f (θ)
[
µ
(
(1− e)
(
1− SIf (θ)
)
− δ − 1
)
− δν
]
(E.38)
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for SI :
(1− L−D)
[
c′
(
SI
)
− λf (θ)
]
=
c′′
(
SI
)
f (θ)
[
(µe+ ν)
(
1− SIf (θ)
)
− ν
]
(E.39)
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The steady-state version of the first-order condition for L:
λ =
u (w)− u (h) + ητ + β
{
c
(
SI
)
+ αδ
}
1− β (1− δ − SIf (θ))
(E.40)
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for D:
α =
u (h+ b)− u (h)− ηb+ β (1− e)
{
c
(
SI
)
− c
(
SE
)
+ λf (θ)
(
SE − SI
)}
1− β (1− e) (1− SEf (θ))
(E.41)
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for θ:
φξu′ (w) k − f ′ (θ)
{
λ
[
SED + SI (1− L−D)
]
− αSED
}
− δγ kq
′ (θ)
(q (θ))2
= [µ (e+ δ) + νδ]
c′
(
SE
)
f ′ (θ)
(f (θ))2
− µe
c′
(
SI
)
f ′ (θ)
(f (θ))2
(E.42)
The steady-state version of the first-order condition for τ :
ηL = γ (E.43)
The steady state government budget constraint:
Lτ =
D
1− e
b (E.44)
The steady-state equation for employment, L:
δL = f (θ)
[
SED + SI (1− L−D)
]
(E.45)
The steady-state equation for the measure of eligible unemployed workers, D:
D =
δL (1− e)
1− (1− SEf (θ)) (1− e)
(E.46)
The steady-state version of the optimal search condition for eligible unemployed
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workers:
c′
(
SE
)
f (θ)
=u (w)− u (h+ b) + (1− e) β
(
c
(
SE
)
+
(
1− δ − SEf (θ)
) c′ (SE)
f (θ)
)
+ eβ
(
c
(
SI
)
+
(
1− SIf (θ)
) c′ (SI)
f (θ)
− δ
c′
(
SI
)
f (θ)
)
(E.47)
The steady-state version of the optimal search condition for the ineligible unem-
ployed:
c′
(
SI
)
f (θ)
=u (w)− u (h) + β
(
c
(
SI
)
+
(
1− SIf (θ)
) c′ (SI)
f (θ)
− δ
c′
(
SE
)
f (θ)
)
(E.48)
The steady-state version of the firm free entry condition:
k
q (θ)
=
z − w − τ
1− β (1− δ)
(E.49)
The steady-state Nash bargaining equation:
ξu′ (w) kθ = (1− ξ) c′
(
SE
)
(E.50)
E.2.2 Derivation for the Analysis of Section 5.4.2
We want to derive the bargaining power ξ such that, in steady state, the optimal
tax and benefit level is zero, in the model where benefits do not expire. We set
b = e = τ = 0 in the system of equations (E.35-E.50). We also set D = 1 − L
and SI = SE (since benefits do not expire, all unemployed workers are eligible for
benefits). We can drop the government budget constraint (E.44). Since benefits do
not expire, we also drop equation (E.36) (first-order condition for e), equation (E.39)
(first-order condition for SI , equation (E.41) (first-order condition for the measure
of eligible workers), equation (E.46) (the law of motion for the measure of eligible
workers), and equation (E.48) (the optimal search condition for workers ineligible for
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benefits). These equations are meaningless if benefits do not expire. For the same
reason, we also set the multipliers α (on the law of motion for D) and ν (on the
optimal search condition for the ineligible) to zero. This leaves 10 equations: (E.35),
(E.37), (E.38), (E.40), (E.42), (E.43), (E.45), (E.47), (E.49), (E.50), which we solve
for 10 unknowns: w, SE, θ, L, µ, γ, φ, λ, η, and ξ. We obtain ξ = 0.72. This number
is the value of the bargaining power such that, in the model without expiration, the
optimal benefit level and tax would be zero (taking as given the values of the other
parameters). It is the closest analogue to the Hosios condition in our model.
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